Seems the text I posted yesterday of the new Pristina-Belgrade "agreement" on the crossing points and customs is indeed the official version. After further review, it does appear more like an agreed framework for further elaboration rather than an immediately implementable mechanism. It also appears to offer the possibility of being the status neutral approach claimed by the Serbian government. Important details need to be fleshed out but judgement might be profitably withheld while clarifications are offered and developed.
Everyone will have to make up their own minds and hopefully, the EU, KFOR and Belgrade will exercise some patience as those in the north are given an opportunity to hear clarifications and to consider. Here follows my own comments on the various sections:
IBM (fn1) Agreed Conclusions
1. In line with the Lisbon Treaty, and relevant EU legislation (fn2) and given that both parties are part of the EU's Western Balkans agenda, they will be required gradually to harmonise their legislation with the EU acquis and in particular to apply the concept of IBM; This is an admirable goal as coming into EU compliance would be good for everyone. Note the term "gradually." This might take years depending on what the EU does to offer relevant benefits to Serbia and Kosovo.
2. In the interest of faster and more effective processing, the parties, under the overall guidance of the EU, will apply the concept of IBM; Consistent with #1, applying the "concept" of IBM would seem to offer leeway for actual implementation over time.
3. The parties intend gradually to set up joint integrated posts at all their common IBM crossing points. This cooperation will follow the best European practice as it is progressively further developed by the European Commission. The work will be given a high priority; the projects will be identified jointly and will be implemented as soon as practically possible; This says the two sides will give "priority" to implementing the joint posts "as soon as practically possible." I.e., no deadline and as practical. Affecting practicality might well be events on the ground including how far the northern Kosovo Serbs cooperate. I.e., presumably taking into account the fact that even should they take down the barricades, they could always put them back again so nothing can be done until they agree?
4. The joint, integrated, single and secure posts will be located within a 'common area of IBM crossing points', jointly delineated, where officials of each party carry out relevant controls. Exceptionally, and limited to the common IBM areas, the parties will not display symbols of their respective jurisdictions; Seems to suggest joint posts but "common area" might cover immediately adjacent posts. "Relevant controls" is not defined but could allow "separate but equal" status neutral approach. As no political symbols would be displayed, status neutral.
5. The arrangements will include a balanced presence, in line with requirements, from both parties of all related services such as customs, police etc. and will cover matters such as the location of the crossing points, the nature of the facility, opening hours etc. In line with its mandate (fn3) at the crossing points Jarinjë/Rudnice and Tabavije/Bërnjak, this presence will include EULEX officials. EULEX will also be present at crossing points Dheu i Bardhë/Konqul, Merdare/Merdarë, Mutivodë/Mutivode and Depce/Muçibabë; Both Serbia and Kosovo will have police and customs officers at the crossing points. This is a clear step toward status neutrality. EULEX will be at all crossings - to "monitor, mentor and advise" - but presumably will have an executive role at the northern Gates. Despite the fact that fn 3 refers to EULEX's responsiblity to "assist the Kosovo institutions," depending on what occurs in Gates 1 and 31, this could also be status neutral.
6. At the core of the arrangement there will be a clear assignment of applicable legal responsibilities and liabilities to each party's jurisdiction; This has some northerners worried as it could imply that "secretly" or otherwise, Kosovo sovereignty would be implemented - "assigned" - to the northern Gates. If this were to be true, it would not be status neutral. But it would be so out of tune with the general approach it seems the parties accepted that perhaps it is a wrong reading. Perhaps it means that in the north, clear delineation would be made between goods crossing the Ibar River - which would be subject to Kosovo customs - as goods to north Kosovo would be subject to Serbian VAT. This or something like it would be status neutral.
7. A tri-partite implementation group, chaired by the EU, will be established to implement above arrangement as soon as practically possible. For that purpose, a technical Protocol will be developed and signed, if necessary separately with the EU, which will take account of the parties' different views on the question of status. The implications of these conclusions will be taken into account in implementing freedom of movement; This clearly provides for further negotiations on the details before implementation. The "technical protocol" would take into account the continued difference over status. This seems to suggest a commitment to find practical solutions that are status neutral.
8. This agreement does not cover any general or specific revenue or fiscal matters; The "agreement" achieved in Brussels leaves out the key issue of who collects what fees and where. This suggests that perhaps there will be no revenue or fiscal activities at the northern Gates. This would be a good approach and status neutral.
fn 1 One party recognises the line as a border; the other party recognises the line as an administrative boundary.
fn 2 As defined especially in the Schengen Borders Code, Frontex Regulation, Local Border Traffic Regulation, VIS Regulation and Community Code on Visas;
fn 3 As defined by Council Joint Action 2008/124 CEFSP, Article 3, Section a;
Everyone will have to make up their own minds and hopefully, the EU, KFOR and Belgrade will exercise some patience as those in the north are given an opportunity to hear clarifications and to consider. Here follows my own comments on the various sections:
IBM (fn1) Agreed Conclusions
1. In line with the Lisbon Treaty, and relevant EU legislation (fn2) and given that both parties are part of the EU's Western Balkans agenda, they will be required gradually to harmonise their legislation with the EU acquis and in particular to apply the concept of IBM; This is an admirable goal as coming into EU compliance would be good for everyone. Note the term "gradually." This might take years depending on what the EU does to offer relevant benefits to Serbia and Kosovo.
2. In the interest of faster and more effective processing, the parties, under the overall guidance of the EU, will apply the concept of IBM; Consistent with #1, applying the "concept" of IBM would seem to offer leeway for actual implementation over time.
3. The parties intend gradually to set up joint integrated posts at all their common IBM crossing points. This cooperation will follow the best European practice as it is progressively further developed by the European Commission. The work will be given a high priority; the projects will be identified jointly and will be implemented as soon as practically possible; This says the two sides will give "priority" to implementing the joint posts "as soon as practically possible." I.e., no deadline and as practical. Affecting practicality might well be events on the ground including how far the northern Kosovo Serbs cooperate. I.e., presumably taking into account the fact that even should they take down the barricades, they could always put them back again so nothing can be done until they agree?
4. The joint, integrated, single and secure posts will be located within a 'common area of IBM crossing points', jointly delineated, where officials of each party carry out relevant controls. Exceptionally, and limited to the common IBM areas, the parties will not display symbols of their respective jurisdictions; Seems to suggest joint posts but "common area" might cover immediately adjacent posts. "Relevant controls" is not defined but could allow "separate but equal" status neutral approach. As no political symbols would be displayed, status neutral.
5. The arrangements will include a balanced presence, in line with requirements, from both parties of all related services such as customs, police etc. and will cover matters such as the location of the crossing points, the nature of the facility, opening hours etc. In line with its mandate (fn3) at the crossing points Jarinjë/Rudnice and Tabavije/Bërnjak, this presence will include EULEX officials. EULEX will also be present at crossing points Dheu i Bardhë/Konqul, Merdare/Merdarë, Mutivodë/Mutivode and Depce/Muçibabë; Both Serbia and Kosovo will have police and customs officers at the crossing points. This is a clear step toward status neutrality. EULEX will be at all crossings - to "monitor, mentor and advise" - but presumably will have an executive role at the northern Gates. Despite the fact that fn 3 refers to EULEX's responsiblity to "assist the Kosovo institutions," depending on what occurs in Gates 1 and 31, this could also be status neutral.
6. At the core of the arrangement there will be a clear assignment of applicable legal responsibilities and liabilities to each party's jurisdiction; This has some northerners worried as it could imply that "secretly" or otherwise, Kosovo sovereignty would be implemented - "assigned" - to the northern Gates. If this were to be true, it would not be status neutral. But it would be so out of tune with the general approach it seems the parties accepted that perhaps it is a wrong reading. Perhaps it means that in the north, clear delineation would be made between goods crossing the Ibar River - which would be subject to Kosovo customs - as goods to north Kosovo would be subject to Serbian VAT. This or something like it would be status neutral.
7. A tri-partite implementation group, chaired by the EU, will be established to implement above arrangement as soon as practically possible. For that purpose, a technical Protocol will be developed and signed, if necessary separately with the EU, which will take account of the parties' different views on the question of status. The implications of these conclusions will be taken into account in implementing freedom of movement; This clearly provides for further negotiations on the details before implementation. The "technical protocol" would take into account the continued difference over status. This seems to suggest a commitment to find practical solutions that are status neutral.
8. This agreement does not cover any general or specific revenue or fiscal matters; The "agreement" achieved in Brussels leaves out the key issue of who collects what fees and where. This suggests that perhaps there will be no revenue or fiscal activities at the northern Gates. This would be a good approach and status neutral.
fn 1 One party recognises the line as a border; the other party recognises the line as an administrative boundary.
fn 2 As defined especially in the Schengen Borders Code, Frontex Regulation, Local Border Traffic Regulation, VIS Regulation and Community Code on Visas;
fn 3 As defined by Council Joint Action 2008/124 CEFSP, Article 3, Section a;
In any case Thaci and his backers in KFOR and EULEX will have had more than they did before they triggered the current crisis by taking unilateral action.
ReplyDeleteDo you see a problem with the Serbian side rewarding them for acting unilaterally? Will it mean they will be more inclined to act in such a way again?
What tangible guarantees did Borko get that EULEX will not be up to its old tricks again? As this is an agreement to which the EU is not even a party (thought EULEX was clearly a party to the stand off and bears responsibility for the crisis) but was instead its sponsor the answer is none.
Achieving a just and peaceful resolution to the current crisis in north Kosovo is not a matter of rewarding anyone or not. It would help lower tensions and preserve the opportunity for real peace. Peace would benefit all by allowing everyone to focus on the practical problems of achieving economic growth and improving lives.
ReplyDeleteBTW, if a status neutral arrangement for the northern crossing points is implemented, it will largely be the result of the peaceful and principled way the northern Kosovo Serbs responded to the events of July 25.
How does it bring you closer to a resolution to reward precisely the kind of behaviour that threatens the peace the most? It is self-evident that that which you reward you will have more of.
ReplyDelete'Status neutrality' is your mantra, but it is not the mantra of the northern Kosovo Serbs. They are not fighting to keep EULEX from breaking its mission statement (which is anyway a cover for its real mission), but for the Constitution of Republic of Serbia. Status neutral posts mean nothing to them if they are unconstitutional. It was clear the old arrangement was not, but this is much more questionable about the new one, so lets not spin this as some kind of vindication for the communities in the north.
The reality is just the opposite, though the northern Kosovo Serb communities had successfully established a reality on the ground of their own (as Jeremić noted) and had negated any benefits Thaci's international backers could derive from their assault, Belgrade chose to ignore this and struck an agreement that sets them back from where they were before their brilliantly effective heroics.
Anyway, as I've said, there will be no peace and no resolution for as long as internationals can get away with being the referees to a conflict to which they are actually a party to. The dialogue was flawed from the start because it could not and did not result in anything that binds the internationals and they have shown over and over again they won't actually be restrained by the generalities of international law, binding UNSCR resolutions and own phony mission statements.
So, Crappy, you speak for all of the north? And status neutrality is just my mantra?
ReplyDeleteThe internationals are part of the equation. If Yugoslavia could have ended on its own - and not given a chance to Germany to begin getting it wrong - history would have been different. But things are what they are. Perhaps those directly involved will know best what their interests are and will act accordingly.
I completely agree with proposition made by Mr. Gallucci that "peace would benefit all by allowing everyone to focus on the practical problems of achieving economic growth and improving lives".
ReplyDeleteBearing in mind that Kosovo and Metohia had its best economic and social situation while Republic of Serbia maintained its full control over its southern province it surely means the return of institutions of Republic of Serbia south of river Ibar. UN Resolution 1244 and constitution of Republic of Serbia give legal ground for such an enterprise. Furthermore, we are all aware that many Albanians are fed up with drug dealers, terrorists and all sort of criminals that are currently representing them. Common folk is not that stupid, not to notice they were far better off in every sense of a word while they could lean on stable governing of Republic of Serbia.
One has to ask what will happen with Kosovo and Metohia south of river Ibar when donations of USA and Germany (several billion dollars each) cease. Main product, actually scratch that - ONLY product of Kosovo and Metohia south of river Ibar are illegal goods: narcotics, slaves and human organs.
Nobody who means well to the Albanian people would leave it in the clutches of narco-barons.
If someone honestly wants peace than that someone should support eviction of NATO from Kosovo and Metohia and return of military and police of Republic of Serbia.
I don't speak for anyone, nor did I anywhere claim this or even assume I do, so I really don't know why you are asking me this? What I did, was to make the effort to learn what concerns, fears and objectives the people in question have as expressed by their locally elected representatives. I didn't see a whole lot of talk of 'status neutrality', but a lot more about territorial integrity and the Constitution. Tell me if I am wrong.
ReplyDeleteAnyway, given that there were three parties to the recent troubles, the Albanians, the Serbs, but also EULEX which transported Kosovo Albanian customs agents to the crossings and KFOR which attacked the barricades to try to make way for EULEX how does it help to hammer out an agreement between Albanians and the Serbs only? Seeing the EU is not a party to it, the agreement does nothing to restrain EULEX and KFOR (only the Serbs and Albanians) and since NATO and EU have once again shown they will not be bound by international law, Helsinki Final Act, Badinter Comission decision, UNSCR1244 or EULEX mission guidelines what exactly is there to guarantee that at some later date EULEX will not unilaterally raise the flag of the quasi-state proclaimed as "Republic of Kosovo" over Jarinje and Brnjak and start off another crisis?
"If Yugoslavia could have ended on its own - and not given a chance to Germany to begin getting it wrong - history would have been different"
ReplyDeleteAre you serious? It was Germany and the EU that played an important part in encouraging the unilateral secessions of Croatia and Slovenia. The recommendations of the Badinter Commission count for me as war crimes.
Belgium recently spent one and a half year to solve a relatively minor problem. They were lucky that no one in the EU got the idea to encourage one party or the other to take unilateral measures as a "solution". Unfortunately they got such an idea already after a short time with Yugoslavia.
Kosovo was a fabricated war - the same way recently the Libya war was fabricated and now Syria is set up for "humanitarian" mass murder. It is the old trick: fuel a guerrilla and then accuse the government of violating human rights.
If you take into account the real role of the West it hasn't much to be proud of in former Yugoslavia. But as long as it doesn't realize that itself I am afraid we will have to live with their arrogance.