Kosovo: The ICG Comes to Ground on the North

To my recollection, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has never favored the use of force to settle the status of Serbs in Kosovo, including those in the north. But since the UDI, ICG has supported Kosovo institutions and called on Kosovo Serbs to accept independence and participate in those institutions. But now ICG is suggesting Belgrade and Pristina should consider autonomy for the north (and without putting it in the context of a territory exchange as ICG did last August). ICG recommends that Belgrade and Pristina should meanwhile use the current talks to “seek flexible, interim solutions to improve law enforcement, customs collection, and allocation of financial aid in the North.”

The new ICG report notes that despite dissatisfaction with local “corruption…and cronyism,” the northern Serbs remain “unlikely to embrace Pristina.” According to ICG, “northern hostility to Pristina is deeper than the status dispute” and Serbs “overwhelmingly reject” integration into Kosovo. ICG notes that “months of interviews across the political spectrum found no Serbs who favored...acceptance of Kosovo sovereignty and participation in its institutions.” While many Albanians and their international supporters blame Belgrade (for the money and protection given to the northerners), the northern Serbs are not being held back from embracing Pristina because they have no interest anyway in becoming part of Kosovo. The northerners believe life is better on their side of the Ibar and do not trust the Albanians to not discriminate against them if given the chance. ICG reports in some details how northern resistance led to the unraveling of the EU/ICO's “northern strategy” and lack of progress in USAID's effort to win support through offering money.

Contrary to the internationals who point to the increasing integration of the southern Kosovo Serbs, ICG believes that those in the south had “little long-term alternative to integration.” ICG suggests that the international supporters of Kosovo independence feel impelled to bring the north under Pristina's control because for the last ten years they have promised the Albanians they would and because they fear the threat of regional instability if partition is allowed.

The ICG warns that there is little room for peaceful Albanian returns to the north. It notes too that efforts to weaken the northern Serb-majority KPS and to bring them closer to Pristina's control are counter-productive as they serve to “weaken police credibility and increase suspicions they are disloyal to their people.” The ICG warns that the “tug of war” between Belgrade and Pristina over the northern police subordinates rule of law to politics. (Note: Kosovo's Interior Minister has announced dismissal of the former Serb commander of KPS in north Mitrovica. This officer sought to walk the line of providing professional policing while not running afoul of his community. His removal and now firing for political reasons sends a message to the northern KPS that it is better to keep your head down and do nothing. EULEX should order the captain's reinstatement.)

The ICJ criticizes Pristina and friends' “insistence...that the Mitrovica court can only fully function after Serbs accept its authority in the North,” and charges that this “adversely affects Kosovo Albanians in the south and undermines the sense that rule of law is the priority." According to ICJ, delaying the court's functioning “pending installation of the disputed district court on the north bank…cripples prosecutions on both banks, allowing criminals to operate with impunity.” ICG notes that while the north has been alleged to be a high crime area, it is “largely peaceful” with crime rates “generally low” outside Mitrovica and in north Mitrovica only slightly above those elsewhere in Kosovo. While the north's unsettled political and legal situation does allow smuggling, ICG concludes that seeking to “implement Kosovo customs and thus reinforce Kosovo sovereignty....would provoke strong, probably violent Northern reaction, against not only KP agents at the gates but also EULEX itself.” ICJ supports an “interim” approach such as “an internationally managed escrow account to hold customs revenue pending final agreement” and adds that focusing on cross-Ibar trade would be better then seeking to impose customs and excise taxes on household goods used in the North.

The ICG concludes that efforts to suppress Serbian institutions in the north and replace them with Pristina's “would make the North’s governance troubles worse....because Serbian institutions...are broadly supported by the local population and do real work.” Also, “pressing forward with integration, with the justification that it responds to Northerners’ real need for good government and the rule of law, would be a hollow policy that would push the area deeper into anarchy.” The EU's rule of law efforts “require clearly separating these tasks from the broader status question.”

The nub of the problem is the north's status and, according to the ICJ, the north “will not accept Pristina’s authority peacefully, and neither Pristina nor the international community has articulated a persuasive rationale to convince them to integrate or even accept broad autonomy within Kosovo.” Continuing the status quo in the north “is the most likely and least bad” option, barring a currently less likely agreement to offer “greater autonomy for the North inside Kosovo.”

Well put ICG. Hopefully Washington and Brussels are listening closely.