Perhaps the events of last year - Pristina's failed attempt in July to seize the northern boundary and the mangled efforts by EULEX and KFOR to support that effort - have finally convinced at least a few of the Quint that force won't work? Recent statements by the UK and France (Italy already would go along with anything) indicate readiness to accept less than Serbia simply surrendering the north to Pristina. The two EU members have greeted positively President Tadic' recent "four-point proposal," suggesting it could be accommodated within the framework of the Ahtisaari Plan.
Tadic suggested an approach leaving aside the question of Kosovo's status but including a special solution for the Serbian Orthodox monasteries, special guarantees for the southern Kosovo Serbs, resolution of Serbian property claims and a special solution for northern Kosovo. The British ambassadors in Belgrade and - more to the point - in Pristina both reportedly said the proposals are in line with the Ahtisaari Plan and London supports the approach. The French ambassadors to Belgrade and Pristina took the same line, reportedly suggesting that the proposals offer "a solid foundation" that "could open the door to a lasting solution."
Both the French and British repeated the standing formula that Kosovo's "territorial integrity" had to be respected. The British - echoed by the US - reaffirmed the demand that the barricades in the north must come down, "parallel institutions" be dismantled and progress made in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. But the British statements, as reported, offer some interesting nuances as well. The British ambassador to Belgrade reportedly clarified that the "parallel institutions" in the north were not expected to be abolished "soon" but would "begin to function properly in time." His colleague in Pristina noted that the Ahtisaari Plan provides for formation of a new municipality for north Mitrovica and expressed confidence that "a number of issues regarding the north can be resolved by expanding the jurisdictions and responsibility, all in keeping with the Ahtisaari plan." In keeping is an interesting formulation. It is also heard that some in London have been studying the recent TransConflict outline of how the Ahtisaari Plan might be implemented in the north.
The UK/France and US may be playing a variation of "good cop/bad cop." While the two EU members point to a possible Ahitsaari-based approach to the north, the US claims it has "no specific position" on the Tadic proposal. But US Secretary of State Clinton called Tadic this weekend and surely said something more than the publicly acceptable line about being ready to help Serbia and Kosovo "normalize" their relations. The net affect may be to provide Belgrade space to engage on a "status-neutral" approach to Ahtisaari while also not fencing in too closely Pristina's bargaining space.
On the ground, KFOR has stopped calling the local Serbian institutions "parallel" but has not given up entirely trying to force EULEX past the barricades. EULEX has itself still refused to commit to a status neutral approach to the boundary crossings (i.e., to not bringing Kosovo Albanian customs to the Gates). NATO says it is helping to "create room" for a "political solution" for the north. For such room to exist, everyone will have to be open to compromise and resist the temptation to force events by trying to bully the northern Kosovo Serbs into submission. Has the Quint really taken on board that reality?
Tadic suggested an approach leaving aside the question of Kosovo's status but including a special solution for the Serbian Orthodox monasteries, special guarantees for the southern Kosovo Serbs, resolution of Serbian property claims and a special solution for northern Kosovo. The British ambassadors in Belgrade and - more to the point - in Pristina both reportedly said the proposals are in line with the Ahtisaari Plan and London supports the approach. The French ambassadors to Belgrade and Pristina took the same line, reportedly suggesting that the proposals offer "a solid foundation" that "could open the door to a lasting solution."
Both the French and British repeated the standing formula that Kosovo's "territorial integrity" had to be respected. The British - echoed by the US - reaffirmed the demand that the barricades in the north must come down, "parallel institutions" be dismantled and progress made in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. But the British statements, as reported, offer some interesting nuances as well. The British ambassador to Belgrade reportedly clarified that the "parallel institutions" in the north were not expected to be abolished "soon" but would "begin to function properly in time." His colleague in Pristina noted that the Ahtisaari Plan provides for formation of a new municipality for north Mitrovica and expressed confidence that "a number of issues regarding the north can be resolved by expanding the jurisdictions and responsibility, all in keeping with the Ahtisaari plan." In keeping is an interesting formulation. It is also heard that some in London have been studying the recent TransConflict outline of how the Ahtisaari Plan might be implemented in the north.
The UK/France and US may be playing a variation of "good cop/bad cop." While the two EU members point to a possible Ahitsaari-based approach to the north, the US claims it has "no specific position" on the Tadic proposal. But US Secretary of State Clinton called Tadic this weekend and surely said something more than the publicly acceptable line about being ready to help Serbia and Kosovo "normalize" their relations. The net affect may be to provide Belgrade space to engage on a "status-neutral" approach to Ahtisaari while also not fencing in too closely Pristina's bargaining space.
On the ground, KFOR has stopped calling the local Serbian institutions "parallel" but has not given up entirely trying to force EULEX past the barricades. EULEX has itself still refused to commit to a status neutral approach to the boundary crossings (i.e., to not bringing Kosovo Albanian customs to the Gates). NATO says it is helping to "create room" for a "political solution" for the north. For such room to exist, everyone will have to be open to compromise and resist the temptation to force events by trying to bully the northern Kosovo Serbs into submission. Has the Quint really taken on board that reality?
I have just one question: Do all those plans lead towards the dismantlement of the Belgrade's sponsored institutions one day, including Tadic's 4-point-plan (perhaps it does not envisage it anything at all regarding the future of Serbian institutions in the north?
ReplyDeleteDoeas it mean in practice that the compromise is only in gradual international pressure against the Belgrade's institutions, instead of an immediate dismantlement as requested by Merkel, while Belgrade agree to the the establishment of Kosovo's administration in the north?
Whatever happens, it seems improbable that everything remains exactly the same forever. A key question, whatever happens, would be Serbia's commitment to continue to support Serbian communities within Kosovo over time.
ReplyDeleteIn the foreseeable future, the best way to think of the question might be to see the process as one of transforming the current northern municipalities into ones that function within both Serbia and Kosovo. In other words, the municipal administrations would be chosen by the local population in elections coincident with Kosovo-wide local elections according to existing law. (Purposeful ambiguity here.) They would receive funding from both Belgrade & Pristina (as envisioned in Ahtisaari) but essentially function in an autonomous manner (perhaps under some UN or other agreed international presence).
Immediate dismantling appears to me a non-starter. Merkel's demand in this regard is just to get attention. Seems to me the northern Kosovo Serbs have made their point: they will have their own institutions. The issue may be one of treating them in practice in a quantum manner - i.e., as both "particle" and "wave," as both Serbia and Kosovo while letting everyone get on with life.