Over the past few days, B-92 and Blic have carried comment by me on the EU, Serbia and Kosovo. The B-92 article comes from the TransConflict piece originally posted here. The Blic article comes from an interview. For completness, I repeat it below in the original English. (Note: The word "partition" is used with care in my original version to avoid appearing to endorse that approach or any other.)
1. Do you think that the idea of dividing Kosovo damaged the position of Serbia on the international scene in a sense that big powers like USA and Germany put so much pressure on Serbia to prevent the division?
The division of Kosovo - on the ground along the Ibar River and politically between Belgrade and Pristina over status of Kosovo - is a reality and it seems to me that this is what has caused the difficulty. The question is how is that division is to be handled. Partition would be only one possibility. A special status for the north is another. The possibility of sharing sovereignty is a separate possibility. The core issue is not Serbia's position on Kosovo but the inability of the countries supporting Pristina - the Quint - to accept that the people of the north will not accept simple incorporation into rule by Pristina and Serbia cannot simply surrender Kosovo. Germany and the US appear to prefer imposing that and this is the problem. It prevents compromise and - through any use of force - could lead to further conflict.
2. Do you think that clear mesage of President Tadic that he gave up of the idea of division could open the door for negotiations or talks about sovereignty of institution in the North Kosovo or some kind of stronger autonomy for Serbs?
No, I don't because in itself it does not meet German requirements for allowing Serbian candidacy. Germany is demanding that Serbia give up the north, abolish its Serbian local institutions, give the "border" to Kosovo (through "joint" control), and bring down the barricades without EULEX agreeing to behave in a status neutral fashion. Can President Tadic do that? Unless he can, it seems Germany's hardline position will remain the determining factor in any EU approach.
3. How would you asses the possibility of talks about that and in which format (UN, EU, without Russsia...)?
Talks on making progress on the north could take any format. The more important issue is the stance of the Quint and especially the US. As long as the US supports and encourages Pristina to hold out for 100% of what it wants - abolishing the "parallel" institutions, creating a "border" in the north and implementing Ahtisaari there in the same form it has south of the Ibar - the Kosovo side will not be open to compromise. You cannot have real negotiations unless both sides are ready to compromise.
4. Would you please explain your idea of double sovereignty in the North of Kosovo?
The possibility of dual sovereignty might actually be applied more to the Kosovo status issue as a whole. In other words, allow both sides to claim sovereignty of Kosovo. Serbia would stop blocking Kosovo membership in international organizations and each member of the international community would continue to decide for itself whether to recognize Kosovo or not. Serbia could continue to play a role in Kosovo vis-a-vis Kosovo Serbs per the Ahtisaari Plan. (Practical support and cooperation with Kosovo Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo need not entail political questions of status.) Both Serbia and Kosovo could control the common boundary. All of this while continuing to disagree on status and without Serbia recognizing Kosovo as an independent country. Any special arrangement for the north would fit inside this approach. Dual sovereignty over just the north would be a form of partition and probably not acceptable.
1. Do you think that the idea of dividing Kosovo damaged the position of Serbia on the international scene in a sense that big powers like USA and Germany put so much pressure on Serbia to prevent the division?
The division of Kosovo - on the ground along the Ibar River and politically between Belgrade and Pristina over status of Kosovo - is a reality and it seems to me that this is what has caused the difficulty. The question is how is that division is to be handled. Partition would be only one possibility. A special status for the north is another. The possibility of sharing sovereignty is a separate possibility. The core issue is not Serbia's position on Kosovo but the inability of the countries supporting Pristina - the Quint - to accept that the people of the north will not accept simple incorporation into rule by Pristina and Serbia cannot simply surrender Kosovo. Germany and the US appear to prefer imposing that and this is the problem. It prevents compromise and - through any use of force - could lead to further conflict.
2. Do you think that clear mesage of President Tadic that he gave up of the idea of division could open the door for negotiations or talks about sovereignty of institution in the North Kosovo or some kind of stronger autonomy for Serbs?
No, I don't because in itself it does not meet German requirements for allowing Serbian candidacy. Germany is demanding that Serbia give up the north, abolish its Serbian local institutions, give the "border" to Kosovo (through "joint" control), and bring down the barricades without EULEX agreeing to behave in a status neutral fashion. Can President Tadic do that? Unless he can, it seems Germany's hardline position will remain the determining factor in any EU approach.
3. How would you asses the possibility of talks about that and in which format (UN, EU, without Russsia...)?
Talks on making progress on the north could take any format. The more important issue is the stance of the Quint and especially the US. As long as the US supports and encourages Pristina to hold out for 100% of what it wants - abolishing the "parallel" institutions, creating a "border" in the north and implementing Ahtisaari there in the same form it has south of the Ibar - the Kosovo side will not be open to compromise. You cannot have real negotiations unless both sides are ready to compromise.
4. Would you please explain your idea of double sovereignty in the North of Kosovo?
The possibility of dual sovereignty might actually be applied more to the Kosovo status issue as a whole. In other words, allow both sides to claim sovereignty of Kosovo. Serbia would stop blocking Kosovo membership in international organizations and each member of the international community would continue to decide for itself whether to recognize Kosovo or not. Serbia could continue to play a role in Kosovo vis-a-vis Kosovo Serbs per the Ahtisaari Plan. (Practical support and cooperation with Kosovo Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo need not entail political questions of status.) Both Serbia and Kosovo could control the common boundary. All of this while continuing to disagree on status and without Serbia recognizing Kosovo as an independent country. Any special arrangement for the north would fit inside this approach. Dual sovereignty over just the north would be a form of partition and probably not acceptable.
Please bear in mind that both B-92 and Blic strongly favor the current government (or even the "liberal-democrat" fanatics condemning Tadic as not capitulating enough), so their questions reveal more about their politics than anything else...
ReplyDelete