Kosovo: Is There Anyone at the Wheel?

The talks between Belgrade and Pristina are due to continue next week. Meanwhile, Pristina has been transfixed by the collapse of the presidency and its quick re-emergence, reportedly under the guiding hand of the US ambassador. It seems the US is serious about maintaining political stability in Kosovo, at least the part south of the Ibar.

North of the Ibar, it seems rather quiet just now. This despite the view expressed by KFOR's Commanding General in an April 1 speech in Pristina that “in the north there are still tensions and a potential of violence” caused by a “weakness of rule of law' that “can only be remedied when EULEX and the local police are enabled to operate.” The General added that “KFOR is working hard with both EULEX and KP to create the conditions for this.” Whether this means that KFOR and EULEX are supporting the local Serb-majority KPS in the north or the Kosovo Albanian police seeking to infiltrate from the south is not immediately apparent. But one can guess.

Meanwhile, USAID's plans for unilaterally injecting its funds and projects into the north in support of Kosovo's Ministry of Local Government, the Ahtisaari Plan and the ICO's municipal preparatory team are proceeding. Local officials in the north – while appreciative of how the projects could help their communities – seem ready to reject them because of the attached political baggage. The political conditions for the US aid are hard to miss as the tender documents explicitly state that the projects are “crucial” in making “Mitrovica North accept the new reality and integrate into the Kosovar society.”

The EU has placed another marker of sorts in the north with the announcement on April 6 of a new “information point” in north Mitrovica. This IP will help “explain what the EU is about and how all citizens can benefit from the prospect of integration.” Presumably, being more subtle than the Americans, they meant this to be taken as “integration” into Europe and not necessarily into “Kosovar society.”

The Serb side – and most recently President Tadić while visiting Paris – continues to suggest optimism about the talks and an eventual “historical compromise.” But compromises will depend on the Quint being ready to accept such outcomes. And nothing they are saying these days suggests they are. Instead, there is still talk about insecurity in the north requiring imposition of Pristina's rule of law and efforts to buy their way into the hearts and minds of the northerners. Does the Quint have anything beyond this? Does anyone have a strategic sense of how to bring this continuing conflict over Kosovo's north to a peaceful conclusion? Or is it just the final moments till a driver-less bus hits a dead-end?