In late 2005, after being in Kosovo for a few months, I sent a report – entitled “Strategic Thoughts” – to UNMIK HQ in Pristina. It drew two conclusions: that the Kosovo Albanians could not be kept from having their own independent state and that the northern Kosovo Serbs would never accept being incorporated into it.
In that paper, I argued that “Serbs in the north will not accept direct rule from Pristina or by any 'Albanian' institutions. They would simply 'opt out' of Kosovo since they are, functionally, still part of and contiguous to Serbia. Any attempt to impose such an outcome, sanctioned by Belgrade or not, could lead to some form of mass exodus and/or an effort to resist, including perhaps through partition and violence.”
Looking forward, I suggested that “the final status for northern Kosovo (the region including the three northern municipalities plus Mitrovica North) hopefully will be the result of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. However, from looking at the limited universe of successful (and unsuccessful) negotiations of tribal and ethnic conflict elsewhere, it seems that substantial local autonomy for the northern Kosovo municipalities would be an essential element of a stable and peaceful final settlement. This means K-Serbs in the north would essentially govern themselves within the context of the existing municipal governments and within an overall, Kosovo-wide decentralized political structure with some form of protected participation in national institutions…. The international community could not expect to integrate northern and southern structures if the idea is to ensure full compliance of the northern municipalities with Pristina. If we try, we will likely get nowhere and could instead contribute to a hardening of approaches on both sides. If our aim is instead to increase cooperation between northern municipalities and PISG, we may be able to achieve modest results if we focus on practical issues as free from politics as possible. But we will need more flexibility from K-Albanians, some degree of acceptance from Belgrade, and focused efforts from UNMIK to engage all significant K-Serb actors....We cannot dismantle parallel structures and ought not try. No matter what, these structures will remain in place because the K-Serbs require them in order to continue to function as a community.”
I recommended that UNMIK's strategic objective should be to “deliver a stable, peaceful and functioning community of four municipalities to a final overall political settlement,” and that our tactics should be dialogue with all parties.
It may be that those more influential than I have finally come to the same conclusion, as witnessed by the most recent ICG report, which recognizes that the north's rejection of Pristina is unlikely to change and that any attempt to alter the situation through use of force would only make things worse. The EU now appears to be looking to the ongoing discussions between Belgrade and Pristina to begin the process of putting "practical" issues into a sustainable context that preserves Kosovo's territorial integrity while recognizing the reality that the north will remain, for some time, functionally part of Serbia.
Solutions to “practical problems” will need to be status neutral to be acceptable to the northern Serbs and to Belgrade (especially as elections loom). The Kosovo Albanians may seek to avoid such outcomes by threatening to end the talks or by refusing to moderate their demands. The Quint may have to press Pristina to stay engaged and to accept compromise. The Albanians may also seek to provoke both the northern Serbs and EULEX/KFOR into a crisis that allows the use of force. But my guess is that the Europeans will not get sucked into the use of violence for purely political objectives in the north. The Albanians will not go beyond prodding on the edges without international backing – on the ground – for broad intervention.
So it seems now that the odds of renewed violence in and over the north is more remote than it was just a year ago, when the Americans were pushing the ill-fated “northern strategy.” The EU seems to have taken the lead now and is reportedly even considering separating the roles of EUSR and head of the ICO, both now occupied by Pieter Feith. The Serb majority of the north has preserved its freedom just as the Albanians have seized theirs. What is left now is to allow time for political agreements to be reached step-by-step. The process may be a long one, but achieving a sustainable peace requires wisdom and patience, especially from the peacekeepers.
I have been blogging in this space about Kosovo for two years now. In this, as in my time as UNMIK Regional Representative in Mitrovica, I have tried to help focus attention on the requirements of peacekeeping and to expose the dangers of use of force. My objective was always to help deliver a stable, peaceful and functioning community of four municipalities to a final overall political settlement. By this time, I think that process is finally on firm footing. I do not believe there is much more I can contribute by commenting from outside the walls. So this is my last blog in this space. Time for me to move on.
To those who have followed me here, I hope I have been of some assistance in reaching a useful understanding of events. To those colleagues in UNMIK Mitrovica, I express my deepest respect for your continuing peacekeeping when few others gave you any support. I remain proud to have served with you. To the people of Serbia and Kosovo, of all ethnic groups, I hope you get the political leaders you deserve to lead you all forward into the Europe of the 21st Century. To the people of north Kosovo, I applaud your peaceful resistance to efforts to take away your freedom and I urge you to always keep your actions peaceful. Your efforts put you in the same category as those who have risen up elsewhere – most recently in places such as Egypt and Tunisia – and deserve the same respect. To those I have angered or disappointed, it was never my intention.
Over and out.
In that paper, I argued that “Serbs in the north will not accept direct rule from Pristina or by any 'Albanian' institutions. They would simply 'opt out' of Kosovo since they are, functionally, still part of and contiguous to Serbia. Any attempt to impose such an outcome, sanctioned by Belgrade or not, could lead to some form of mass exodus and/or an effort to resist, including perhaps through partition and violence.”
Looking forward, I suggested that “the final status for northern Kosovo (the region including the three northern municipalities plus Mitrovica North) hopefully will be the result of negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. However, from looking at the limited universe of successful (and unsuccessful) negotiations of tribal and ethnic conflict elsewhere, it seems that substantial local autonomy for the northern Kosovo municipalities would be an essential element of a stable and peaceful final settlement. This means K-Serbs in the north would essentially govern themselves within the context of the existing municipal governments and within an overall, Kosovo-wide decentralized political structure with some form of protected participation in national institutions…. The international community could not expect to integrate northern and southern structures if the idea is to ensure full compliance of the northern municipalities with Pristina. If we try, we will likely get nowhere and could instead contribute to a hardening of approaches on both sides. If our aim is instead to increase cooperation between northern municipalities and PISG, we may be able to achieve modest results if we focus on practical issues as free from politics as possible. But we will need more flexibility from K-Albanians, some degree of acceptance from Belgrade, and focused efforts from UNMIK to engage all significant K-Serb actors....We cannot dismantle parallel structures and ought not try. No matter what, these structures will remain in place because the K-Serbs require them in order to continue to function as a community.”
I recommended that UNMIK's strategic objective should be to “deliver a stable, peaceful and functioning community of four municipalities to a final overall political settlement,” and that our tactics should be dialogue with all parties.
It may be that those more influential than I have finally come to the same conclusion, as witnessed by the most recent ICG report, which recognizes that the north's rejection of Pristina is unlikely to change and that any attempt to alter the situation through use of force would only make things worse. The EU now appears to be looking to the ongoing discussions between Belgrade and Pristina to begin the process of putting "practical" issues into a sustainable context that preserves Kosovo's territorial integrity while recognizing the reality that the north will remain, for some time, functionally part of Serbia.
Solutions to “practical problems” will need to be status neutral to be acceptable to the northern Serbs and to Belgrade (especially as elections loom). The Kosovo Albanians may seek to avoid such outcomes by threatening to end the talks or by refusing to moderate their demands. The Quint may have to press Pristina to stay engaged and to accept compromise. The Albanians may also seek to provoke both the northern Serbs and EULEX/KFOR into a crisis that allows the use of force. But my guess is that the Europeans will not get sucked into the use of violence for purely political objectives in the north. The Albanians will not go beyond prodding on the edges without international backing – on the ground – for broad intervention.
So it seems now that the odds of renewed violence in and over the north is more remote than it was just a year ago, when the Americans were pushing the ill-fated “northern strategy.” The EU seems to have taken the lead now and is reportedly even considering separating the roles of EUSR and head of the ICO, both now occupied by Pieter Feith. The Serb majority of the north has preserved its freedom just as the Albanians have seized theirs. What is left now is to allow time for political agreements to be reached step-by-step. The process may be a long one, but achieving a sustainable peace requires wisdom and patience, especially from the peacekeepers.
I have been blogging in this space about Kosovo for two years now. In this, as in my time as UNMIK Regional Representative in Mitrovica, I have tried to help focus attention on the requirements of peacekeeping and to expose the dangers of use of force. My objective was always to help deliver a stable, peaceful and functioning community of four municipalities to a final overall political settlement. By this time, I think that process is finally on firm footing. I do not believe there is much more I can contribute by commenting from outside the walls. So this is my last blog in this space. Time for me to move on.
To those who have followed me here, I hope I have been of some assistance in reaching a useful understanding of events. To those colleagues in UNMIK Mitrovica, I express my deepest respect for your continuing peacekeeping when few others gave you any support. I remain proud to have served with you. To the people of Serbia and Kosovo, of all ethnic groups, I hope you get the political leaders you deserve to lead you all forward into the Europe of the 21st Century. To the people of north Kosovo, I applaud your peaceful resistance to efforts to take away your freedom and I urge you to always keep your actions peaceful. Your efforts put you in the same category as those who have risen up elsewhere – most recently in places such as Egypt and Tunisia – and deserve the same respect. To those I have angered or disappointed, it was never my intention.
Over and out.
Note: This blog will remain online for some period of time to serve as a record of recent events and so that anyone contemplating something foolish on the ground can never say they were not warned of their folly.
Thank You very much for sharing your views with us.
ReplyDeleteDamir
I will miss your blog!!
ReplyDeleteThank you for your commitment to a stable and peaceful final settlement for Kosovo. I valued your insightful comments, your detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground and your feeling for the diplomatic processes.
ReplyDeleteYou conclude that the process is on a firm footing and you seem optimistic for a solution, although you mention that it may take a long time. I sincerely hope the situation will indeed develop as you expect.
It was nice to occassionally share thoughts on our blogs. I hope to meet you again in cyberspace.