Kosovo and The Myth of Multi-Ethnic Democracy

As I noted a few months ago, tongues will wag while waiting on the ICJ. While there has been some overall drift in the rhetoric – everyone seems to be suggesting now that the Court decision will open an opportunity for further talks – obfuscation and silliness continue, especially from the pro-Pristina side. The Kosovo government remains most agile, now maintaining – through its Interior Minister – that it is against partition and that the local structures in north Kosovo are illegal but also that the Ahtisaari plan will provide a better form of local self-government for the Serbs. The British Ambassador to Belgrade continues to rail at straw men, repeating that can be no negotiations because no one can believe that Kosovo could return to Serbian control. (Who is asking that it should? Not Belgrade.) Rather, he says, Serbia must find a way to deal with the “fact” that “22 EU member-states” have recognized Kosovo. He also maintains that “nobody” sees partition as a good solution. Meanwhile, EU/ICO chief Pieter Feith continues to speak for humanity on Kosovo. He has now declared that the questions of status “will not be opened for discussions again” and that partition “is not an option.” He suggests too that “certain red lines … should be kept in mind” and Serbian “parallel institutions” in Kosovo are “unsustainable” and “represent an obstacle in … arrival at the final destination, and that is Brussels.”

If one were to give any benefit of doubt at all to the continued Quint insistence that the question of Kosovo’s status is closed, we must consider the only argument that might make this credible, that Kosovo can become a truly multi-ethnic democracy. Interior Minister Rexhepi, a quick learner, refers to this argument – long touted by the Quint itself – that Serb agreement to be integrated into independent Kosovo under the Ahtisaari Plan will make Kosovo into such a model. This would, so the line goes, be not only good for the Serbs but also for the whole Balkans as it would avoid partition and thus setting a bad example for places like Bosnia (which Rexhepi explicitly refers to). The problems with this are two: Kosovo itself is an ethnic partition as well as over 90% of the populations is Albanian at this point. And the existence of a truly multi-ethnic democracy is a largely a myth.

To take the second point, the myth: One must first make the distinction between societies that are made up of various ethnic groups that are assimilated or seek assimilation into the dominant culture and language and those that are made up of groups each with their own culture and language that they wish to retain. There are multi-ethnic democracies of the assimilation type, the U.S. and Brazil are prime examples. They are large and populous countries in which a tapestry of ethnic groups mainly resulted from immigration and voluntary assimilation into the dominant culture and language. Racism and discrimination against native peoples may remain an issue in such places but there are not warring tribes or clashing nations. Russia may also be considered an example.

The second group of possible candidates for “multi-ethnic” democracy are those that start with a tribal base, made from peoples defining themselves as nations and inhabiting a place they feel is their homeland. This is a small but not insignificant set. It includes successor and remnant states of former multi-national empires – such as Romania and Serbia – that have found ways to accommodate minority populations within a democratic framework. But this remains very much a work in progress in Eastern Europe and very uncertain in former Ottoman areas of the Mid-east.

The UK is in this second group and has had hundreds of years to form a union of the Anglo-Saxons and Celts. But this, somewhat surprisingly, also remains a work-in-progress with experiments of devolution still underway. South Africa is a possible contender. Non-black Africans account for around 20% of the population and on both sides of that marker, there are varied and many tribal groupings. It seems to be a working multi-racial, multi-national democracy. But the current configuration was not imposed by anyone but rather agreed through negotiations. The post-apartheid regime came out of a negotiated settlement between the white regime and the ANC in which both sides accepted the compromises that now seem to work so well the “transitional” may have become permanent. India is a large multi-ethnic democracy that is not based on assimilation nor made up of immigrants. But the religious divide is fundamental and no one ethnic group – defined by language – has a majority. India is so huge, diverse and spread out that it is perhaps only democracy that can hold the place together. In any case, former British India has already been partitioned twice.

Perhaps if one looks at Iraq, one can also add a third category of where enough U.S. troops remain to enforce cohabitation (in this case between Arabs and Kurds.) And I’ve left Belgium for last. It is a functioning, modern multi-national democracy with two large national groups – the Flemish and Walloons – co-habiting in the heart of Europe. But of course, at this moment, it would be quite optimistic to use this as an example of how such arrangements can be sustainable.

Multi-national democracy as applicable to Kosovo is a myth. There are examples of where it seems to be working but these have been forced by circumstances or have resulted from negotiated, compromise settlements. If a true multi-national Kosovo is to be established within the Yugoslavia-era boundaries, it too will have to be the result of a negotiated agreement including compromises by both sides. Whatever else one may say about the possibility of sustained multi-national democracy, one cannot credibly argue it can be imposed.