Diplomacy often takes place behind "smoke and mirrors" meant to hide – until the time is right – that people are talking to each other about things they'd rather deny they were talking about. This may be accompanied by “trial balloons” – statements about possibilities that test the waters but also allow denial – verbal feints, and even lies and intentional misdirection. But usually, where there is smoke, there is fire. This may well be true about the current flap about whether there is or is not the possibility of negotiations on some form of special status for northern Kosovo.
The American's tough talk about terrorism from the north, and apparent support for Pristina's supposed efforts to impose its rule there, may have been part of the “smoke” covering something more interesting. They have apparently prevailed upon the Kosovo government to postpone its forced takeover of the northern KPS. This would have incited violence and might have foreclosed any opportunity for negotiations. Negotiations about what? As the US Ambassador reportedly suggested, about a settlement for the north offering it the “special nature of a region within a sovereign state” of Kosovo. The Ambassador suggested Prime Minister Thaci might share such a view. There have been denials and questions in Pristina but the balloon has been launched.
The possibility of some Ahtisaari-Plus status for the north is not a new idea. Nor is the possibility that it might be framed politically by some agreement to disagree on Kosovo status. (Each side could claim sovereignty of the whole of Kosovo while the north would be part of both perhaps on the Brcko model.) The devil would be in the details as the northern Serbs are unlikely to trust any practical arrangements for local government or linkages to Serbia that would be under Pristina's control. There probably would have to be some international involvement as intermediaries or facilitators. But these are things that could be talked about. President Tadić would be willing as he would probably trade anything he could – including the Presevo Valley – to put the Kosovo issue behind him. If the Albanians hesitate, the US could do it for them, as indeed the Ambassador apparently has already done. (There may have already been such talks, direct or indirect, as Pristina sources seem to suggest that Belgrade has neither accepted or rejected the proposal.)
Right now, the Quint is putting pressure on Belgrade to avoid a September fight in the UN General Assembly over any resolution calling for new negotiations. The possibility of an arrangement on the north going beyond Ahtisaari has been broached. If everyone holds their fire – especially on the Albanian side – then perhaps behind smoke and mirrors a way could be found to agree on a formulation for talks on how a political settlement for the north could be achieved?
Seeing you call this Ahtisaari Plus doesn't bode well for me. The Ahtisaari negotiations were started after Albanian violence (march 2004). They were meant to offer Serbia a face saving way to recognize Kosovo but they were so stacked with pro-Albanian preconditions that they were doomed from the beginning. In the end we got the unilateral Ahtisaari Plan that looked nice on paper but ignored many of the issues that were important for the Serbs and would have been present in any negotiated solution (refugee returns, speeding up of property dispute resolution, connection with the Serbian education system, cheap access to Serbian phone system, etc.).
ReplyDeleteNow this Ahtisaari Plus seems again a reward for Albanian violence and the threat of more. The Kosovo Albanian political scene may be favorable for a solution: with Haradinaj in The Hague and Limaj under investigation Thaci is virtually unopposed. But there is still the Kosovo public opinion that has been told for years by US and EU diplomats that their case is solid and they don't need to compromise.
If I heared US diplomats criticizing Kosovo for the lack of refugee returns or some minority rights issue I would believe they were preparing the public for some concessions. Now I just expect an "Ahtisaari-Plus": some nice looking regional autonomy proposal that ignores crucial issues like control of the judicial system, access of special police to nortern Kosovo and control over the return of Albanian refugees to the north. Just like Ahtisaari it would be a "face saving" device for Serbia to recognize Kosovo that - when it is rejected - will be used to convince other countries that we tried but those stubborn Serbs didn't listen.
I think the Ahtisaari Plan is a solid "first draft" but also needs important details further specified. It remains, in my view, the best approach for the Serbs south of the Ibar. Unfortunately, the ICO has not played its role in addressing these details.
ReplyDeleteFor the north, I use the term Ahtisaari-Plus to simply mean something going beyond that plan. The details of "beyond" would presumably be worked out through renewed negotiations.