From Outside The Walls

Kosovo: Who Does the ISG Speak For?

2012-01-25T21:13:00.003+01:00

The International Steering Group (ISG) met on January 24 in Vienna to consider its 2012 program for Kosovo. The forum issued a communique calling upon the government of Kosovo to continue to implement the Ahtisaari Plan, aiming to complete outstanding elements so that the period of "supervised independence" could terminate by the end of this year. The ISG reaffirmed its commitment to Kosovo's "territorial integrity within its existing borders." The ISG also called upon Serbia to "abide by its international commitments and refrain from interfering in Kosovo, including by withdrawing its police, security, and other state presences, and supporting efforts by international actors and the institutions of Kosovo to promote the rule of law." The group also demanded that Belgrade "ensure that its local elections are not extended into northern Kosovo."

The ISG has, in effect, demanded that Serbia pull out from Kosovo and assist in bringing the north under the administration of Pristina. It called the continued presence of Serbian institutions there "interference" and not in line with Serbia's "international commitments." Who is the ISG speaking for here? The answer can only be that it speaks for itself, a self-chosen group of 25 countries brought together - in another of those Bush-era "coalitions of the willing" - to legitimate Pristina's unilateral declaration of independence.

The ISG does not speak for the international community and certainly not for the United Nations or the Security Council. It speaks for those countries - led by the Quint - that saw fit in 2008 to step outside UNSCR 1244 and to take on the political and financial costs of shepherding the new state through a shaky start-up. Politically, the ride has been rougher than expected, with recognitions even now from less than half of the UN membership and many internal problems remaining. So now, the Quint is in a hurry to cut the costs and split. The ISG speaks very much for itself and certainly not for the people of Kosovo.

The ISG - really the US, Germany and Brussels - are tired of Kosovo and impatient to leave. This is dangerous. Being in a hurry may lead the Quint to make mistakes. Right now, Washington, Berlin and Brussels appear to be looking to diplomatic pressure on Belgrade. If President Tadic wants EU candidacy enough, he'll accept surrender on the ISG's terms. Comments reportedly made by EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuehle make that clear. He emphasized that Serbia's chances to receive candidacy next month hinge on accepting further concessions in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and bringing down the barricades in the north.

What happens if the "diplomatic" pressures fail to produce the desired effects? It's possible that recent British and French comments indicate a possible opening for a negotiated, compromise solution for the north. But is that opening real or simply wheel-spinning till spring? The Self-Determination party is already adding to the pressure on the Kosovo administration to do something about the north by making it crack down against barricades in the south.

It must be clear by now that there is no military solution to the north. Any determined use of force against the northern Kosovo Serbs by anyone will likely lead to violence and partition. Tadic cannot make this any less so. But the ISG saying it plans to leave by the end of 2012 implies a threat to ensure the implementation by then of Kosovo's "rule of law."

As noted previously, the end of "supervised independence also raises another issue. If the ICO and EULEX leave or substantively end their missions while outstanding issues - including the north - remain, who assumes the essential buffering role between the two sides in the status dispute? This can only be the UN, which still has the peacekeeping responsibility under 1244. The UN should be developing plans now for a stepped up presence - including police - for the north. Without political agreement - discounting a simple breakdown into renewed war - it will still need to do what the Security Council sent it to Kosovo to do, keep the peace.

Kosovo: An Opportunity for Agreement On the North?

2012-01-22T21:08:00.001+01:00

Perhaps the events of last year - Pristina's failed attempt in July to seize the northern boundary and the mangled efforts by EULEX and KFOR to support that effort - have finally convinced at least a few of the Quint that force won't work? Recent statements by the UK and France (Italy already would go along with anything) indicate readiness to accept less than Serbia simply surrendering the north to Pristina. The two EU members have greeted positively President Tadic' recent "four-point proposal," suggesting it could be accommodated within the framework of the Ahtisaari Plan.

Tadic suggested an approach leaving aside the question of Kosovo's status but including a special solution for the Serbian Orthodox monasteries, special guarantees for the southern Kosovo Serbs, resolution of Serbian property claims and a special solution for northern Kosovo. The British ambassadors in Belgrade and - more to the point - in Pristina both reportedly said the proposals are in line with the Ahtisaari Plan and London supports the approach. The French ambassadors to Belgrade and Pristina took the same line, reportedly suggesting that the proposals offer "a solid foundation" that "could open the door to a lasting solution."

Both the French and British repeated the standing formula that Kosovo's "territorial integrity" had to be respected. The British - echoed by the US - reaffirmed the demand that the barricades in the north must come down, "parallel institutions" be dismantled and progress made in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. But the British statements, as reported, offer some interesting nuances as well. The British ambassador to Belgrade reportedly clarified that the "parallel institutions" in the north were not expected to be abolished "soon" but would "begin to function properly in time." His colleague in Pristina noted that the Ahtisaari Plan provides for formation of a new municipality for north Mitrovica and expressed confidence that "a number of issues regarding the north can be resolved by expanding the jurisdictions and responsibility, all in keeping with the Ahtisaari plan." In keeping is an interesting formulation. It is also heard that some in London have been studying the recent TransConflict outline of how the Ahtisaari Plan might be implemented in the north.

The UK/France and US may be playing a variation of "good cop/bad cop." While the two EU members point to a possible Ahitsaari-based approach to the north, the US claims it has "no specific position" on the Tadic proposal. But US Secretary of State Clinton called Tadic this weekend and surely said something more than the publicly acceptable line about being ready to help Serbia and Kosovo "normalize" their relations. The net affect may be to provide Belgrade space to engage on a "status-neutral" approach to Ahtisaari while also not fencing in too closely Pristina's bargaining space.

On the ground, KFOR has stopped calling the local Serbian institutions "parallel" but has not given up entirely trying to force EULEX past the barricades. EULEX has itself still refused to commit to a status neutral approach to the boundary crossings (i.e., to not bringing Kosovo Albanian customs to the Gates). NATO says it is helping to "create room" for a "political solution" for the north. For such room to exist, everyone will have to be open to compromise and resist the temptation to force events by trying to bully the northern Kosovo Serbs into submission. Has the Quint really taken on board that reality?

Kosovo: If EULEX leaves, then What?

2012-01-18T18:08:00.000+01:00

The Kosovo government has begun pressing its internationals - the five Western powers that supported its unilateral declaration of independence, the Quint - to get ready to leave by telling them this is the last year of "supervised independence." This would entail the departure of the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and the International Community Office (ICO). EULEX, however, also exercises the UN's rule of law mandate under UNSCR 1244. If it leaves, who take that over?

Prime Minister Thaci started the debate over the future of the international missions at the turn of the year by suggesting it was time for "complete independence." It may be that his comments were in hope of future electability but they have sparked further discussion against the backdrop of already announced ICO plans to wind down its mission this year and the planned departure of US NATO forces in 2013.

The ICO has long been moribund and its departure would be hardly noticed by anyone. The bigger question is EULEX. The Kosovo government apparently sees its role being reduced to dealing with war crimes and international crime. Pristina sees itself taking responsibility for justice and policing with little need for EULEX.

EULEX has responded to the current speculation by noting that while a "strategic review" is taking place on its future, "no decisions have been made regarding any future, potential re-shaping of the mission." EULEX chief de Marnhac is quoted as saying that any decision would have to be approved by EU members.

A potential decision to withdraw international supervision of Kosovo raises various issues, including whether Kosovo can indeed stand on its own at this point, whether the existing elements of minority protections and participation south of the Ibar would be maintained without international supervision and how any changes could be squared with the continued existence of UNSCR 1244. To be sure, some actors - certainly the Kosovo Albanians and the US - do not see the continued relevance of the UN mandate for Kosovo. But that mandate still exists and has the force of international law (as confirmed by the ICJ in 2010).

The continued relevance of 1244 is most specific in the area of rule of law. In November 2008, the UN Security Council allowed the Secretary General to transfer UNMIK's responsibility for rule of law in Kosovo to EULEX. Under the accepted terms, EULEX was to take the place of UN police and justice and act in a status neutral fashion. EULEX has not generally acted in a status neutral fashion but it does represent at present the sole international element linking the local justice and police functions exercised in northern Kosovo to a Kosovo-wide framework.

The EULEX statement on its "strategic review" makes no mention of the need to also consult with the UN. If EULEX simply exits Kosovo, there would be a vacuum in the international framework for rule of law. Pristina might wish to fill that space but without any agreement with Belgrade and local Kosovo Serbs, that probably would lead to conflict. Without some agreed formula for the north, if no one took EULEX's place, that would be a form of partition.

Without modifying or replacing UNSCR 1244, the responsibility for rule of law in Kosovo - and most specifically in the north - would revert to the UN should EULEX leave. This might mean the need to return UN police and judges to the north. Many might view this situation as difficult to accept. But the Quint's unilateral decision to impose Kosovo independence in 2008 left a host of difficult and unsettled questions. It would be unfortunate if the Five decided they didn't exist and simply departed. It would be even worse should the Quint and its agents - KFOR and EULEX - seek again to try use of force after the winter snows clear.

Some in the Pristina media are speculating that President Tadic may seek to help the Quint meets Thaci's deadline by somehow removing the barricades and replacing the "illegal" municipal leaders. Some are still wringing their hands over the "refendum" called for February. However, there are also signs the UK and perhaps even the US are open to some "broader" Ahtisaari Plan for the north. But in any new compromise approach to the north, the UN may still have a role.

Kosovo: Much Ado About Nothing

2012-01-05T18:38:00.000+01:00

The Kosovo town of Leposavic decided this week to join the other three northern municipalities in holding a "referendum" in mid-February on whether to accept or not inclusion in Pristina institutions. Both Belgrade and Pristina have announced their opposition to the vote. Serbian government officials have suggested the referendum is not in the "interests of the state" because it might provoke reaction from the international community and from the Kosovo Albanians. Pristina calls the vote "illegal" and denies that the northerners have the "right" to declare themselves outside the "sovereignty" of the Kosovo "state."

It is unclear if Belgrade and Pristina's rejection of the February vote will remain verbal or escalate into actions to pressure the northern Kosovo Serbs to drop their plans or to prevent the vote outright. But KFOR appears to have chosen this moment - the eve of the Orthodox Christmas - to once again seek to close the boundary crossings to large vehicles while forcing traffic into the Gates manned by EULEX and Kosovo Albanian police and customs.

But why all the fuss? Northerners reportedly will not be voting on declaring independence - from either Serbia or Kosovo - nor on declaring a "republic" or partition. Northern leaders say they will not be using official funds to hold the vote. They believe that showing, through an open vote, that the majority of northerners oppose rule from Pristina will strengthen their political position and that of Serbia. In any case, the vote won't decide anything.

The "referendum" will essentially be a poll of northern Kosovo Serb sentiment on accepting Kosovo independence. It is not in violation of UNSCR 1244 as that mandates only that Kosovo residents accept UN administration of Kosovo, i.e., UNMIK. Indeed, the four northern municipalities are the only institutions in Kosovo to work with UNMIK.

It's true that the likely results of the poll will not surprise anyone. It has been clear since 2008 - and seemingly proven by the effort on the barricades since July 2011 - that the northern Kosovo Serbs reject rule from Pristina. But in the face of continued efforts from the Quint and Kosovo Albanians to paint the resistance to inclusion in Kosovo institutions as a result of control by "criminals" and "radicals," it's understandable that the northern communities want to go on record publicly and clearly.

The "referendum" poses no threat to anything or anyone. But the isolation of the northern Kosovo Serbs by Belgrade and the internationals - KFOR and EULEX - is dangerous. On one side, President Tadic seems so determined to not offend the EU that he reportedly will not be stopping in the north during his Christmas visit to Kosovo. Belgrade has made it clear the referendum does not have its support while labeling it as well a political ploy by the opposition. On the other side, KFOR's actions on the Gates and EULEX's continuing refusal to act in a status neutral fashion in the north adds to the pressures on the north.

If anyone thought that more pressure would convince the northern Kosovo Serbs to back down, that at least would explain their actions. But who can still expect that? Continued pressure on a beleaguered community may instead become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Making a big fuss over this little poll might lead to the next vote being much more serious.

Kosovo: What 2012 Might Bring

2012-01-03T17:52:00.000+01:00

2012 may be the year that the north Kosovo issue is resolved, or maybe "resolved." The possibility of continued stalemate remains and the danger of renewed conflict cannot be excluded. But various factors suggest a strong effort to remove north Kosovo as an element of contention between Serbia and the Western powers. Discounting further efforts to impose a solution by force - which would most likely lead to partition - the likely outcome will be associating the four northern municipalities to the government in Pristina through some form of a special status elaborated from the Ahtisaari Plan. Full recognition of Kosovo by Serbia remains unlikely for now.

Serbian policy on Kosovo is being driven primarily by an almost desperate effort to gain EU candidacy. It is anchored, however, by a constitutional and political inability to simply give Kosovo away. This is unlikely to change no matter who wins the upcoming parliamentary (and later presidential) elections.

It seems likely at this point that either the DS Party of President Tadic or the SNS of Tomislav Nikolic will gain the largest vote. It seems probable as well that one of these parties will lead the next government. Perhaps both will form the government. Nikolic is saying he will not enter coalition with the DS and is hinting at alliance with the DSS. But one can never believe anything a politician says during an election campaign, not in Serbia, not in America, not anywhere.

No matter which party forms the next government in Belgrade - DS or SNS or both - it will remain under pressure to somehow gain EU membership. If the DS wins, it may well make the "historic leap" to settle the practical issues of Kosovo - including the north - early in the new term so that by next elections, the government will be able to show real returns on joining the EU. President Tadic is already hinting at a "new plan." If the matter is entirely up to Tadic, implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan as is, without requiring Serbian recognition of Kosovo, would be sufficient for him to agree. That would include implementation of the various agreements reached and to be reached through the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue facilitated by the EU and probably, over time, diminishing support for Serbian institutions in Kosovo.

For the SNS, the political calculations might well be much the same. What better way to consolidate becoming the new majority party - and put the "radical" past behind it - than to be the one to lead Serbia into the EU? The formula could be pretty much the same as well: accept the practical arrangements reached through dialogue and some form of special status for the north. Nikolic might bargain for a package going a bit beyond Ahtisaari (and if he did enter coalition with DSS, perhaps continued support for Kosovo Serbs). But, who knows, as Nixon went to China, maybe Nikolic would go to Pristina?

While it is possible that the EU powers will look for ways to support Tadic, it seems unlikely they would give Serbia candidacy in March to help him in the elections. Under the influence of Washington and Berlin, the EU will more likely continue to use candidacy as a stick rather than a carrot. Pristina will seek to keep the pressure on the northern Kosovo Serbs. The northerners seem ready to hold their poll on Pristina in February and may continue their barricades through the elections. How they react to implementation of the boundary regime agreed late last year and how KFOR and EULEX act on the ground will determine how difficult the coming spring will be in the north.

A pressure point may arise in connection with the local elections to be held with the parliamentary ones. There will be various views on whether the Serb local elections in Kosovo should happen as well and what would be the status of any governments elected. The Quint will almost certainly pressure Belgrade not to hold them as a part of its demand that Serbia withdraw its "parallel" institutions from the north. But it may be difficult for either DS or SNS to agree to the Quint demand in the middle of a campaign. How the Kosovo Albanians react to Serbian elections in Kosovo and what they push their internationals to do or allow could determine whether the risk of violence accompanies any voting.

But the local elections also raise an important political opportunity. Could a way be found to treat them in a way that allowed a transition to eventual elections held on a Kosovo-wide schedule in line with implementation of a plan such as outlined last year in TransConflict? Could the UN play a role in legitimizing the elections and then later in helping synchronize them?

This year is likely to see the northern Kosovo Serbs under intense pressure to accept this or that "resolution" to their status. They have proven over the last months on the barricades that they do not intend to accept just anything. They may need now to seriously consider what they can accept and then seek to translate their power on the ground into active and positive participation in the process to determine their future. Meanwhile, it would be far wiser for the Quint to allow that process to proceed without further efforts to impose any one-sided "solutions" through force or intimidation. Who can think rationally when they are called every day to take to the streets to protect their families from bullies?

Are We Headed for War With Iran?

2011-12-28T19:05:00.001+01:00

In response to the recent Congressional approval of new US sanctions on Iran targeting its oil shipments, on December 27, the country's vice president warned that any such measures could lead it to close the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is a vital shipping lane for oil. The price of oil spiked and then reportedly settled when the Saudi government said it would make up for any shortfall from an Iranian blockade. Some experts believe that Iran's rhetoric was simply for effect and it would not risk confrontation with the US. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has reportedly suggested it has a "plan" for keeping the Strait open. A spokesperson for the US 5th Fleet (sic) warned on the 28th that "anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; any disruption will not be tolerated." She added that the US Navy is “always ready to counter malevolent actions to ensure freedom of navigation."

This latest confrontation between Washington and Tehran comes as the US and Israel are reportedly also developing military options to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The Israelis consider such a possibility an existential threat.

The enmity between the US and Iran goes back three decades, since the Iranian Revolutions and the taking of the US Embassy in Tehran. The recent difficulties are coincident with the international effort - led by the US - to limit Iran's nuclear capability. The argument is that Iran is likely to use any such capability to threaten stability in the region and support radical (Shia) Islamic movements, could lead to further proliferation (and perhaps to radical groups gaining access to nuclear bombs) and allow Tehran to blackmail anyone that might seek to intervene against Iranian interests or the regime itself.

Perhaps it's worth taking a closer look at this argument before heading into an another Asian war?

There is little doubt that Iran - even without nuclear weapons - is aggressively seeking to further its interests in the region, including by seeking to mobilize the various Shia populations in an intra-Islamic contest with the Sunni. The Iran-Iraq War was a Sunni-Shia confrontation. Saudia Arabia - ruled by a Sunni dynasty - has long fought a "cold war" against Shia and Iranian influence using the somewhat conflicting strategy of alliance with the US while supporting radical Wahhabism. The US has repeatedly blundered through this internal Islamic feud by supporting Iraq in its war with Iran, by toppling Saddam and thus ushering in a Shia government of Iraq, and by supporting "friendly" Arab regimes until they were overthrown through popular reaction putting power into the hands of Islamic movements. Meanwhile, our unquestioning support for the Saudis and Israel left us in the cross-hairs of an radical Sunni terrorist group called Al Qaeda.

Do we really have a dog in the Shia-Sunni fight? Is it up to us to protect Saudi Arabia and what have we gained in our "war" against terrorism by so doing? Would it be better for the various countries of the region to work out there own way to religious tolerance, modernism and democracy? It might be ugly but as Lord Harlech once put it: "Every country has a right to its own War of the Roses."

What about the danger of nuclear proliferation? Well, the first question we might ask is who is left to proliferate to? The major powers have them, India and Pakistan have them, North Korea (and probably Israel) has them. There's really no one left that could that would. Would Tehran give them out to radical movements? There is no record of nuclear powers sharing so indiscriminately (not even Pakistan). States with nuclear weapons become status quo powers. They check and balance each other. In the case of "rogue" states (i.e., North Korea), we mollify and look to powerful neighbors to place limits on the regime. Isn't the possibility of a nuclear Iran more an issue for China and Russia than the US? And would Iran actually risk annihilation by threatening to attack Israel?

An Iran armed with nuclear weapons would have more leverage against external threats. This is how nuclear weapons have always worked. Looked at from Iran's perspective, the use of sanctions to stop it from developing a nuclear capability may well look like an attempt at regime change or an effort to preserve the option of regime change. The Iranian leadership - the clerics and the crazy president - is a nasty piece of work. But would it not be better to back off and let the internal dynamics work without outside pressures or interference? South Africa developed nuclear weapons and then, after it achieved full democracy, gave them up.

Maybe the tough exchange of words about the Straits is just talk. But the sense that Iran must be prevented from achieving a nuclear capability at all costs is dangerous. Unleashing war to prevent war is a very risky business. Maybe its time for the US to back away a bit and let those folk work things out themselves while we defend the homeland and rebuild our economy?

Kosovo: New Travel Regime and A Referendum - Good Things

2011-12-27T16:01:00.000+01:00

So far through the holidays, north Kosovo has been peaceful and cold. The barricades remain with mostly just a few people "standing guard." But there have been two noteworthy occurrences over the past few days: the travel agreement reached earlier this year between Pristina and Belgrade has gone into effect and the northern Kosovo Serbs have announced a referendum for February 15. Both point to an opening to resolve pressing Kosovo issues through dialogue rather than conflict.

The agreement on travel seems rather complicated but is a compromise that should allow travel to resume "normally" despite the competing political agendas of Serbia and Kosovo. Basically, anyone using the former KS plates issued by UNMIK or the new Serbian plates can enter and travel through both territories after paying an insurance fee. Vehicles with the new RKS plates of Kosovo will need to receive temporary plates at the boundary before entering Serbia. Travelers will be able to use their respective ID cards by receiving temporary entry and exit documents. The agreement will apply, for now, only at the southern Kosovo crossings.

The agreement has been criticized by both Albanians and Serbs because of the cost of the insurance. Some northern Kosovo Serbs also see it as serving Pristina's political agenda. But the EU has welcomed implementation and Belgrade's chief negotiator has indicated that the insurance fee will disappear when the insurance associations of Kosovo and Serbia reach agreement on reciprocity.

Meanwhile, the mayors of the four northern Kosovo municipalities announced a referendum will be held on February 15 on the question of accepting or not Kosovo institutions. Belgrade officials have criticized the move, calling it political and claiming the opposition is behind it. Of the four northern municipalities, three are held by the opposition. The fourth is controlled by President Tadic' DS party.

In the tense situation created in northern Kosovo by unilateral moves by Pristina and illegal support for them provided by KFOR and EULEX, a call for a northern vote could itself be provocative. But noteworthy is that the northern Kosovo Serbs have not called for a vote on independence or separation from Kosovo. Rather the leaders apparently plan more of a poll to measure the support - or lack of it - for accepting rule from Pristina. Such a poll is unlikely to show much acceptance of Kosovo institutions. But that may be the point, to lay to rest the notion that except for pressure from "criminals" and "radicals" the majority of northern Kosovo Serbs would accept being incorporated into Pristina's "rule of law." Everyone knows this is not true but let an actual poll resolve the issue once and for all.

A poll of northern sentiment on Kosovo independence could help clear the air. It would need to be conducted openly and transparently under some form of observation. Perhaps a neutral NGO or press organization could oversee or even conduct it. Important would be finding a way to counter any reasonable suggestion that the poll itself was rigged.

That Pristina and Belgrade can reach compromises and implement practical solutions to practical matters points to the potential for further such agreements through dialogue. If the northern Kosovo Serbs manifest their opposition to rule from Pristina democratically and transparently, then the use of force to impose political outcomes will be even harder to justify. Both the travel agreement and the referendum reaffirm that the path to peaceful resolution of remaining status issues should be and can be through dialogue and compromise.

Kosovo: It Remains Confusing But...

2011-12-23T14:21:00.000+01:00

The crisis set off in July by Pristina's attempt to seize the northern crossing points with its police is not over and the threat of renewed conflict remains. The dynamics since have led the northern Kosovo Serbs to remain on the barricades even in these cold, snowy winter days and to the EU refusing to step forward by helping Serbia enter the fold.

The EU seems stuck on the Kosovo issue with EULEX still refusing to commit itself to status neutral peacekeeping in the north. EULEX chief de Marnhac continues to assert that all his organization wants to do in the north is to bring the rule of law. He denies that EULEX favors Pristina and claims it's simply trying to carry out its mandate. The problem with this is that he refuses to say which rule of law - UNMIK regulations under UNSCR 1244, Kosovo law or Serbian law? De Marnhac also manages to avoid saying which mandate EULEX is seeking to serve - that granted by the UN Secretary General in November 2008 or the one extended by the Kosovo government? While ambiguity can sometimes be helpful, in this case it leads to continued distrust in the northern community. Thus the barricades continue.

But there are some positive signs that offer glimmers of hope. As it is the Christmas season, we can entertain these.

KFOR too wants to see the barricades come down. But a KFOR spokesman told the press that "removal of the barricades belongs to the overall context of the situation in the north, but it is not the main important issue." KFOR "might" have to remove them "in the future" to gain freedom of movement but "removing barricades only to remove barricades is not the way forward." KFOR also refused to echo the charge that the local institutions in the north are "parallel" and "illegal." The spokesman reportedly said those terms are not "adequate." He added that the "four municipal presidents in the north were elected in line with the will of the people who live there, and for KFOR, that means we cooperate with them." Perhaps this is all mere misdirection but maybe it is based on an understanding that the use of force would gain nothing and the leadership in the north is not mere criminals.

Other glimmers? For the first time, a Kosovo government official appears to have opened the door to an "Ahtisaari Plus" way of implementing the plan in the north. The Deputy Prime Minister - a Kosovo Serb - reportedly said that the approach was not ideal but was an opportunity that should not be missed. And this week, the Serb National Council proposed that a referendum be held to ask the people of the north to say whether they want to accept Pristina institutions or not. A transparent poll of northern sentiment on this question could bring welcome clarity to the issue of the people's will.

So, hopefully Kosovo is entering the holiday season with people beginning to absorb the lessons of the last months. What are these? That use of force on the ground and on the question of Serbian EU candidacy gains nothing. Political issues require political solutions. May Heaven preserve us all.

Kosovo: Recent Press

2011-12-22T16:46:00.000+01:00

Over the past few days, B-92 and Blic have carried comment by me on the EU, Serbia and Kosovo. The B-92 article comes from the TransConflict piece originally posted here. The Blic article comes from an interview. For completness, I repeat it below in the original English. (Note: The word "partition" is used with care in my original version to avoid appearing to endorse that approach or any other.)

1. Do you think that the idea of dividing Kosovo damaged the position of Serbia on the international scene in a sense that big powers like USA and Germany put so much pressure on Serbia to prevent the division?

The division of Kosovo - on the ground along the Ibar River and politically between Belgrade and Pristina over status of Kosovo - is a reality and it seems to me that this is what has caused the difficulty. The question is how is that division is to be handled. Partition would be only one possibility. A special status for the north is another. The possibility of sharing sovereignty is a separate possibility. The core issue is not Serbia's position on Kosovo but the inability of the countries supporting Pristina - the Quint - to accept that the people of the north will not accept simple incorporation into rule by Pristina and Serbia cannot simply surrender Kosovo. Germany and the US appear to prefer imposing that and this is the problem. It prevents compromise and - through any use of force - could lead to further conflict.

2. Do you think that clear mesage of President Tadic that he gave up of the idea of division could open the door for negotiations or talks about sovereignty of institution in the North Kosovo or some kind of stronger autonomy for Serbs?

No, I don't because in itself it does not meet German requirements for allowing Serbian candidacy. Germany is demanding that Serbia give up the north, abolish its Serbian local institutions, give the "border" to Kosovo (through "joint" control), and bring down the barricades without EULEX agreeing to behave in a status neutral fashion. Can President Tadic do that? Unless he can, it seems Germany's hardline position will remain the determining factor in any EU approach.

3. How would you asses the possibility of talks about that and in which format (UN, EU, without Russsia...)?

Talks on making progress on the north could take any format. The more important issue is the stance of the Quint and especially the US. As long as the US supports and encourages Pristina to hold out for 100% of what it wants - abolishing the "parallel" institutions, creating a "border" in the north and implementing Ahtisaari there in the same form it has south of the Ibar - the Kosovo side will not be open to compromise. You cannot have real negotiations unless both sides are ready to compromise.

4. Would you please explain your idea of double sovereignty in the North of Kosovo?

The possibility of dual sovereignty might actually be applied more to the Kosovo status issue as a whole. In other words, allow both sides to claim sovereignty of Kosovo. Serbia would stop blocking Kosovo membership in international organizations and each member of the international community would continue to decide for itself whether to recognize Kosovo or not. Serbia could continue to play a role in Kosovo vis-a-vis Kosovo Serbs per the Ahtisaari Plan. (Practical support and cooperation with Kosovo Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo need not entail political questions of status.) Both Serbia and Kosovo could control the common boundary. All of this while continuing to disagree on status and without Serbia recognizing Kosovo as an independent country. Any special arrangement for the north would fit inside this approach. Dual sovereignty over just the north would be a form of partition and probably not acceptable.

Kosovo: Serbia, the EU and Germany

2011-12-20T14:17:00.000+01:00

German Chancellor Merkel visited Kosovo on December 19 and encouraged the Kosovo Albanians to fight corruption, "behave responsibly" and not "stir up tensions." But her main message seemed more focused on Serbia. She made clear that for Germany, there is no way for Serbia to enter the EU unless it surrenders Kosovo.

Merkel did not say that Serbia must recognize Kosovo. Indeed it seems that the EU is anxious to make clear that formal recognition is not required. (Five EU states themselves don't recognize Kosovo.) But the conditions Merkel did lay down would amount to a complete Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo. Germany requires that all barricades be taken down, ways found to regularize trade, joint "border" control and the abolition of all Serb "parallel" local institutions in the north - including municipalities, courts and schools.

Merkel also visited German NATO troops and told them that "our security and our peace back home are down to troops serving their country here." (German security depends on subduing the Serbs in northern Kosovo? Why would that be?)

In sum, Merkel's message was for the Kosovo Albanians to behave and while German political and military pressure on Belgrade takes care of the north.

It seems clear that while some in the EU may be uncomfortable with putting Serbia into a corner - surrender Kosovo or lose the EU - Germany is not. And Germany commands the EU at this historic juncture because it seems only Germany can bail out the Euro.

It seems also clear that Serbia cannot meet Merkel's conditions. On the issue of so-called "parallel" institutions, Belgrade has responded that perhaps it would be better if the internationals accepted them as it is impractical to imagine them disappearing. Many in Serbia are talking as if they believe EU candidacy is now unlikely and not the end of the world. President Tadic - still clinging to his mantra of both Kosovo and the EU - is stretching his rhetoric as far as he can since he too understands he cannot meet Merkel's conditions. During a visit to Macedonia, he told the press that there is no way that Serbia can bring Kosovo back into its "state system" as it was before and there is no support for partition. He suggested perhaps some dual sovereignty approach might work.

The continued German effort to "bludgeon" Serbia and the northern Serbs into surrender is either based on a stubborn belief that force can work or is a cynical way of keeping Serbia outside. In the coming weeks and months - as it becomes clear that the barricades won't come down without agreement on KFOR/EULEX status neutrality and Serbian local institutions in the north won't be abolished in any case - how with the Quint react? Will the US and Germany, for whatever reasons, up the military pressure and perhaps seek a solution through use of force? Or will Serbia (and Tadic) be left to simply wither on the EU vine? Either way, Europe seems to be allowing Germany to lead it into a historic blunder by freezing Serbia out rather than bringing it in. Is progress on corruption, migration and ethnic conflict, etc more likely that way?

Kosovo: A Short Note on EULEX FOM

2011-12-19T14:17:00.001+01:00

EULEX Chief Xavier Bout de Marnhac has been speaking to the press about the need for the northern Kosovo Serbs to take down their barricades and give EULEX complete freedom of movement (FOM). He reportedly said that there should be "permanent and unconditional access for everyone, including EULEX and international organisations." FOM, he added, is an "absolute prerequisite for effective rule of law throughout Kosovo, which we are trying to achieve."

General de Marnhac served previously in Kosovo as head of the French NATO force responsible for the north and as commander of KFOR. He knows the situation in the north well and so far has kept EULEX out of direct confrontation with the local Kosovo Serbs there. But EULEX has stubbornly refused to commit itself to status neutral peacekeeping in line with its 2008 assumption of the UN's responsibility for rule of law in Kosovo. De Marnhac's comments leave open the question of whose rule of law EULEX is trying to spread through the north and whether "everyone" to be granted FOM includes Kosovo Albanian police and customs officials. It light of EULEX's apparent effort to use the recent Russian convoy episode to sneak such officers to the northern Gates, what de Marnhac said and didn't say is unlikely to convince the northerners to drop their guard.

So far EULEX has not embraced the peace proposal offered by the northern Kosovo Serbs. It would be unfortunate if de Marnhac's comments now are the only answer the northern mayors will receive - simply a further demand to surrender. It remains difficult to avoid the conclusion that both KFOR and EULEX are acting within a policy based not on their UN mandate but unilateral decisions by the Quint. Peacekeepers acting illegally unfortunately risk more conflict.

BTW, German Chancellor Merkel is visiting Kosovo today and will reportedly also be visiting German NATO troops there. If she travels north to meet the German troops there, will she take the time to meet the locals there too? Or at least to Trepca where the Germans got the batteries for their tanks in WWII?

Kosovo: War or Peace?

2011-12-17T14:24:00.000+01:00

The Russian aid convoy finally was allowed to enter north Kosovo on December 16 after a compromise over the EULEX demand to accompany the trucks. As the local Kosovo Serbs were still preventing EULEX from traveling by road to the Jarinje crossing point - they believed that EULEX was seeking to bring Kosovo Albanian police with them - the EULEX vehicles traveled from south Kosovo north through Serbia and then around back to Kosovo. It is not known if they had any Kosovo customs officials in the trunk.

The absurd lengths that EULEX went through to not commit itself to acting according to its status neutral UN mandate suggests that the crisis in the north is not yet over. EULEX chief de Marnhac justified EULEX's demand that it "control" the entry of the Russian vehicles as a matter of "rule of law." EULEX (and KFOR) cite this principle without specifying which rule of law they believe they are enforcing. Their insistence on subjecting the north to Pristina's "rule of law" - bringing Kosovo Albanian police and customs officials to the boundary - is at the root of the dispute that has kept the locals on the barricades since July. Russia's Ambassador to Serbia correctly noted that EULEX had exceeded its UNSCR 1244 mandate for political purposes.

Meanwhile, the northerners have presented KFOR and EULEX with a proposal for a "time out for peace" while broader issues are settled through dialogue including them. Everyone would commit to not undertake unilateral actions. The barricades would come down while the local Kosovo police (KPS) man the crossing points under KFOR and UNMIK supervision. KFOR would mount checkpoints around Mitrovica to prevent unilateral moves while EULEX would operate normally from there south. All this would leave time for filling in the details of the agreement to have both Serbian and Kosovo officials on the Gates. But so far, there has been little comment from the internationals with KFOR saying it is a "political matter" and EULEX only that it is "looking" at the proposal.

At the core of the proposed peace plan is the northerners continued distrust of EULEX. They remain opposed to an EULEX presence at the northern Gates as long as it seeks to impose Kosovo authority and customs there. EULEX efforts to do so are without question beyond the UN mandate for rule of law passed to them in November 2008. Perhaps Russia will now insist that the UN take back that responsibility?

The peace initiative opens the door to backing away from confrontation and it seems to suggest the northerners themselves are prepared to enter a dialogue on the future of the north. The government in Pristina continues to insist that the northern mayors are "illegal" but they have demonstrated they are the leaders on the ground and capable of acting responsibly. Chancellor Merkel will visit Kosovo next week. She should meet with representatives of the northern Kosovo Serbs - perhaps visit them on the barricades - and hear their side to judge for herself if they are all "criminals."

The open question remains the US. Left to themselves, the Europeans might well decide on an approach looking to peacefully implement issues agreed between Pristina and Belgrade while discussing further issues. But if anyone simply wishes to out-wait the northerners - leave it to winter to drive them off the barricades - or look for a good moment to again use force, it would be the US. Pristina's insistence on its plans for incorporating the north suggests at the least that its US patron is encouraging them to not compromise. So, the danger of war remains. Merry Christmas?

Kosovo: Alternative Realities

2011-12-15T18:00:00.001+01:00

I wrote two days back about the dangers of possible war over north Kosovo. The situation remains serious and tensions high. The northern Kosovo Serbs have offered a peace plan to KFOR and EULEX worth serious consideration. But instead, for now its hard to know whether to laugh or cry over recent events and statements emanating from Pristina and its international supporters. They seem to be living in alternative realities absurdly but also dangerously out of synch with the real situation on the ground and the complexities of the continued international dispute over Kosovo's status.

At the top of the list is the EU attempt this week to force a Russian convoy of "humanitarian aid" to pass through Kosovo customs before being able to deliver its cargo to the local Red Cross. The Russians no doubt know they were setting up the Quint to make some sort of blunder in its handling of the aid convoy, which took some days to drive to Serbia. Some - including ICO Chief Pieter Feith - have questioned the need for such aid. But Russia authorities say that while there is currently no humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, the reported cargo of electric generators, blankets, clothes, food and cooking gear are needed to help prevent one in the coming winter. Anyway, sure enough, EULEX rose to the occasion by stopping the convoy.

EULEX apparently saw this initiative by a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council - which passed the 1999 Resolution (1244) under which EULEX now has responsibility for rule of law in Kosovo - as a good opportunity to force Russia to recognize the government in Pristina. EULEX insisted on either accompanying the convoy into Kosovo or redirecting it to a southern crossing point manned by Pristina police and customs. The EULEX contingent to accompany the convoy would have included Kosovo Albanian poice. The Russians refused both options and the northern Kosovo Serbs stopped EULEX from traveling north. Reportedly an agreement has now been reached and the convoy may enter on December 16.

It seems unlikely that the genteel mandarins of the EU would have chosen to confront Russia on their own. Over Kosovo? It is not unlikely that the US hand was behind this again with US NATO forces being the element to stop the 27 trucks from entering in the first place. I remember working in the Clinton White House during the late '90s and asking colleagues there why the US treated Russia so arrogantly. The answer was that we had "won" the Cold War and Russia was now a second rate power of no account. Seems the same short-sighted attitude prevails despite all talk of "reset."

Next on the alternative reality list is Feith, the most apparently clueless international in the Balkans. After staying relatively quiet recently, he reportedly criticized the Russian aid effort and, for good measure, jumped back into the debate over the north. He repeated to reporters his longstanding refrain about resistance to Pristina authority in the north being led by criminals and suggested that the EU will insist on abolition of "parallel" police and security and administrative structures before granting Serbia candidacy. Perhaps he is counting on US support for his next job but at least he is being finally honest.

Along with Feith, there is the recent "revelation" by Prime Minister Thaci that the barricades in the north are preventing his government implementing its "decentralization" plan for the north. The is an Orwellian use of language in which "decentralizing" means abolishing those "parallel" local institutions actually supported by residents and imposing upon them rule from Pristina institutions dominated by Kosovo Albanians that they so clearly reject.

Finally, two snippets many may have missed recently. KFOR and EULEX are always talking about the criminals in the north. But a strange silence covers events for which actual people are identified. Two Kosovo Serbs arrested last month in Serbia for transporting weapons actually worked for the EU and may have been trafficking the weapons for Kosovo Albanians. As of today, the two - Arlov and Mitrovic - are still listed as members of the EU Info Kosovo office "team." (Look fast, they may soon clean this up.) Also, a person named by KFOR as behind organizing violence against it in the north reportedly worked until recently for the Pristina telecoms company (PTK) and had in the past unsuccessfully tried to put its cell telephone antennas into the north. Who actually is doing what and for who is not an easy matter to judge in Kosovo. That the Quint may use any Kosovo Serbs it can find to gain a foothold in the north also can leave one unsure of whether to laugh or cry.

Kosovo: The Danger of War

2011-12-13T15:26:00.001+01:00

It seems clear by now that the Quint countries - and chiefly the US - are determined to pry northern Kosovo from Serbia without regard to any UN mandate or what the people of northern Kosovo may prefer. The pressure from the EU on the Tadic government may be breaking it - the deputy prime minister has already resigned - but the Quint seems to have decided to go for broke. Brussels remains determined that Serbia must accept Kosovo customs in the north, get the locals to bring down the barricades and end support for the "parallel" institutions that have been part of the Serbian administration since before 1999.

The Quint may also be preparing a war scenario in the north by seeking a military solution to the local Kosovo Serb resistance to rule from Pristina. The locals themselves believe they see signs of a coming NATO military offensive in the north. KFOR has been demanding freedom of movement (FOM) for EULEX and "refusing" to accept the Serb offer to let NATO through the barricades. But it has used FOM to re-supply its forward areas and has been reinforcing its own presence along the main roads in the north.

KFOR may also be preparing the way for some action to "arrest" those it claims are behind the clashes in the north that injured NATO soldiers. (Interestingly, it focuses on the events of November 28 and the death of a Kosovo Albanian policeman shot in a Serbian village in July rather than the September 27 event in which NATO personnel were wounded in an apparent friendly fire incident NATO was quick to cover up.) NATO and EULEX could use this as justification for new actions against the northerners. Indeed, the Serbian Interior Minister downplayed the NATO focus on possible criminals in the north and charged that "a part of the international community" is making plans "to militarily conquer northern Kosovo."

KFOR's own commander has made it clear that NATO has completely abandoned its UNSCR 1244 mandate for Kosovo peacekeeping. In a remarkable video of KFOR FOM activity in northern Kosovo released by NATO, German Major General Drews explained that his forces are "insisting" on FOM because "as long as there is no FOM in northern Kosovo, EULEX and the institutions in Kosovo are prevented from realizing the rule of law in this country; presently there is no rule of law, there are no legal institutions, no working police and other institutions." Looked at in light of 1244, this statement is wrong in two big ways:

Under UNSCR 1244, the only legal institutions in Kosovo are UNMIK ones. The instituions in the north work with and under UNMIK and therefore are legal, including the local Kosovo police (KPS). The Pristina institutions proclaim their legality but that remains a disputed matter and has not been judged legal by anyone. Not the ICJ and not the UNSC.
There is not a single word in NATO's 1244 mandate for Kosovo that gives it the responsibility to impose anyone's rule of law in the north except, possibly UNMIK's.

Drews' comments suggest that NATO and the EU no longer base their presence in Kosovo upon the UN mandate but rather the "invitation" from Pristina to help it implement the Ahtisaari Plan as now written. This has two implications: that the northern Kosovo Serbs now have no legal responsibility to cooperate with KFOR and EULEX and that KFOR believes any action to subdue the north is within its Pristina-derived mandate. This is a very dangerous mix.

NATO's abandonment of its UN peacekeeping mandate for a Pristina mandate to conquer the north explains why the northern Kosovo Serbs may look around at KFOR's actions to date and fear a coming military offensive. But they are unlikely to simply surrender. And even if NATO placed troops on every street corner, it could not force them to participate in Kosovo institutions. Their officials could meet anywhere and they could ignore anything coming from the south. To impose a court in north Mitrovica, NATO would have to escort the personnel there everyday, perhaps by helicopter as they do now to the crossing points. Does the Quint really expect any government in Belgrade to simply agree to end support to a besieged north? A military "solution" to the north is shear illusion and folly. Another dangerous mix.

Serbia and the EU: Who Needs Who?

2011-12-12T15:36:00.000+01:00

The European Union has said "no" to Serbia. Chancellor Merkel's order to the rest of Europe to become more German will probably lead to the unraveling of the Euro - and maybe the EU - as the mandated austerity will sooner or later splinter on the various national political realities. In the middle of this, President Tadic continues to tie his country and his own political fate to gaining EU membership. One might see in this an a-historical strategic choice.

The EU - apparently motivated by the US and "led" by Germany (and Austria?!) - rejected Serbia's candidacy over its continued "refusal" to surrender Kosovo. The US seems to believe that all the Serbs need is some good hard hits on the head to come to heel. In north Kosovo, US KFOR has acted on the ground to administer such blows (as on September 27) while pushing the German/Austrian KFOR to do the same.

In the "diplomatic" realm, the EU is expressing its certainty that surely Serbia will get candidacy next year after it has shown the good sense to do as it has been told and give up the north. The EU wants to see "actions and not words." The EU is careful to inform that this does not mean "recognition" but "normalization" of relations with Kosovo. And taking down those nasty barricades that injured NATO soldiers trying to remove them.

However, "normalizing" relations with Pristina will not mean any special status for the north but rather bringing the north into Kosovo institutions on Kosovo Albanian terms. The dialogue that Brussels has sought to use to find an un-American way to approach the northern stalemate keeps running into Pristina's refusal to accept any practical arrangements that do not somehow entrench Kosovo sovereignty. The US says it doesn't have to. Meanwhile, KFOR sometimes passes through the barricades and sometimes doesn't because the northern Serbs refuse to let EULEX by until it stops taking Kosovo Albanian officials to the boundary crossings and KFOR still insists. (EULEX is using helicopters for now despite the Kosovo Albanian officials sitting and doing nothing once there as the crossings remain blocked.)

Tadic remains wedded to doing everything he can for EU membership. The northern Kosovo Serbs are worried that under EU pressure he might try to cut them off. Perhaps stop paying salaries or withdraw the MUP. But as almost everyone knows except apparently the Quint, Tadic cannot simply cut the north off, certainly not when the EU placed a noose around his neck and is kicking the chair out from under him. He has to have somewhere to put his feet.

It has been said that the trouble with the Balkans is that it produces more history than it can consume. It actually seems more that the Balkans produces too much history for the rest of Europe to consume. It was the frontline for centuries in Europe’s defensive war with the Ottomans, who were still there just 100 years ago. The “Holy Romans” and “Habsburgs” of today are now standing at the Gates keeping the Serbs out of Europe. But in truth, the EU needs the Balkans inside even more then the Balkans needs to get inside.

The EU loses if there is any "outside." As it is discovering, for a united European economy to work, everyone must be inside and playing by the same rules. An EU based on exclusions and inequalities - where Germany can reap huge profits by selling to neighbors who don't pay their debts - won't work. Austerity alone will only stop the buying and not resolve the problems. And anyone left outside might do quite well taking up with those who eventually fall out.

Serbia might be wiser to tell the EU that for now, it is comfortable with handling the Kosovo issue in its own way and when it is ready, it will get back to Brussels. Don't call us, we'll call you?

Kosovo: A Northern View

2011-12-08T21:54:00.001+01:00

Here follows a view of the current situation in north Kosovo from the northern Serb perspective. It does not necessarily represent my view but is, more importantly, an authentic voice from those on the barricades. They deserve to be heard too.
----

DAY 136

New record in civil disobedience in Serbia. Milosevic made it only for 78 days against NATO, while protest of citizens against his regime in ‘96 and ‘97 lasted 88 days and students made it more then 117 days.

It is a first winter morning with snowfalls, here today. It all started one hot July night when someone’s plan was to ignite the crises with possible outcome of permanent 'resolving' of 'problem' of North and its criminals, about 50,000 of them. Fortunately, the plan apparently approved and coordinated with Uncle Sam has failed and criminals have only become hoodlums. During these few months people in the North, or let’s say hoodlums in that time, have become core of interest of regional and international media and politicians. Some of their own compatriots have even tried to make them look as non-democratic, politically motivated smugglers who only care about their own profits. This has then changed in past two months and most of the international and local media have finally started to present the crowd, who was obviously just scarred about their own future and careful about all of the pranks coming from south of the Ibar River, as Northerners – ordinary people tired of trying to defend themselves from something they don’t see as their choice.

Well, exactly the question of choice is the core of the ‘problem’ Northerners feel here. Nobody from international community or any other party have ever asked themselves what do the Northerner think about this apparent ‘reality’ they are under constant attack from to be assimilated in. They, who send the reports to their mission headquarters in Brussels, New York, Washington and maybe to the Moon, sit comfortably in the nice offices in Pristina, close to a fancy restaurant probably built from the funds with unknown origin and have never come north of Ibar River and spoke directly with people, probably because of the lack of respect. This is the problem which is now chronic for the past 12 years. The very same people send a report that ‘problem’ of the North are few insurgents, probably members of the nationalistic parties and some criminals who work closely with criminals from south and once these people are discredited, the majority will be able to live normal life under the framework of the plan which I do not like to name here. If they are so right then they would not need to throw down the Ibar River so much money of European and American tax payers, who do not live in prosperity these days and would probably not be very happy when they would be aware of this fact. It would be much more profitable for all if they would pay this money first to fund a proper survey data in order to hear and understand what the Northerners really think.

However, maybe the true should not be set out and it is not their real plan to have the outcome which is not the one they would like. If that would be the case then the Northerners will on their own have to find the best possible way out to resolve this question above all other questions. Maybe a simple referendum based in accordance with effective legal framework would be possible way out of this situation when two sides claim different reality, or not.

Whatever the case would be, some of us are bit tired of UAV’s flying low in the middle of the night and the arrogance of the heli pilots sending their own messages by flying low above the downtown. Accidentally, most of these vehicles are US KFOR property. They refuse to understand and accept the soberness/stubbornness of the Balkan people. Maybe they still need to try ‘Sljivovica’.

Latest development over the brand new deals from Brussels is new worry for Northerners and another test of their trust. The removal of barricade in Jagnjenica Village has been presented as people hearing reason and beginning of obedience to call from Belgrade to withdraw. The additional argument was removal of some barricades near Gate 1. This was however just a set of practical steps to allow better movement possibilities. The Northerners are still pretty much on the same positions regarding the barricades and will wait to have presentation of final or at least semi-final agreement for the north gates, as the one available through media is just a skeleton for further arrangements. Maybe, they will just have to trust, to a trust Belgrade got verbally in Brussels, which leaves new maneuver space for Pristina to enforce set of regulations to which the EULEX will be bound to in accordance to its mandate. At the end of a day it will be another headache for a mission who failed to stay status neutral and provide Rule of Law under the provisions of UN SC Resolution 1244, and will apparently completely fall apart as a consequence of a status positive virus disease. It looks like that the pieces of EULEX mission are self-removing in order to keep the benignity status. This is just a roomer, but wherever there is a smoke, there must be a blue hat (not helmet), too.

As a simple people, the only thing we can do is to stay calm, wait and see how the things will develop after the 9 December 2011, a day when Serbia should get its candidacy, the one which looks like a candidacy to become a member of region in Germany, rather then a member candidate to European Union. Maybe we should propose the status of Euro-Autonomy of the North. It looks like everything is possible in EU these days. To some there are more conditions than you can type words in one minute, while for the others the same word is spelled ‘welcome’. Maybe they see us the same eyes we see their mess-up mission in Kosovo, but still most of us feel like Europeans who, looks like, have better manners then those flying in Kosovo in past few months and those sitting in mission head offices in Pristina.

In the meanwhile, everybody should hold their breath in Serbia, including the south part (Serbian Province) until the COB 9 December 2011. Then we can continue drinking ‘rakija’ 1 peacefully until someone comes to our table to see where we live and how our reality realy looks like. We are famous to be good hosts and we invite them to join us.

By the Northerner,
in Kosovska Mitrovica,
8 December 2011

1 - It is a period of family name celebrations, ‘Slava’. Coincidently, tomorrow is St. Alypius the Stylite day, who was famous to be firm to live alone and escaped to a dilapidated pagan temple in Greece, where he spent 53 years on a pillar he placed on this site. He died at the age of 118. As he placed the cross there and remove the pagan signs, people started to visit this place and built two monasteries on the site after his death.

Kosovo: An End to the Northern Crisis?

2011-12-05T18:04:00.000+01:00

News media are reporting today that the northern Kosovo Serbs have begun removing barricades after an agreement with KFOR. At the site in Zubin Potok that was the site of recent clashes, KFOR will keep a checkpoint that will now include local Kosovo police. Tanjug also reports that barricades on the road to Gate 1 in Leposavic are coming down. It is not yet clear if all the barricades will be removed or just some.

There is some expectation that the new agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on the crossing points plus the removal of some barricades might lead to the EU deciding favorably on Serbia's EU candidacy this week. As long as nothing else negative happens in the next few days, it at least will make it harder for Germany and others to deny Serbia.

But the real story may be that finally an opportunity has been created to end the current crisis in the north that began on July 25. The decision by the northern Serbs to at least test whether KFOR and EULEX are willing now to return to acting within their UN mandate is a wise and courageous one. The actions by KFOR and EULEX over the last few months to impose Kosovo customs at the northern boundary have given the local community in the north absolutely no reason to trust them. But within the context of the new agreement - which offers a framework for a status neutral approach to the northern crossing points - and to help remove any excuses for Berlin to veto Serbian candidacy, the northerners have apparently decided to act as if they do. It is now up to KFOR and EULEX to perform their duties as peacekeepers as mandated by UNSCR 1244 and not to seek to further the political agenda of any one side.

Now some words on "status neutral" and "trust."

Some have questioned the value and meaning of "status neutral." The term derives from UNSCR 1244 which does not settle the question of the status of Kosovo but provides for peacekeeping while that status is resolved. "Status neutral" does not mean, nor does it prevent, each side claiming that status has been decided. Pristina and its supporters assert Kosovo independence while Serbia and Serbs deny it. "Status neutral" does, however, establish a mandatory approach for those international elements - namely KFOR, EULEX and UNMIK - acting under the UN mandate in Kosovo. A status neutral framework for the northern boundary would simply mean that both sides accept neutral practical arrangements while the political dispute continues. Status neutral does not mean either side has given up their views on Kosovo's political status.

Some question how KFOR and EULEX can be trusted to remain neutral and carry out any agreements reached in a status neutral manner. Indeed, they have good reason to question these two Quint agents. But it is not really a matter of trust. The northern Kosovo Serbs have demonstrated, by their determined and peaceful resistance to the effort to impose a new political order on them, that they must be part of any process to achieve a stable and peaceful accommodation over the north. Their actions to protect what they see as the interests of their community are their ultimate guarantee. Nothing lasting can be done without them. Hopefully, KFOR and EULEX will not again be used to try and settle the northern issue through force. Clearly that does not work.

Kosovo: Commentary on the New Agreement

2011-12-04T19:09:00.000+01:00

Seems the text I posted yesterday of the new Pristina-Belgrade "agreement" on the crossing points and customs is indeed the official version. After further review, it does appear more like an agreed framework for further elaboration rather than an immediately implementable mechanism. It also appears to offer the possibility of being the status neutral approach claimed by the Serbian government. Important details need to be fleshed out but judgement might be profitably withheld while clarifications are offered and developed.

Everyone will have to make up their own minds and hopefully, the EU, KFOR and Belgrade will exercise some patience as those in the north are given an opportunity to hear clarifications and to consider. Here follows my own comments on the various sections:

IBM (fn1) Agreed Conclusions

1. In line with the Lisbon Treaty, and relevant EU legislation (fn2) and given that both parties are part of the EU's Western Balkans agenda, they will be required gradually to harmonise their legislation with the EU acquis and in particular to apply the concept of IBM; This is an admirable goal as coming into EU compliance would be good for everyone. Note the term "gradually." This might take years depending on what the EU does to offer relevant benefits to Serbia and Kosovo.

2. In the interest of faster and more effective processing, the parties, under the overall guidance of the EU, will apply the concept of IBM; Consistent with #1, applying the "concept" of IBM would seem to offer leeway for actual implementation over time.

3. The parties intend gradually to set up joint integrated posts at all their common IBM crossing points. This cooperation will follow the best European practice as it is progressively further developed by the European Commission. The work will be given a high priority; the projects will be identified jointly and will be implemented as soon as practically possible; This says the two sides will give "priority" to implementing the joint posts "as soon as practically possible." I.e., no deadline and as practical. Affecting practicality might well be events on the ground including how far the northern Kosovo Serbs cooperate. I.e., presumably taking into account the fact that even should they take down the barricades, they could always put them back again so nothing can be done until they agree?

4. The joint, integrated, single and secure posts will be located within a 'common area of IBM crossing points', jointly delineated, where officials of each party carry out relevant controls. Exceptionally, and limited to the common IBM areas, the parties will not display symbols of their respective jurisdictions; Seems to suggest joint posts but "common area" might cover immediately adjacent posts. "Relevant controls" is not defined but could allow "separate but equal" status neutral approach. As no political symbols would be displayed, status neutral.

5. The arrangements will include a balanced presence, in line with requirements, from both parties of all related services such as customs, police etc. and will cover matters such as the location of the crossing points, the nature of the facility, opening hours etc. In line with its mandate (fn3) at the crossing points Jarinjë/Rudnice and Tabavije/Bërnjak, this presence will include EULEX officials. EULEX will also be present at crossing points Dheu i Bardhë/Konqul, Merdare/Merdarë, Mutivodë/Mutivode and Depce/Muçibabë; Both Serbia and Kosovo will have police and customs officers at the crossing points. This is a clear step toward status neutrality. EULEX will be at all crossings - to "monitor, mentor and advise" - but presumably will have an executive role at the northern Gates. Despite the fact that fn 3 refers to EULEX's responsiblity to "assist the Kosovo institutions," depending on what occurs in Gates 1 and 31, this could also be status neutral.

6. At the core of the arrangement there will be a clear assignment of applicable legal responsibilities and liabilities to each party's jurisdiction; This has some northerners worried as it could imply that "secretly" or otherwise, Kosovo sovereignty would be implemented - "assigned" - to the northern Gates. If this were to be true, it would not be status neutral. But it would be so out of tune with the general approach it seems the parties accepted that perhaps it is a wrong reading. Perhaps it means that in the north, clear delineation would be made between goods crossing the Ibar River - which would be subject to Kosovo customs - as goods to north Kosovo would be subject to Serbian VAT. This or something like it would be status neutral.

7. A tri-partite implementation group, chaired by the EU, will be established to implement above arrangement as soon as practically possible. For that purpose, a technical Protocol will be developed and signed, if necessary separately with the EU, which will take account of the parties' different views on the question of status. The implications of these conclusions will be taken into account in implementing freedom of movement; This clearly provides for further negotiations on the details before implementation. The "technical protocol" would take into account the continued difference over status. This seems to suggest a commitment to find practical solutions that are status neutral.

8. This agreement does not cover any general or specific revenue or fiscal matters; The "agreement" achieved in Brussels leaves out the key issue of who collects what fees and where. This suggests that perhaps there will be no revenue or fiscal activities at the northern Gates. This would be a good approach and status neutral.

fn 1 One party recognises the line as a border; the other party recognises the line as an administrative boundary.
fn 2 As defined especially in the Schengen Borders Code, Frontex Regulation, Local Border Traffic Regulation, VIS Regulation and Community Code on Visas;
fn 3 As defined by Council Joint Action 2008/124 CEFSP, Article 3, Section a;

Kosovo: An Agreement on the Crossing Points? UPDATE

2011-12-03T19:52:00.002+01:00

After some initially conflicting statements, Pristina and Belgrade have reportedly reached an agreement in principle on handling the boundary crossing points and customs. Details have not yet been released [a version from the Internet below] but the framework to be applied will be a form of the EU's Integrated Border Management (IBM) approach. This apparently means some form of joint Serbia/Kosovo presence at the northern and southern crossing points. But according to Serbia's lead negotiator, Kosovo and Serbian police and customs will be only observers at the northern Gates which will remain under EULEX control.

Exactly how the northern Gates will function and what customs activities, if any, will take place there remains unclear and may indeed require further elaboration. According to the Serbian side, there will be no state symbols at the crossing points, neither Kosovo nor Serbian officials will have any "executive" functions and there is no agreement yet on the "fiscal and revenue" arrangements.

Both Pristina and Belgrade will present the framework agreement in their own manner. From the Kosovo side, this will be seen as reaffirming the dividing line as a border. Belgrade will insist that the mechanism to be implemented will be as an administrative boundary. The EU itself is being quite sensitive to what it calls the arrangement, as witnessed by the careful way EU facilitator Cooper avoided spelling out exactly what "IBM" means and then ended up calling it the "integrated management of crossing points."

Depending on how the details fill out the agreement - apparently the subject of further discussion - the arrangement could defuse the current crisis in the north and provide both sides something to claim as a victory. In the south, Kosovo would gain the ability to refer to the IBM approach as Serbian acceptance of a sovereign border while Serbia would be able to say it has sent its police and customs back to Kosovo. In the north, an agreement to keep the crossing points under EULEX but with the presence of customs officials (from both sides) could offer a status neutral outcome to retaining Kosovo as one customs space.

I've written previously about possible status-neutral approaches to customs at Gates One and 31. The key points would be whether or not customs fees would be collected there and, if so, how would they be handled. If no customs fees are taken at the northern crossing but both sides simply assist EULEX by recording information - which the Kosovo authorities might then use to levy and collect fees south of the Ibar - this would appear consistent with UNSCR 1244. If fees were collected by EULEX and then go into escrow pending political agreement, that too would be status neutral. If EULEX collected fees only for goods bound for the south, this also could be done in a status neutral manner, though perhaps fairly cumbersome in practice. It seems unlikely that Belgrade would agree to customs collection for all goods at the northern Gates by Kosovo officials, or even by EULEX itself if all funds went into the Kosovo treasury.

Filling in the details will take time. But the new agreement does raise the possibility that perhaps, the German hardline against granting Serbia candidacy could be dropped in time for a December 9 decision. The EU facilitator reported progress on other matters as well in the Brussels talks. Perhaps the tough talk from Merkel and KFOR was focused on pushing Belgrade the last steps. (One wonders who helped push Pristina, as it does not appear to make the maximalist gains it had hoped for, the US?)

It remains to be seen how the northern Kosovo Serbs will respond. It may take action on their part to start removing the barricades to also remove the remaining excuse for not giving Serbia candidacy. President Tadic has said he now expects their support. If the agreement reached on the crossing points is status neutral - even if not in their view ideal - it would be worth considering. But someone may have to give them a clearer idea of those important details. Is there time before December 9?

The Text as reported from Within the Gates:

IBM (fn1) Agreed Conclusions
1. In line with the Lisbon Treaty, and relevant EU legislation (fn2) and given that both parties are part of the EU's Western Balkans agenda, they will be required gradually to harmonise their legislation with the EU acquis and in particular to apply the concept of IBM;
2. In the interest of faster and more effective processing, the parties, under the overall guidance of the EU, will apply the concept of IBM;
3. The parties intend gradually to set up joint integrated posts at all their common IBM crossing points. This cooperation will follow the best European practice as it is progressively further developed by the European Commission. The work will be given a high priority; the projects will be identified jointly and will be implemented as soon as practically possible;
4. The joint, integrated, single and secure posts will be located within a 'common area of IBM crossing points', jointly delineated, where officials of each party carry out relevant controls. Exceptionally, and limited to the common IBM areas, the parties will not display symbols of their respective jurisdictions ;
5. The arrangements will include a balanced presence, in line with requirements, from both parties of all related services such as customs, police etc. and will cover matters such as the location of the crossing points, the nature of the facility, opening hours etc. In line with its mandate (fn3) at the crossing points Jarinjë/Rudnice and Tabavije/Bërnjak, this presence will include EULEX officials. EULEX will also be present at crossing points Dheu i Bardhë/Konqul, Merdare/Merdarë, Mutivodë/Mutivode and Depce/Muçibabë;
6. At the core of the arrangement there will be a clear assignment of applicable legal responsibilities and liabilities to each party's jurisdiction;
7. A tri-partite implementation group, chaired by the EU, will be established to implement above arrangement as soon as practically possible. For that purpose, a technical Protocol will be developed and signed, if necessary separately with the EU, which will take account of the parties' different views on the question of status. The implications of these conclusions will be taken into account in implementing freedom of movement;
8. This agreement does not cover any general or specific revenue or fiscal matters;

fn 1 One party recognises the line as a border; the other party recognises the line as an administrative boundary.
fn 2 As defined especially in the Schengen Borders Code, Frontex Regulation, Local Border Traffic Regulation, VIS Regulation and Community Code on Visas;
fn 3 As defined by Council Joint Action 2008/124 CEFSP, Article 3, Section a;

Kosovo: The Heat is On

2011-12-01T22:46:00.001+01:00

The north continued mostly peaceful again on December 1. However helicopters and drones apparently are again flying over the north suggesting to the local population that KFOR may be planning another round of activity directed at removing barricades. The Quint may see an opportunity to use President Tadic' call to end the barricades as cover for taking action. As KFOR has recently been suggesting that the local leaders are responsible for the violence, perhaps even arrests are planned? It seems now that the heat is on.

Tadic has played his last card in publicly dissociating himself from the barricades. Though the Germans and others are demanding he act directly to enforce his order, he cannot. The northerners show no sign of obeying. Instead, they are building more barricades and expressing "regret" over Tadic' position. Some remain considering reacting to any negative action from Belgrade or from KFOR with a declaration.

Germany has pulled off the gloves with Belgrade. Reportedly, Berlin still believes Tadic has considerable influence in the north that he can use. The German Foreign Minister reportedly said the recent "attacks" on KFOR "are "jeopardizing" Serbia's candidacy. Beyond this, he seemd to be finally admitting that Serbia must give up Kosovo as a condition for getting a favorable decision next week: "I am saying freely and without hesitation: if Serbia does not accept Kosovo territorial integrity, then it is a criterion in the German decision making.” The German Defense Minister echoed these comments saying the "violence" in the north is "driving away" candidacy. As it was German NATO troops in the lead provoking the violence, it almost seems that Berlin in simply creating the conditions for doing what it wanted to do anyway, reject any more EU members.

The EU is reportedly waiting to see the results of the current round of talks in Brussels between Belgrade and Pristina. The Quint may hope that Tadic may buckle under the intense pressure and accept some formula for putting Kosovo customs on the boundary and even ending support for the northern municipalities. Further KFOR actions on the ground might either precede such agreement - to force Belgrade the final steps - or follow it using any agreement as justification for further steps to subdue the north. While all this could merely be huffing and bluffing, it seems not impossible that a final push on the ground might occur over the next hours.

To be clear, I do not favor or oppose any specific political outcome. I've suggested here and elsewhere various compromise approaches to the larger and smaller issues swirling around the north. But it is also clear to me - from my time as UN regional representative in north Kosovo, my visit there last summer and all the information available to anyone who looks and listens - that the northern Kosovo Serbs are on the barricades because they see their community under existential threat and that they will not walk away from these. Any effort to drive them away will lead to violence that could spiral out of control and affect the entire region.

As I did yesterday, I end with questions: Why is it the peacekeepers - in Kosovo under the UN flag - that have turned up the heat? And who will then put out the fire that they may create?

Kosovo: What Next?

2011-11-30T19:03:00.000+01:00

It has remained calm in north Kosovo through the night of November 29 and into the 30th. The local Serbs have rebuilt their barricades despite occasional tear gas from KFOR and have completed a bypass road around the new NATO checkpoint between Zvecan and Zubin Potok. The NATO force remains in its self-created cul-de-sac.

It appears that the EU will make its decision on Serbian EU membership on Monday, December 5. "Several European capitals" have reportedly been signalling Belgrade that it may not get candidacy because of the barricades in north Kosovo. President Tadic and other senior officials in his government responded by appealing to the northern Kosovo Serbs to take the barricades down. Echoing a charge usually laid by Pristina and its Quint allies, Tadic accused northern leaders of hiding behind their citizens. Prime Minister Cvetkovic warned of further unrest if the barricades remain and called on the northerners to give dialogue a chance.

Meanwhile, COMKFOR tried to rebut charges that it had been acting illegally by again citing its mandate to ensure freedom of movement and by asserting that the Serb protests lack legitimacy because of the resort to violence. The Commander of NATO's southern flank also issued a statement supporting KFOR's actions and again claiming they were within the UNSCR 1244 mandate. KFOR's claim - which is at best obfuscation - was also repeated by the Quint members of the UNSC.

All this means that no one is really listening to anyone or tracking accurately what is happening on the ground. The EU and US seem determined to use all possible pressure to get Belgrade and the northern Kosovo Serbs to cave in by next week. One cannot therefor discount further escaltion by KFOR. As the Serbs show no sign of backing down, further violence cannot be excluded.

If violence escalates further, what would everyone do? Pristina would press for a real NATO offensive to gain control of the north. The US might support this thinking that a massive show of force would lead to a Serb capitulation. Perhaps the Germans and others would jump on board. They may even prefer to slam the door on Serbia in this way. But it remains unlikely that any of the NATO countries would accept, or want to be seen inflicting, real casualties. And it seems unlikely that KFOR could undertake further escalation without leading to further casualties, perhaps considerable.

Perhaps the next days will pass peacefully with little change on the ground. Then the EU would have to decide one way or the other about Serbia. A decision to postpone candidacy would be a blow to Tadic. Serbian politics would probably enter a phase of turmoil that would last until the upcoming election. The Quint would lose leverage with Belgrade and with the northern Kosovo Serbs. The Kosovo Serbs, in turn, would find themselves back in the center of Serbian politics. The EU facilitated dialogue would probably sputter to a end. Pristina might feel it now had nothing to lose by further provocations in the north and perhaps taking out its frustration on the southern Kosovo Serbs.

Maybe, just maybe, the EU will instead step back from the hardline US/German position and give Serbia candidacy anyway. Even better with a date. This would allow Tadic the room to continue in the dialogue with Pristina. Time could be gained for considering a longer term, compromise approach to the north and related issue such as customs.

One wonders why in 21st Century Europe this is such a difficult decision to make.

Kosovo: KFOR Out of Control & Outside UN Mandate

2011-11-29T23:24:00.000+01:00

November 29 was apparently a bit calmer in the north with no direct clashes. But KFOR kept things tense while the northern Kosovo Serbs rebuilt their barricades. KFOR soldiers fired tear gas and stun grenades and threatened use of lethal force to prevent Serbs from their rebuilding activities but were ignored. KFOR reportedly fired rubber bullets at journalists. Some tear gas blew back on the NATO forces as dump trucks drove up to the dividing line depositing huge piles of rock and gravel in front of armored personnel carriers and standing soldiers. By day's end, the local Serb community had reportedly built three new barricades partially surrounding the KFOR contingent meant to force their retreat. They also managed to build an alternative road to go around the NATO checkpoint established on the old barricade. Hundreds of the local community remain on the site.

President Tadic called on the northerners to take down their barricades in the national interest as events in north Kosovo are hurting the chances of Serbia receiving EU candidacy in early December. It would be surprising if he actually expected them to respond positively to his appeal.

KFOR is in a trap of its own making but has egregiously escalated the conflict, raising the risk of further violence. KFOR released three press statements on the 28th all citing NATO's UNSC mandate for Kosovo as justifying its recent actions. The last says:

This morning the roadblock- removal operation by KFOR went as planned. KFOR was executing its mandate to re-establish Freedom of Movement. The operation was successful and was completed without violence to the demonstrators. Later on demonstrators attacked KFOR positions and inflicted injuries. The protestors opened fire with small arms at KFOR troops and two soldiers were wounded. The violence by the protestors is still ongoing. The protestors use explosive devices and Molotov Cocktails against KFOR.
So far the violence resulted in 23 additional injured soldiers in the late afternoon and evening. The protestors could not be called as peaceful demonstrators at all, but as violent and criminal. Up to now KFOR only used pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons. However, in life threatening situations like this KFOR soldiers will respond with all proportionate means.
KFOR’s mission is to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Kosovo which includes freedom of movement in accordance with its mandate, under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.
Any action threatening a safe and secure environment and the life of anyone is unacceptable. KFOR will take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety of all the people of Kosovo, but also of its soldiers.

The statement merits close parsing.

KFOR claims the operation was to re-establish freedom of movement (FOM). However the Kosovo Serbs were not preventing KFOR movements. Rather they were denying FOM to EULEX because EULEX was using it to impose a political agenda of planting Kosovo customs officers on the northern crossings. KFOR was therefore conducting an operation to enforce FOM for Kosovo customs.

KFOR claimed the operation went as planned. So KFOR meant to be surrounded and stalled by hundreds of locals and to inflict and suffer a number of casualties?

KFOR claims injuries from small arms fire. Some find it strange that KFOR was filming everything but has not yet produced any evidence. In September, some KFOR soldiers were apparently injured by friendly fire. (Note: No one should be using fire arms. No one.)

KFOR denies peaceful protest in static assembly - barricades - is peaceful but rather "violent and criminal." Yet KFOR is provoking reaction using "pepper spray, tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons" and now also threatening "all proportionate means." All this in the name of ensuring a "safe and secure environment." This is NATO peacekeeping?

KFOR says its actions are covered under its UNSCR 1244 mandate. It's been saying that all along despite the fact that its role under the Resolution does not include imposing political outcomes. Its insistence on playing that role - including the use of non-lethal and threat of lethal force - strongly suggests a military out of control as well as outside its mandate. The Quint is playing with fire. They need to de-escalate and allow the EU to make a decision on Serbia without risking a new Balkans conflict.

NATO pushing Kosovo Over the Brink

2011-11-29T05:42:00.000+01:00

During the daylight hours of November 28, NATO forces - reportedly German and Austrian troops - launched a large scale effort to remove barricades manned in north Kosovo by the local Serb community. The KFOR action also sought to cut a crucial road link between the Serb-majority municipalities of North Mitrovica and Zvecan with Zubin Potok on the boundary with Serbia. The action appeared aimed at isolating and fragmenting the northern Serb community and breaking its resistance to efforts to impose rule from the Albanian dominated government in Pristina.

KFOR used tear gas and heavy machinery and also fired rubber bullets at those peacefully on the barricades. The Serbs responded with stones and video showed them also using sticks to beat back soldiers with plastic shields. Shots were fired with reports of who did what conflicting. KFOR claimed various injured with two from gunshots. Dozens of Serbs were reportedly injured, some seriously. Perhaps copying tactics used elsewhere, NATO also reportedly set fire to tents used by the protestors.

KFOR asserted its action was to gain freedom of movement (FOM) for itself and EULEX. The local Kosovo Serb leadership reaffirmed its commitment to KFOR FOM. But they continue to deny FOM to EULEX because it still seeks to impose Kosovo customs at the northern crossings.

Under pressure from the Quint, KFOR seems bent on bringing the northern Kosovo Serbs to their knees before December 9. The EU is due to decide on Serbian membership at that point. The US and Germany apparently are pushing to deny candidacy for Serbia unless it has accepted losing Kosovo and surrendering the north. If the barricades can be taken down by then, the EU could give Serbia candidacy (without a date probably) and help President Tadic save face. If Serb resistance is not overcome by the 9th, the EU would have to face the decision to stiff Serbia and deal Tadic a stinging rebuke or swallow the threats and grant candidacy anyway. Some in the EU may favor the latter. Either way, the EU will lose some near term leverage and hardliners Germany and the US seem to prefer going for broke now.

It still comes down to what happens on the ground in the north. The Serbs show no sign of being ready to surrender. On the other hand, each NATO provocation ups the ante on violence. The situation in the north remains very tense and Kosovo may have passed over the brink on the 28th. KFOR's actions could be the undoing of any possibility of peaceful compromise.

NATO has no UN mandate to support EULEX efforts to install Kosovo customs on the boundary without a prior political agreement.

EULEX should either act in a status neutral manner or the UNSC should revoke its mandate for rule of law. The UN Security Council will coincidently discuss Kosovo on November 29. But action there to reign in the NATO Kosovo force and repossess UNMIK's mandate from EULEX would likely be prevented by a US veto.

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=11&dd=28&nav_id=77535

http://www.tanjug.rs/news/25513/locals-clash-with-kfor-in-jagnjenica.htm

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=11&dd=28&nav_id=77524

http://www.emg.rs/en/news/serbia/169675.html

Posted by iPhone.

Kosovo: Quint Brinksmanship

2011-11-24T14:30:00.001+01:00

In the early morning hours of November 24, NATO troops from its Kosovo force (KFOR) again tried to change facts on the ground through stealth and use of force. They drove a group of local Kosovo Serbs off a road barricade they had been peacefully manning and then set up barbed wire to stop the Serbs from retaking the barricade. Sirens and social media alerted the locals and hundreds of them went to the barricade. They reportedly removed the barbed wire and as they sought to reinforce the barricade, clashed with KFOR troops from Hungary and Portugal. The Serbs reportedly threw stones and used trucks to back the soldiers off while KFOR used teargas before backing off. Neither side used firearms but KFOR reported 21 of its soldiers were injured, including one seriously by a truck. KFOR broke off the effort and the Serbs rebuilt their barricade. Meanwhile, a grenade was reportedly thrown near the North Mitrovica University and shots were heard in the area. (No injuries reported in those incidents.)

NATO has tried three or four times in the past weeks to remove barricades in the dead of night. This latest came two days after the recent talks between Belgrade and Pristina failed to resolve the issue of the northern crossing points and just days before the EU is to decide whether or not to grant Serbia member candidacy on December 9. The EU continues to threaten Serbia with not receiving a favorable outcome unless it allows Kosovo customs on the boundary and begins ending support for the northern Kosovo Serbs and their barricades. The effect of the EU pressures has led to some apparent loss of interest in getting candidacy.

The Quint seems to be on the verge of losing its leverage with Serbia. There is nothing else President Tadic can do to please them. What they are asking - that he give up north Kosovo - he cannot deliver. They more they press for the impossible, the more Serbs get ready to be left without the EU. Diminishing returns. And if Brussels denies Serbia candidacy next month, its leverage over the near term drops pretty much to zero.

So, why does NATO try once again to resolve the northern crisis on the ground through use of force? Perhaps because the people making Kosovo policy just now - the US Embassy in Pristina? - still believe a determined show of force will work? Or perhaps - because the Quint refuses to believe Belgrade does not control the northern Serbs - as part of an all-out effort to use all available pressures to push Tadic to order the northern Serbs to desist? Perhaps because they thought they'd catch the Serbs sleeping and would be able to finally show Pristina its internationals are making progress? Maybe just to muddy the waters and provoke the Serbs into doing something that would make them look bad or perhaps justify further repressive actions by KFOR and EULEX? Or maybe, to provide a good excuse to keep another potential EU member outside looking in rather than inside and adding to its already enormous problems?

The violence of last night actually helps no one. The injuries reported by KFOR are unfortunate. The locals might be more careful (though they claim to have seen the injured KFOR soldier hit by a KFOR vehicle). But it is the Quint that has put things on the brink by refusing to act within their UN peacekeeping mandate. All they need to do is accept the northern Kosovo Serb request that they not use freedom of movement to take Kosovo officials to the boundary crossings to begin enforcing Kosovo customs. The Serb request is that KFOR and EULEX act as status neutral peacekeepers, i.e., that they act within the mandate provided by UNSCR 1244.

To again be clear, KFOR and EULEX actions to enforce Kosovo customs are illegal. Everything they do to further Pristina's political agenda is illegal. Their efforts to remove barricades provoke legitimate peaceful response. Use of force in the dead of night invites zealous response. Things can get out of hand. And the fault of that can be placed squarely on KFOR's doorstep.

Does Kosovo have to go over the brink for the Quint to look at compromise solutions for north Kosovo?

Kosovo: Sharing A Conundrum

2011-11-22T06:30:00.003+01:00

As thing now stand, Serbia, Kosovo and the northern Kosovo Serbs are in the same boat. Intentionally or not, the EU and US are subjecting them all to forces that leave them on collision courses with each other as well as allow the “Euro-Atlantic” alliance to keep them on the doorstep of Europe rather than letting them in.

Beset with huge – perhaps insurmountable – economic and political problems of their own, the Europeans seem uninterested and/or unable to support real solutions in the central Balkans. They meekly follow the US lead despite Washington's own unrealistic approach to overcoming the region's lingering ethnic differences. In Bosnia, the EU/US axis seeks to pursue the holy grail of centralization despite the three entities appearing comfortable with the current situation in which they run their own affairs. (Sarajevo, of course, would not mind more centralism with it at the center.) The EU's feckless approach to Macedonian membership – waiting for the Greeks – offers nothing there as well.

Meanwhile, the EU is beating Serbia over the head with conditions for membership that at least some Europeans know full well are unrealistic. The Quint has managed to keep Ramush Haradinaj tied up in court while dangling over PM Thaci the sword of corruption and organ trafficking charges. The US keeps promising Pristina the moon while offering nothing more than destabilizing theatrics in the north. This amounts to an easy way to block both Serbia and Kosovo moving into Europe – member candidacy for Serbia, visa-free travel for Kosovo.

Serious efforts to help resolve the north Kosovo issue – through finding a compromise solution – and preparing Kosovo for travel would take time and resources that perhaps the Quint capitals just don't want to spare. So, left to their own devices, Kosovo, Serbia and the northern Serbs will either find their own way to dance together or be left to hang alone.

Finding the key nut to crack would not be difficult for the EU if it were serious. Just look at the position in which they have left President Tadic. Trapped by EU demands he cannot meet and facts being created on the ground in north Kosovo, he has no clear alternatives and therefore no clear policy. He would make any deal he could but cannot just give away Kosovo or the north. The deal the Germans and US seem to want – accepting Kosovo customs and taking down the barricades – the northern Serbs would not let him deliver. They appear more open to compromise than ever. But they will not simply surrender and don't trust anyone, including Tadic. One may encourage the northerners to take their barricades down and be open to new ideas but they are not thinking of compromise just now as all they see are hands raised against them.

What could the EU do differently? It could back off its effort to force Kosovo customs to the boundary crossings in favor of some status neutral approach. This would allow the northern Serbs to bring down their barricades while Belgrade continues to work through the EU dialogue with Pristina on further practical steps forward. All this would justify the eminently sensible step of granting Serbia candidacy in December. The Europeans could also drop the confrontational approach that seems to be favored by the US and instead seek to support Kosovo through a process of getting it ready for its own movement into the EU.

As of now, it seems the only way for Kosovo and Serbia to get serious help from Europe is to continue drifting toward conflict. North Kosovo would be the trigger. How to avoid this is their shared conundrum. Maybe they themselves need to take the first steps to back away from the current stalemate. And maybe the Europeans should stop looking for a “know-nothing” exit strategy from the Balkans and instead work on bringing it from the cold.

Kosovo: On The Brink of Something

2011-11-21T15:56:00.000+01:00

Delegations from Pristina and Belgrade are reportedly meeting today in Brussels to continue their dialogue. They may, or may not, talk about the north and they may, or may not, settle anything. Discussions may continue November 22.

This will be a crucial moment for President Tadic' efforts to gain EU member candidacy this year. The EU has followed the German/US lead in making the surrender of north Kosovo - meaning, for now, accepting Kosovo customs in the north and removing the barricades - the last condition. As The Economist notes, on the ground in the north, NATO troops are oddly guarding Kosovo Serb barricades.

The northern Kosovo Serbs have made clear that they will not feel bound by agreements reached in Brussels that would subject them to Pristina's institutions. Last week, a senior Serbian official raised the possibility that the north could declare independence if asked to accept such an outcome. The northern leaders themselves are remaining quiet about such an alternative. On November 21, the four northern mayors were reportedly meeting with UNMIK.

But at least one draft of a possible declaration of northern independence is circulating in the north (see below). Time is tight. In the next few weeks, something may well happen that takes events in the Balkans off in a different direction.

Maybe the EU and Belgrade will reach an understanding that grants Serbia candidacy without requiring it to risk political upheaval in Serbia and violence in Kosovo by trying to cut off the north? Then perhaps the region can enjoy the coming holidays and next year return to continuing to find practical accommodations to practical problems. Or maybe, the EU will press Belgrade to accept the unacceptable. Tadic could quietly agree to anything and leave it to the northern Kosovo Serbs to provide their negative answer on the ground. Or maybe the Quint will tire of the game and simply try one more time to settle matters by force? (US Ambassdor Dell was seen this past weekend staring north from the southern shore of the Ibar.) Some paths lead to peaceful change and some maybe not.

Guess we have to wait and see...

--------------------- Circulating Draft --------------------------------

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

When in the Course of human events, which are the consequence of the break up of ex-Yugoslavia, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature`s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the cause which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

In every stage of Oppressions and a long train of abuses and usurpations that we have endured in the past decade, and which were present intermittently throughout centuries. We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms the entire international community which is present on the territory of Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija in form of the following organizations: UN (UNMIK), EU, NATO (KFOR), OSCE, European Council and others, nonetheless our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury.

Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Albanian brethren. We have repeatedly warned them that the only fair resolution of this situation which would respect all our differences could be attained through the continuation of talks hopefully resulting with a compromise solution satisfactory for all concerned parties. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us and assimilate us through the activities of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Governing. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our mass exile from the territory of Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija in the year of 1999 and earlier on, of our missing and killed, of all the notorious and unsolved crimes which have been committed against the members of our nation (Staro Gacko, Livadice, Gorazdevac, Obilic) and finally of the March violence in the year of 2004, all the while having a complete understanding of all the grievances others have caused to them in our name. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred and common past to disavow the usurpations of our property, to resign the demolition of our graves, violent settlement of disputes and vengeance, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondences. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of the mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.

We, therefore, the legitimate Representatives of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People who we represent, solemnly publish and declare, that these territory that we settle are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent State in accordance with the International Law and because of all the injustice that we have had to endure, that they are Absolved from all allegiance to the so called Republic of Kosovo, and that all political connection between them and so called Republic of Kosovo, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent State, they have full Power to bring decisions, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent State may of right do, to that purpose we bring the following:

DECLARATION OF INEPENDENCE

Convened in an extraordinary meeting on x Xxxxx, 201x in Kosovska Mitrovica, the capital of the Republic of North Kosovo,

With reference to the Advisory opinion of the International court of justice in Hague in connection with unilateral Declaration of independence of Kosovo on July 22, 2010,

Respecting imperative and dispositional provisions of the international law, including the United Nations Charter, Helsinki Final Act, as well as Resolution 1244 ( SC/RES/1244-1999) and Interim Constitutional framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo from 2001 and UNMIK – FRY Common Document from 2001,

Answering the call of the people to build a society that honors human dignity and affirms the pride and purpose of its citizens,

Committed to confront the painful legacy of the recent past in a spirit of reconciliation and forgiveness,

Dedicated to protecting, promoting and honoring the diversity of our people,

Reaffirming our wish to become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies,

Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation,

Recalling the years of strife and violence in Kosovo, that disturbed the conscience of all civilized people, the years that last to this very day and take lives of ordinary people who strife towards a peaceful life,

Proud that after placing Kosovo under United Nations Interim Administration in1999, North Kosovo developed functional, multi-ethnic institutions of democracy that express freely the will of our citizens,

Recalling the years of internationally-sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the question of our future political status,

Regretting that no mutually-acceptable status outcome was possible, in spite of the good-faith engagement of our leaders,

Determined to see our status resolved in order to give our people clarity about their future, move beyond the conflict of the past and realize the full democratic potential of our society,

Honoring all the men and women who made great sacrifices to build a better future for our democracy:

1. We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare North Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people, which will be reaffirmed in a referendum, and is in full accordance with the recommendations of International Court of Justice and all legally relevant documents pertaining to the Kosovo Status Settlement.

2. We declare North Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the rights of all communities in the territory that we control and create the conditions necessary for their effective participation in political and decision-making processes.

3. We accept fully the obligations which we as a democratic state inherit from our legal precursors, as well as all international obligations pertaining to the international law. We shall implement in full those obligations including through priority adoption of the legislation, particularly those that protect and promote the rights of communities and their members.

4. We shall adapt as soon as possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights.

5. We welcome the international community’s continued support of our democratic development through international civilian and military presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1244(1999). We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise implementation of our independence. . We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to retain the leadership role of the international military presence on our territory and to implement responsibilities assigned to it under UN Security Council resolution 1244, until such time as our institutions are capable of assuming these responsibilities. We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure future peace, prosperity and stability.

6. For reasons of culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the reforms required for European and Euro- Atlantic integration.

7. We express our deep gratitude to the United Nations for the work it has done to help us recover and rebuild from war and build institutions of democracy. We are committed to working constructively with the United Nations as it continues its work in the period ahead.

8. With the independence comes the duty of responsible membership in the international community. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other acts on the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the international legal obligations and principles of international comity that mark the relations among states. We shall fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all our neighbors. We shall also refrain from the treat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

9. We hereby undertake all the international obligations, including those concluded on our behalf by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo ( UNMIK) and treaty and other obligations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Crna Gora and the Republic of Serbia to which we are bound as a former constituent part, including the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. We shall cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. We intend to seek membership in international organizations, in which we shall seek to contribute to the pursuit of international peace and stability.

10. We declare our commitment to peace and stability on our region of southeast Europe. Our independence brings to an end the process of Yugosavia`s violent dissolution. While this process has been a painful one, we shall work tirelessly to contribute to a reconciliation that would allow West Balkans to move beyond the conflicts of our past and forge new links of regional cooperation. We shall therefore work together with our neighbors to advance a common European future.

11. We express, in particular, our desire to establish good relations with all our neighbors with whom we have deep historical, commercial and social ties that we seek to develop further in the near future. We shall continue our efforts to contribute to relations of friendship and cooperation with them, while promoting reconciliation among our people.

12. We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically, and irrevocably, that our Republic shall be legally bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including, especially the obligations under international law. In all of these matters, we shall act consistent with principles of international law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, including resolution 1244 (1999). We declare publicly that all states are entitled to rely upon this declaration, and appeal to them to extend to us their support and friendship.

Kosovo: Is the Quint Serious About Peace at All?

2011-11-18T20:44:00.000+01:00

According to the press, the Quint is apparently still using helicopters to fly Kosovo customs officials to the two northern Gates. It was KFOR doing the air travel but I understand it may now be helicopters rented by EULEX? In any case, seems that EULEX is pleased with itself because it continues to plant these customs officials at the boundary crossings even though they have nothing to do as the northern Kosovo Serbs continue to block them. It appears too that KFOR has stopped trying to close off all alternative roads as there are too many of them and too few KFOR. (Perhaps not all national contingents are willing to go on these wild goose chases? Just the Americans and Germans?)

Not at all clear what the Quint thinks it gains by this daily empty gesture. Perhaps it is meant to appease Pristina? Or perhaps to keep the boundary issue open until Belgrade agrees - under pressure from the EU - to some customs formula acceptable to the Kosovo Albanians? Whatever the case, it sure ain't status neutral. Talk about Kosovo as "one customs area" cannot hide the fact that UN peacekeepers - i.e., KFOR and EULEX - have no legal mandate to decide which side owns that area.

And EU pressure there is. The German ambassador in Kosovo reportedly has said that his country gives Serbia until December 9 - the date for an EU decision on candidacy - to provide "firm evidence" that it will give up on the "parallel" institutions in the north. This is necessary to prove Serbia's "constructive relations" with Kosovo. The German ambassador reportedly added that while it cannot be expected that the "parallel" institutions would be abolished byDecember 9, "if Serbia wants the EU Council of Ministers to approve its candidacy status on that day, it has to find a way to show that it has given up on these structures."

It is beginning to look like maybe, just maybe, Germany is simply using the Kosovo issue - raising conditions it knows President Tadic cannot accept - because it does not want further problems inside the EU. Germany has its hands full with all those Latin and Mediterranean countries who can't be trusted to live as responsible burghers. Merkel does not want to have to explain to her taxpayers how she could have let in one more "basket case" that Germany will end up having to pay for. So Berlin sets ever receding conditions for Serbia and now demands that Tadic give up the north.

For the first time, a Serbian government official is surfacing the possibility that the misguided Quint policy could lead the north to declare its independence. (The ICJ ruled in 2009 that international law is silent on such things.) There are other ways to settle the northern issue but the US and EU are not helping getting there. A return to status neutral peacekeeping would give everyone more options than simply deepening the conflict. But deepening the conflict may be what at least some of the Quint want.

Kosovo: Between Rock and Hard Place

2011-11-17T15:23:00.000+01:00

Early in the dark hours of the morning of November 17, a large number of KFOR and EULEX vehicles apparently tried to cross Serbian barricades near Zupce in north Kosovo. The locals received information suggesting they were carrying Kosovo Albanian police to the Zubin Potok crossing point (Gate 31). The local Serbs reacted quickly and reinforced their barricades. After some tense moments, they agreed to allow some of the KFOR vehicles through after KFOR made clear they would not seek to remove barricades and were just trying to exercise freedom of movement. A second KFOR convoy including EULEX turned back to the south.

It is difficult to understand what KFOR and EULEX were playing at. Testing whether the Serbs were still awake? Trying to sneak by with a fast one? In the event, everyone acted responsibly and conflict was avoided. But KFOR accomplished nothing beyond proving yet again that there are no use-of-force solutions to the northern Kosovo Serbs' refusal to accept Kosovo institutions.

But on the other hand, it is easy to understand the Quint's eagerness to be seen doing something other than wait for President Tadic to surrender to EU pressures on membership. The EU, UK, Germany, France and US all are threatening to hold up EU candidacy if Serbia does not renew talks with Kosovo and clear the roads in the north. The Kosovo Albanians are waiting for their internationals to do something. The wild card here is the northern Kosovo Serbs. Whoever huffs and puffs, they must be the ones to bring down their "brick" walls. And they remain unconvinced. KFOR/EULEX actions on the ground do nothing to encourage them to end their peaceful resistance. The Quint remains caught between a rock and a hard place on the ground in Kosovo.

Also in that tough spot is President Tadic. He is facing those EU/US demands with a target date of December 9. Either Serbia will be granted candidacy status or not. The Kosovo conditions have been made clear to him. But as much as he might like to be accommodating, he cannot be seen bowing to threats. In London to meet with the British PM, Tadic told a meeting that he cannot disband "parallel" structures in north Kosovo because they are legal Serbian ones. He said that if the EU does not grant Serbia candidacy unless it recognizes Kosovo, it would be the EU's mistake.

Indeed it would be the EU's mistake. Its threats to give up Kosovo and end support for the northern Serbs won't work. So then on December 9, it will either have to put up or shut up - grant candidacy or delay it. Either way, it loses leverage on Serbia. And it loses most if it delays. With springtime elections in Serbia looming, delay means that Tadic most likely will not survive the political backlash of being denied. Nikolic would seem unlikely to then accept terms Tadic couldn't. Seems the EU is caught in the ultimate hard spot. It has serious other problems and maybe never was enthusiastic about the deep Balkans anyway. But letting it slip away? Over the few hundred square kilometers of north Kosovo?

Kosovo: Again Danger of Violence in Brdjani

2011-11-16T16:16:00.000+01:00

Despite last week's clash in the sensitive Brdjani area of north Mitrovica that led to one death, Kosovo Albanians are apparently seeking again to begin construction of houses there in another dangerous example of "unilateral returns." Brdjani is an area of high ground - called Kroi i Vitakut by the Albanians - where mostly well-off Albanians lived before the 1999 violence. It is immediately adjacent to the Serb-majority core of north Mitrovica. In the waves of ethnic cleansing that left no Serbs in south Mitrovica, the people there fled and houses were destroyed. (Some areas inhabited by Albanians do remain north of the Ibar River.) In 2009, Albanians pushed to "return" to the area and began building houses under the protection of KFOR and EULEX. The action was not a product of agreement between local communities and was not coordinated with the UN mission responsible for north Mitrovica. Local Serbs protested, KFOR anf EULEX used force (including teargas) to break them up.

In the first stage of this unilateral "return," the Albanians built further back from the Serb areas. Since 2009, they have built roads and improved infrastructure. The two groups seemed to have worked out a modus vivendi. But the clash on November 9 occurred in the area between the two. The Albanians are now apparently seeking to construct houses right next to the Serbian homes.

KFOR and EULEX helped plant a time bomb in north Mitrovica when in 2009 they permitted and supported an uncoordinated Albanian "return" to Brdjani. A proper approach to returns would address the issues of all communities, north and south of the Ibar. Instead, KFOR and EULEX allowed a one-sided return into an area that had remained vacant for so long because its location made it too exposed and too contested for anyone to simply seize. This was an early example of KFOR and EULEX stepping outside their UN peacekeeping mandate to enforce the political objectives of one side on the other.

Now the Kosovo Serb local leadership is asking UNMIK, EULEX and KFOR to prevent further construction because of the risk of further clashes. Whether the Albanians are rebuilding now in order to provoke a Serb response or not, their action is provocative. EULEX and KFOR should prevent any further unilateral actions. If not, and any violence follows, they will be as responsible for it as anyone.

Testimony to the US Congress on Kosovo

2011-11-15T21:45:00.003+01:00

On November 15, I testified to the US Congress on Kosovo as part of a three-person panel including Ambassador Kurt Volker and Ivan Vejvoda. This followed the testimony of the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Europe, Philip Gordon. Gordon presented the US view that the north of Kosovo is full of criminals and needs to be subject to the rule of law. He expressed support for KFOR/EULEX actions to obtain freedom of movement. He rejected the idea of partition but under persistent questioning from Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Gordon did leave open the hypothetical possibility of an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on an exchange of territories.

The complete text of my testimony follows:

Kosovo: Time for a New Approach
Gerard M. Gallucci

Testimony of November 15, 2011 for the Hearing on the Balkans by the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Events over the last four months in northern Kosovo are unfortunate reminders of the potential for things to spiral out of control there, with consequences that could be felt throughout the Balkans. On July 25, units of the Kosovo Special Police (sent from Pristina) attempted to seize control of the two northern crossing points with Serbia that had been until then manned by local Kosovo police and members of the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). In the next days, NATO troops (of its Kosovo Force - KFOR) and EULEX – both in Kosovo under a UN peacekeeping mandate – sought to support the action by transporting Kosovo police and customs officials to the two Gates.

The local Kosovo Serbs saw this as an effort to subject them to Kosovo Albanian control and to cut them off from Serbia. They responded by peacefully resisting and raising barricades to block further such efforts by the Kosovo authorities or the international forces. KFOR and EULEX reacted by confronting peaceful protests with armed force, using live fire on September 27, and repeatedly seeking to remove barricades and close off alternative roads using tear gas, pepper spray and heavy machinery. US personnel have been on the frontline of these efforts, stepping outside their UN mandate without any apparent recognition by the Administration of their new role.

Let me clear about three things:

1.   The NATO troops and EU police have been acting outside their UN peacekeeping mandate by trying to impose Kosovo customs in the north without any prior political agreement. They are there to keep the peace while others seek to resolve the political differences. Their actions have damaged international credibility and increased tensions dangerously.
2.   The great majority of the local Kosovo Serbs in peaceful protest and on the barricades are not criminals or being forced to be there against their will. They see the actions by Kosovo authorities and KFOR and EULEX as an attack upon their lives and community.
3.   Nothing can be gained by the effort by the Quint countries – the US, UK, Germany, France and Italy – to impose Pristina's authority through force. The Serbs rebuild their barricades and use other means to get supplies. The actions by NATO and the EU have only hardened their rejection of Pristina and made compromise more difficult.

I note that last week, one person (a Kosovo Serb) was killed and several others injured (including a local policeman) by gunfire in a sensitive mixed area of north Mitrovica. Accounts differ as to what happened but it seems the gunfire came from Kosovo Albanians.

After 12 years of frozen conflict, it has become clear that an effort to find a practical accommodation for the north, while Kosovo status remains unresolved, is long overdue. The local Kosovo Serbs have prevented, through peaceful means, what they see as an effort to impose on them Kosovo institutions that they reject. The international peacekeepers have reached the limits of their ability to project political solutions that do not have the support of the local communities in the north. It may therefore be a good time for all parties - Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, Pristina and Belgrade and the internationals including the EU and the United States - to look for alternatives.

TransConflict (an NGO located in Belgrade which occasionally publishes my analysis) has posted a paper (attached) that looks at such a possible alternative: status neutral implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo (developed at the request of the UN Secretary General in 2007). It derives from an understanding that nothing positive can emerge as long as the two sides continue to see the situation in zero-sum terms, that for them to win, the other side must lose. Rather, to avoid further conflict and open the door to focusing on achieving economic progress, each side must be willing to compromise and consider outcomes that recognize the fundamental interests of the other side, as well as their own. Simply put, these are: 

for the northern Serbs, to be allowed to live in their own communities without political interference in local matters from Kosovo central institutions and with continued linkages to Serbia.

for the Kosovo Albanians that the north remain part of Kosovo and function in significant ways as part of the Kosovo political system.

The paper provides a series of detailed recommendations - for the courts, the police, municipal competences, finance, inter-municipal co-operation, co-operation with Serbia and extended competences for north Mitrovica - that could facilitate implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan in north Kosovo.

But without outside help, Kosovo Serbs and Albanians are unlikely to be able to rise above their history and achieve compromise. The northern Serbs would prefer outright partition and remaining part of Serbia. The Albanians would prefer not to have a Serb majority in the north.

Unfortunately, the responsible internationals – the Quint and most especially the US – still support imposition of Pristina authority and institutions in the north. Reportedly, US elements of KFOR are even now seeking to close all alternative roads along the boundary to force the northern Serbs to capitulate to Kosovo customs in the official crossings. The rest of KFOR and EULEX appears to be simply waiting for Serbs to abandon their barricades in the coming cold. (They refused a Serb offer to allow them through the barricades if they do not use this access to impose Kosovo customs officials on the boundary.) The illegal and counterproductive efforts of KFOR and EULEX to seek to force the northern Kosovo Serbs to surrender have only increased distrust and strengthened the local resistance to any compromise. The Serbs show no sign of being ready to take down their barricades.

Since 2008, Quint policy – strongly encouraged by the US – has been to bully and threaten Serbia and the Kosovo Serbs to accept the loss of Kosovo and to abandon the north to Pristina. Some view this as one more bit of “punishment” for Serbia despite its new reality of democracy and eagerness to become fully part of Europe. But pressure and use of force has not worked. No Serbian leader – despite EU threats to deny the country EU membership unless it cooperates – can simply surrender Kosovo or end support to the north. The northern Serbs see no alternative but to continue to resist. The Kosovo Albanians see no reason to compromise when they have US support to continue demanding everything. (The Europeans have been surprising willing to follow the US hardline, perhaps because they wish to avoid being left alone in the Balkans.) This leaves the alternatives for the north the same they always have been: continued frozen conflict or partition – both of which might lead to further ethnic conflict and/or flight – or some compromise solution. As things now stand, north Kosovo may have to see more conflict before everyone looks to compromise. It is a good time to look for other approaches to Kosovo than trying to force one side to lose everything. If the United States cannot support an effort to achieve real compromise, then it should get out of the way and bring our soldiers home before they get further involved in one more conflict far from home.

Kosovo: Just What Are the Alternatives?

2011-11-14T17:30:00.000+01:00

Woke up this morning to an interesting conversation on Twitter between three Brits, an American (me) and a Kosovo Albanian about the relevance, or not, of Bosnia i Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska experience to north Kosovo. I suggested that the example of BiH is relevant to Kosovo only insofar as it shows what might be avoided if a genuine compromise over the north could be achieved. An approach not copying the Repubika Srpska model could be built upon the basis that both Belgrade and Pristina agree on keeping Kosovo whole. The next step would be to accept a status neutral framework for the north that would avoid institutional separatism.

But in truth, compromise solutions are always the most difficult to achieve. They require a step back – maybe a few steps – from the maximalist positions both sides take into a dispute. A compromise keeping the north in Kosovo but functionally as part of Serbia remains beyond both sides preferred outcomes:

The northern Kosovo Serbs would prefer outright partition and remaining part of Serbia. This is not the wish of “radicals” but of the overwhelming majority. Second best for them would be to be treated as Republika Srpska if Belgrade supported them or to declare independence if Belgrade did not. (The northerners have been quietly discussing this for some time and the ICJ has already decided that such declarations are not against international law.) Next best would be to preserve the present stalemate which at least keeps them out of the hands of Pristina. A distant fourth possibility that some might consider would be to have a certain form of special autonomy within Kosovo such as the Ahtisaari Plus.
The Kosovo Albanians would prefer not to have a Serb majority in the north. They were promised by the US all of Kosovo and still want it. They also do not trust having Serbs on the boundary with Serbia and in possession of Gazivoda Reservoir and the mineral wealth of the mountains and Trepca. Their second choice would be compliant Serbs within municipalities under Pristina's control. Only in third place would be willingness to implement the Ahtisaari Plan as it is without any “Plus.” But this at least gives them a foot in the door and could therefore lead to the first two outcomes. Going beyond Ahtisaari remains beyond choice.

Starting from this basis, one can see that compromise would be next to impossible without strong outside support and encouragement of a framework that offers each side something but not everything. Unfortunately, the responsible internationals – the Quint and its KFOR and EULEX agencies – also still prefer a maximalist position and not a neutral one. They support imposition of Pristina authority and institutions in the north. Reportedly, US elements of KFOR are even now seeking to close all alternative roads along the boundary to force the northern Serbs to capitulate to Kosovo customs in the officials crossings. The rest of KFOR and EULEX appears to be more patiently waiting for the Serbs to abandon their barricades in the coming cold.

But the illegal and counterproductive efforts of KFOR and EULEX to seek to force the northern Kosovo Serbs to surrender has only increased distrust and strengthened the local resistance to any compromise. Meanwhile, the EU – led by the Germans but no doubt with US support – is pressing Belgrade to give up the north or lose candidacy. President Tadic is between a rock and a hard place. Anything his government might agree to on the boundary crossings would face a hard look from the northerners and might not end the crisis.

The alternatives on the north remain what they always have been: continued frozen conflict, partition, ethnic conflict and/or flight or some compromise solution. But as things now stand, north Kosovo may have to see more conflict before everyone looks to compromise.

Kosovo: Something to Consider

2011-11-10T16:48:00.000+01:00

Events over the last two days in northern Kosovo are unfortunate reminders of the potential for things to spiral out of control there, with consequences that could be felt throughout the Balkans. On November 9, KFOR (reportedly US National Guard troops) again tried to accomplish whatever by removing a Serb barricade and closing an alternative route across the boundary. This appears to be another effort to force the northern Kosovo Serbs into accepting Kosovo customs at the crossings. The Serbs reacted by erecting another barricade. NATO's action to impose Kosovo customs without any prior political agreement was not only outside its UN mandate but damaged any remaining credibility with the local community. Not effective peacekeeping, or anything really.

Later the same day, three Kosovo Serbs were wounded by gunfire in the mixed Brdjani area of north Mitrovica. One later died. Brdjani is a sensitive location near the core Serb neighborhoods of north Mitrovica where KFOR and EULEX unwisely allowed a unilateral return of Kosovo Albanians in 2009. Accounts differ as to what happened and on past experience, it is unlikely that the police will be able to provide a clear version accepted by all. But the potential for further violence remains and KFOR and EULEX - indeed the US and EU - do not yet appear focused on preserving peace rather than seeking to impose political agendas.

After 12 years of frozen conflict over Kosovo, it has become clear that an effort to find a practical accommodation for the north while status remains unresolved is long overdue. The local Kosovo Serbs have prevented, through peaceful means, what they see as a one-sided effort to impose Kosovo institutions north of the Ibar River. The international peacekeepers have reached the limits of their ability to project political solutions that do not have the support of the local communities in the north.   It may therefore be a good time for all parties - Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, Pristina and Belgrade and the internationals including the EU and the Contact Group - to look for alternatives.

TransConflict has published a paper (suggested by neutral parties) that looks at such a possible alternative: the Ahtisaari Plan. It derives from an understanding that nothing positive can emerge as long as the two sides continue to see the situation in zero-sum terms, that for them to win, the other side must lose. Rather, to avoid further conflict and open the door to focusing on achieving economic progress, each side must be willing to compromise and consider outcomes that recognize the fundamental interests of the other side, as well as their own. Simply put, these are: 

for the northern Serbs, to be allowed to live in their own communities without political interference in local matters from Kosovo central institutions and with continued linkages to Serbia.

for the Kosovo Albanians that the north remain part of Kosovo and function in significant ways as part of the Kosovo political system.

  
In the current context, any compromise approach would need to leave aside the question of the status of Kosovo and - for the purposes of any agreement over the north - the status of any Kosovo institutions in which the northern Serbs might participate. The paper provides a series of detailed recommendations - pertaining to the courts, the police, municipal competences, finance, inter-municipal co-operation, co-operation with Serbia and extended competences for north Mitrovica - that could facilitate implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan in north Kosovo. It is offered as something to consider.

Kosovo: Separate Tracks

2011-11-07T13:48:00.000+01:00

There comes a time in some conflicts where people on both sides come to understand that they cannot get what they want by further violence or may in fact lose more than they might gain by continuing to fight. If they are lucky, some outside third party may take an interest and help the two sides to move into a negotiating framework. This is the moment that they all begin to move on a single track toward the possibility of an agreement that freezes the conflict and perhaps leads toward a political resolution and a stable peace.

There is a counterpart to this moment in the lead up to more violence. It happens when everyone begins to see only their own grievances, their own version of history, their own agenda. They lose the ability to hear each other and to be able to consider anything new, anything that might require compromise. Everyone starts down separate tracks to stalemate or a new collision.

It may be that north Kosovo is reaching one of these moments. Seems that most everyone - Kosovo Serbs, Albanians and the internationals - grasps at some level that the situation in the north has become untenable as it is now. The latest report by the UN Secretary General makes this clear. It also may be that there is increasing willingness to consider possible modes to resolve the current crisis and perhaps even find an approach that would help return things to a more normal life for everyone. But it seems increasingly that people are talking past each other and reacting more to what has happened rather than what might be done to move away from conflict. The tracks may be separating.

The two local parties - Serbs and Albanians - are the least likely to be able to rise above their history. They believe too that any acceptance of some compromise position would be a sign of weakness. They feel the ground may be shifting beneath them: Belgrade may sell them out, the EU may want new approaches. Without outside help, nothing good is likely to emerge.

Unfortunately, the outside helpers - the Contact Group - seems also trapped by their history and political agendas. KFOR and EULEX find it impossible to commit fully and openly to peacekeeping instead of continuing to seek a one-sided political outcome at the northern boundary. They have stopped - for now - using force but seem unable to address in any way the deep distrust their actions have created in the northern Kosovo Serb community. The Quint seems to be stuck in place, without the ability to offer anything new. Russia sees it has no reason to change its support of Serbia even as the Tadic government remains mesmerized by the slogan of both the EU and Kosovo.

Winter is approaching and hopefully the cold, cold Balkans weather will prevent everyone from doing anything really dumb. But the potential for accidents remain and life for everyone in Kosovo will remain suspended in this local cold war. And time moves forward. People will either have something new to consider or find themselves listening more and more to the old voices in their heads. The internationals still are the responsible peacekeepers and the only real potential peacemakers at this time. They need to get on track.

Kosovo: EU Losing Patience?

2011-11-03T17:38:00.000+01:00

According to BalkanInsight, an unnamed European diplomat in Brussels says that the EU is "losing patience" with Belgrade and Pristina's dispute over north Kosovo. The source said Europe wants mutual accusations to end between Kosovo and Serbia over who is responsible for tensions in northern Kosovo and for both sides to get on with talks. Reportedly, EU Foreign Affairs chief Ashton is trying to break the deadlock in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina over the agenda for the next round of discussions. "Both parties should demonstrate commitment to finding a compromise on the dialogue, including on the north," the EU diplomat told Balkan Insight. The source suggested that the two sides are "both right" about the north - Pristina wishes to impose its rule there while the local Serbs resist - but should "should move on with a plan on how to get out of this limbo, since the situation is unacceptable and unstable.... The blame games between the two should end; they don’t lead anywhere."

The "European official" whined that the EU was “furious” with Serbia for leaving the negotiations. "European opinion over the summer was quite anti-Kosovo because of the [Special Police] action in the north and Pristina got the message that such unilateral operations are harmful. But, the "European diplomat continued "all those Serb barricades erected later on the roads and Belgrade’s failure to deal seriously with the matter have changed opinions. Now the Albanians are less blamed than the Serbs for the tensions in the north." Nevertheless the source hinted that some EU members have started negotiating with both Kosovo and Serbia to find a solution for the north.

These comments appear to be part of a diplomatic offensive to both pressure Belgrade with the usual warnings about what must be done on Kosovo to gain EU candidacy and unusual outreach to the northern Serbs to see what they might want. Very interesting.

On the surface, it seems silly of the EU to be voicing impatience with Pristina and the Serbs' inability to settle their differences. If the two sides could settle their differences left to themselves, they would have. They clearly need help. A typical form of help is for outsiders to provide both encouragements and a framework for reaching agreements. The Quint - i.e., the EU and the US - instead have been trying since 2007 to force a unilateral settlement of the Kosovo status issue and for the north. This has not worked. So the EU should be losing patience with itself. Or maybe with the US for forcing such a hard line on it?

But under everything, perhaps the EU is edging toward a new approach, one recognizing that settling the north - and avoiding partition - will require something beyond what the Quint has offered thus far. The Ahtisaari Plan provides a framework. Implementing it would not be entirely straightforward. But if the Europeans are growing tired of having to deal with Kosovo as a crisis - don't they have Greece to worry about ? - then it would be a good time to engage with the northern Kosovo Serbs and offer both sides the necessary encouragement to begin filling in the framework.

Kosovo: When All Else Fails, Blabber

2011-11-02T13:46:00.000+01:00

The Quint's efforts to force a resolution of the north Kosovo crisis - caused by Pristina's unilateral actions and the Quint's own efforts to support them - have reached a stalemate. The barricades remain and it seems that only the northern Serbs themselves could bring them down. The Serbs have offered a formula for providing status-neutral freedom of movement (FOM) for KFOR and EULEX but these Quint agents refuse to accept the requirement to act only within their UN mandate.

So what do people do when they need to be seen doing something and really can't? They blabber. The chief Quint representatives were apparently blabbering quite a bit at a conference this week, with the American ambassador causing the biggest stir by suggesting that Kosovo seems to lurch from crisis to crisis and "this has become the governing style.” ICR Pieter Feith mentioned there were times when Prime Minister Thaci did not listen to him while EULEX deputy chief Sparkes talked about failures of the EU mission to live up to "expectations." US Ambassador Dell laid the blame for this sad state of affairs on the UN mission in Kosovo for holding onto power too long and not giving the Kosovo Albanians the opportunity to learn by doing. This triggered "irresponsibility on the part of Kosovo's political class" which "contributed to appearance of irresponsible media and a political class which is not capable of adopting its own decisions without external assistance." This apparently leaves it to poor Dell and Feith to tell them what to do.

Dell's casting blame on the UN is cynical and ill-informed. Cynical because the UN is actually in the hands of the UNSC which includes the US, UK and France. The US had the number two spot in UNMIK for most of the last 12 years while West European countries had the number one spot. I.e., UNMIK is what the European and US members made of it. Ill-informed because as anyone familiar with the actual history of UNMIK can tell him, the Kosovo Albanians captured the mission early on and ran Kosovo through it even before "self-rule."

Meanwhile, Interior Minister was also doing his share of blabbering. He suggested that KFOR can dismantle all the barricades in just a few days but wants to do it gradually, by winter. Minister Rexhepi repeated the standard line that the barricades serve criminal and radical political interests while adding the new KFOR/EULEX bit about freedom of movement as an international standard that should be provided to KFOR, EULEX, Kosovo institutions and all citizens. But he did also reportedly say there will be no further unilateral actions in the north. Hopefully that is not just blabbering.

Joining in the blab-a-thon is the British Foreign Ministry still pushing the Brussels line that Serbia is so close to EU membership and all it has to do is agree to arrangements for the north. Seems to overlook that if Tadic could, he would. But he gets no help from the EU.

Now, I remain of the opinion that KFOR Commander General Drews really is trying to find a way to return NATO to its peacekeeping role in Kosovo. Many in northern Kosovo would disagree with that given KFOR's recent actions and the refusal to accept compromise over FOM. But I won't accuse him of blabbing, just perhaps some conceptual confusion. The General reportedly said that he favors a peaceful resolution of the problems in the north but if not KFOR would find another solution. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that the alternative to peaceful would seem to be non-peaceful. Using non-peaceful means to impose political objectives - the freedom to act outside the UNSCR 1244 mandate - would not be peacekeeping.

Kosovo: Barricades Considered

2011-10-31T19:00:00.001+01:00

The current tense stalemate in north Kosovo continues. The local Serbs remain on their barricades, building one to take the place of another that KFOR removed, despite the cold weather and coming winter. KFOR says it refuses to use the partial freedom of movement (FOM) offered by the Serbs until EULEX can exercise it as well. The KFOR commander and EULEX deputy chief tried on October 31 to travel together through the barricades but the EULEX vehicles were not allowed through and they turned back. Given that some KFOR supply convoys reportedly have used the opportunity to go north in the past several days, the attempt by the senior Quint officials to exercise FOM seems to have been a bit of a stunt.

The northern Kosovo Serbs mounted their barricades as a response to the effort by Pristina – initially supported by KFOR and EULEX – to impose its customs controls on the northern boundary between Serbia and Kosovo. The local Serbs see the effort as an attempt to impose a state border between them and Serbia proper. As they reject the independent Kosovo state, they rejected the effort to establish its northern border. The Serbs saw setting barricades as their only way to peacefully protest and prevent KFOR and EULEX from supporting Pristina by transporting its officials back and forth to the crossing points. The locals also began using alternative roads to avoid the “official” crossings. KFOR at times sought to block those in an effort to force the Serbs to use the crossings manned by Kosovo Albanian officials (brought there in KFOR and EULEX helicopters).

To be clear, all activities by KFOR and EULEX to impose Kosovo customs and Pristina's officials at the boundary crossings were illegal under their UN peacekeeping mandate. The barricades used by the northerners to resist these illegal efforts were well within their right to peacefully resist. Eschewing violence, even when KFOR fired at them, they have successfully prevented the one-sided outcome in the north pushed by Pristina and its international supporters.

It is fair to ask, however, if the barricades remain necessary. The northerners have successfully made the case that the question of the north will not be settled by force. There is increasing recognition that something more more be done than simply trying to impose Pristina's control in the north. It even may be that KFOR and EULEX are ready to accept some neutral formula on customs.

So, perhaps, it is a good moment to bring down the barricades at the two main Gates. This would allow a practical test of KFOR and EULEX status neutrality. If no effort was made to collect Kosovo customs at the Gates, there would be no need to remount any barricades. Even if EULEX allowed Kosovo police and customs officers to be at the Gates, as long as they did not seek to control or collect fees there, they could be ignored. And if they did try to collect fees at the Gates, the locals could simply go around. In other words, it might be worth thinking about treating the boundary crossings as if they were not there rather than continuing to block them. This would allow KFOR and EULEX room to return to peacekeeping and their UN mandate without rubbing their nose in their inability to force surrender. It would also relieve pressure on the northerners themselves and on Belgrade.

The barricades along the Ibar may be another matter. The Serbs may find them still necessary to be able to prevent any new unilateral incursions by the Kosovo-Albanians until KFOR accepts its responsibility to prevent such rather than ferry ROSU north by helicopter as it did in July.

Kosovo: Peace Not Self-enforcing

2011-10-28T16:08:00.001+02:00

KFOR's public reaction to the northern Serb's partial opening of barricades does not yet appear to embrace a peacekeeping approach. It is removing barricades in the dead of night while the KFOR commander says he will not use the freedom of movement (FOM) offered by the Serbs "because it does not apply to EULEX, for which we cannot check whether the full freedom of movement exists."

General Drews explained that KFOR's demand remains that "unconditional and permanent freedom of movement should be provided for all international missions, including KFOR, EULEX and all others organizations and citizens.... Until this happens, KFOR will not use the given freedom of movement. There will not be any division between KFOR and our international partners in Kosovo." Asked if the FOM KFOR demands includes Kosovo police, Drews reportedly replied that the police in northern Kosovo should also be able to work. While apparently sidestepping the question if that includes Kosovo Albanian police, Drews said that "on the other side, I trust that the Kosovo government will act prudently and in keeping with the situation."

It is understandable the KFOR may be trying to avoid statements that suggest it has backed away from efforts to impose Kosovo customs and authority on the northern boundary crossings. But the suggestion that it should be up to the Pristina government to exercise restraint and not unilaterally use FOM to send its police and customs officers to the north cannot be credited at this juncture given the Kosovo government's threat to launch police operations in the north.

For KFOR's request, for complete FOM for everyone to be taken seriously, it must go on record that it will prevent unilateral and provocative actions by both sides. The risk, should the northern Serbs simply accept Drews' "trust" in Pristina, would be that another effort to impose Kosovo customs on the boundary would be followed by a new confrontation that would be much harder to settle by dialogue. Any barricades that the northern Kosovo Serbs remove - or that KFOR removes - could be quickly replaced. The stage would be set for real confrontation and the possibility for violence would increase.

To repeat what is obvious: KFOR and EULEX's effort to impose Kosovo customs on the northern boundary is outside its UNSCR 1244 mandate and has nothing to do with enforcing rule of law. It was an effort to enforce law of the jungle. The Serbian government - however anxious not to displease Brussels by being too direct - has had to publicly draw the conclusion that KFOR and EULEX have been serving Pristina. The ICJ in 2010 upheld the mandate of the UN in Kosovo and it is the only authority under which KFOR and EULEX may act legally within Kosovo. It is a matter of "rule of law" that KFOR and EULEX remain status neutral.

It is also a matter of keeping the peace for KFOR and EULEX to act strictly under their UN mandate. Peace does not keep itself. The peacekeepers cannot simply back away and expect everyone to behave. Pristina caused the current crisis by acting unilaterally in July. KFOR cannot expect the northerners to simply take it on faith that Pristina will not again seek to provoke violence.

Kosovo: Some Progress

2011-10-27T16:21:00.000+02:00

The press reports that the northern Kosovo Serbs have opened one lane in each of the two roads heading north to the Gate 1 and 31 boundary crossing points to allow KFOR to more easily (and cheaply) supply its forces in the north. They also will partially open a few barricades elsewhere. But others will remain and local leaders have indicated that the Serbs will be watching what passes through the roads. While providing this freedom on movement for KFOR resupply access, they still refuse to allow the same for EULEX until it reaches agreement with Belgrade on not transporting Kosovo customs to the boundary crossings. The Mayor of Zubin Potok expressed hope that "KFOR will respect our decision and not abuse it."

KFOR called the northerner's decision "a good first step" but repeated KFOR's "demand" for "unconditional freedom for KFOR, EULEX mission, other institutions and citizens." KFOR called on the Serbs to "stop their activities and completely remove the barricades."

The decision by local leaders to open the roads for KFOR logistical requirements is a wise one. It should decrease the immediate threat of further conflict and allow time for dialogue and for KFOR to demonstrate it has returned to status neutral peacekeeping. It also should allow time for Belgrade and EULEX to reach an understanding of how they might deal with the customs issue in a status neutral manner.

The northerners were no doubt under considerable pressure from Belgrade to find a way to avoid further confrontation with NATO. President Tadic must somehow find a way to appear to be meeting EU demands on north Kosovo while at the same time not having the issue re-ignite nationalist feelings about "losing" Kosovo. That the Kosovo winds are again blowing strong in the Serbian body politic is suggested by reported comments by Deputy Prime Minister Dacic suggesting that if Serbia cannot have all of Kosovo anymore, he should take the north.

But the decision to partially open the roads also suggests readiness among the northern Kosovo Serbs to find a way to defuse the threat of violence created by Pristina's efforts in July to change things on the ground through unilateral actions. Given KFOR's inability to resolve the crisis through further use of force, it opens up a chance for it and EULEX to back out quietly of the box Pristina (and the US?) made for them.

The next steps need not be taken out loud. Best might be for quiet understandings and compromise actions. This would be real peacekeeping.

Kosovo: Nothing Good Happening

2011-10-26T14:09:00.000+02:00

Some interesting press reports that suggest the gulf between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs and the dangerous situation the Quint has allowed to develop.

B92 reports comments from the Kosovo Interior Minister to the effect that his government is planning operations in the north, Rexhepi reportedly told Koha Ditore that the action would come “soon, I cannot give you the exact date, because we have to agree and coordinate our work. We need a plan.” According to Rexhepi, the operations to establish the "rule of law" in the north would be carried out and followed by an action aimed at unblocking the roads, adding they would not be postponed. “After removing the barricades, the priority will be establishing law and order. People who committed crimes and are under arrest warrants will be brought to justice.” Rexhepi indicated that after removing the barricades in northern Kosovo, there would be further operations requiring police and "civil action."

On the other side, a northern Serb spokesman told Balkan Insight that his community wants to remain part of Serbia and the people are willing to die for this cause. KFOR and EULEX “cannot force us to be part of the independent Kosovo. This will never happen.... There are two options. The first is that we are allowed to live inside Serbia, separated from independent Kosovo. The second is that someone expells us from here, which believe me, is hard to achieve. Deporting 50,000 people looks like a big risk.” The spokesman reportedly suggested that the current dispute in the north over customs is "a private war of [Kosovo Prime Minister] Hashim Thaci...not a war between the Albanian and Serbian nation.” But, he added, "no one can force us love each other."

Meanwhile, KFOR remains unwilling to discuss the northern Serb offer of freedom of movement in return for it and EULEX returning to status neutrality (though the US contingent wants to talk about access for resupplies). The Pristina press speculates that KFOR may instead wait until winter and cold weather when it would be easier to act to remove the barricades.

By the way, on Twitter, the NATO effort to break-up peaceful protest in northern Kosovo with tear gas, pepper spray, bulldozers, and disruption of cell phones is making its way into the same category of the #OWS.

Kosovo: Deafness Abounds

2011-10-25T17:54:00.000+02:00

Despite KFOR and others crowing about lifting the barricade of Gate 31 at Brnjak on the 24th, the roads to both main boundary crossing points remain blocked. KFOR soldiers are stationed in difficult positions with troops from various national contingents complaining about the conditions and weather. EULEX is reportedly spending millions of Euros transporting supplies and equipment to the blocked Gates. The local Serbs are under pressure from Belgrade to end the dispute and the northern leaders have offered KFOR and EULEX freedom of movement if they "will not transport Kosovo customs officers and work on establishing customs at the Jarinje and Brnjak crossings." The Serbs have meanwhile worked manning the barricades into their daily existence, responding quickly through social media and sirens to any hint of a NATO effort to break through.

KFOR's response suggests deafness: "Freedom of movement must be achieved without the conditions for anyone, anytime. It is very clear. Nothing else is acceptable....Freedom of movement for all includes the international organizations, as well as for all citizens of Kosovo and this should be achieved. Freedom of movement for KFOR because, for example, supply or similar and not for EULEX, is unacceptable." This leaves aside the crucial issue that makes it difficult for the northern Kosovo Serbs to accept KFOR's terms. Does "without conditions for anyone" and "all citizens of Kosovo" include Kosovo customs officers and police sent to enforce Kosovo customs in the north?

EULEX is no better: "We expect the freedom of movement to be re-established for everyone so that people can go about their normal daily lives without restrictions. People want freedom of movement and the rule of law. Those who put up the roadblocks should bring them down. This is also expected by all Member States of the European Union." This begs the question, yet again, of whose "rule of law" and which "people." It seems pretty clear that the people who live in the north value being free of Pristina's "rule of law" over their own freedom of movement. Why else would they be be willing and able to stop the NATO military machine from just bulldozing them over?

It remains necessary to point out, apparently, that KFOR and EULEX have no legal right under their UNSCR 1244 mandate to insist that Kosovo customs have access to the boundary. None. The effort to impose it there is not a matter of "rule of law" but of political expediency.

As I've suggested, a compromise over customs is possible. It need not even be formalized. Perhaps a "gentleman's agreement" could be reached so that no one need say anything new but the barricades would come down and stay down unless KFOR and EULEX allow the collection of Kosovo customs fees at the Gates? Maybe UNMIK can quietly convey necessary reassurances? Trouble is, the northerners have no apparent reason to trust the internationals. They do seem deaf.

Kosovo: Compromise Over Customs Now

2011-10-24T18:24:00.000+02:00

Over the last few days, it has become clear that the situation in the north has reached a dangerous stalemate. KFOR has tried by intimidation and stealth to remove the barricades mounted by local Kosovo Serbs to protest NATO and EULEX failure to remain status neutral. Both sides have tried dialogue and President Tadic has urged both to remain peaceful. But the dispute has come down to the Serb demand that KFOR and EULEX stop trying to impose Kosovo customs at the northern boundary through transporting Pristina's officials there and KFOR/EULEX's refusal to accept any conditions on being allowed freedom of movement (FOM).

On October 23, the northern Kosovo Serb mayors and other officials met with President Tadic in Belgrade. Tadic went as far as he could to support the northerners while also urging them to work with KFOR to reach a political solution and avoid extremism. He reportedly insisted that talks with KFOR and EULEX be continued and that they be given FOM provided they do not transport Kosovo customs officers. But this is exactly the problem, KFOR and EULEX appear unwilling and unable to agree to give up the imposition of Kosovo customs at the northern boundary. Tadic' advice does not contain any useful policy proposal. He remains trapped by the strong pressure from the EU to end northern Serb resistance to Pristina and his inability to simply order the northerners to surrender.

The northern Serb leadership has indicated that if KFOR and EULEX agree to not transporting Kosovo officials to the boundary, they would bring down the barricades and then be ready to discuss further. This suggests openness to considering a broader formula on customs. However, KFOR and EULEX would face a serious political problem if they were to agree on a simple withdrawal of Kosovo customs from the two crossing points. They and the Kosovo government would lose credibility and could become the targets of political reaction from frustrated Kosovo-Albanians. (One tried to remove a barricade on the Mitrovica bridge with a bulldozer from the south.) The Kosovo government might even fall. So KFOR and EULEX refuse the Serb demands and hunker down and reinforce while tension grows with each day.

I have written about a possible compromise on Kosovo customs in the north. Simply put, Kosovo customs officials (in multi-ethnic composition) would “assist” EULEX at the two Gates in recording commercial shipments into Kosovo. Customs fees would be collected in south Mitrovica for those goods going south. The crossing points would remain under the UNSCR 1244 flag and EULEX control. This is essentially the situation that existed previously. The key would be for the northern Serbs and KFOR/EULEX to agree to implement this arrangement without any need to withdraw Kosovo customs officials as a pre-condition to opening the roads while also recognizing that no further effort should be made to enforce Kosovo customs per se in the north.

This ought not to be too much of a compromise for either side. Both probably are tired of the current face-off and both must be concerned about the prospects of violence should tensions continue to simmer. President Tadic might do himself a favor by focusing on something more useful than mutual encouragement to just keep talking. Talk about what is the pressing question. The Quint needs to reflect on the position KFOR finds itself in and seek to make the best of the mess created by Pristina's July gamble that it could just seize the north. Both sides now should be talking about a compromise that allows everyone to relax and Pristina and Belgrade to return to implementing and making further practical arrangements.

Kosovo: NATO Tries Midnight Raid

2011-10-22T12:22:00.000+02:00

In the early morning hours of October 22, the Kosovo NATO force (KFOR) sent a contingent of Moroccan troops (who serve with the French) and Hungarians to north Kosovo. They went to remove barricades that KFOR had failed to do the previous two days in daylight. The troops in riot gear and with armored personnel carriers and heavy machinery were met by hundreds of local Serbs peacefully blocking their efforts. The Serbs were roused in the middle of the night by sirens that alerted them to the attempt. KFOR apparently once again attempted to disrupt cell phone communication but social media carried news of the events in real time. Reportedly, KFOR soldiers ordered reporters to leave or be tear-gassed. As of the morning, there had been no violence but tensions remain high with NATO helicopters being reported flying over the north.

On Friday, the KFOR commander had suggested he was ready to meet again with local leaders to try and reach a political solution to take down the barricades and give the international forces freedom of movement (FOM). Despite KFOR's effort to short-circuit talks by preemptively removing a barricade in the dead of night, on Saturday morning local mayor Slaviša Ristić reaffirmed Serb readiness to allow FOM for the international forces if KFOR and EULEX confirmed their status neutrality in the field. “This can be easily solved if KFOR and EULEX say that they will not transport Kosovo police and customs officers and if they take back those people from the crossings, then a space for free movement of everybody and for normal talks will be opened.”

It remains unclear why KFOR continues to try to settle the political crisis over efforts to impose Kosovo customs in the north through use of force. KFOR and EULEX have not been able to remove any barricades that way and the local Serb community appears ready to peacefully block any such effort and to rebuild any blockade that could be removed. The situation is nevertheless growing more tense the more KFOR and EULEX refuse to fully accept the requirement to act in a status neutral manner. It is the Quint's refusal to accept political and practical solutions to political and practical issues that is causing the danger of violence to hang in the air.

Kosovo: Agreement on Barricades Should Not Be So Hard

2011-10-21T15:32:00.000+02:00

The Kosovo NATO force (KFOR) tried again on October 20 to bring down the barricades mounted by the northern Kosovo Serbs. They used pepper spray and teargas on old men and women and managed to move one truck off the road at one place leaving all 18 barricades in place. EULEX says the "joint operation" was to "re-establish freedom of movement in northern Kosovo" claiming that "barricades were removed and vehicle check points and roadblocks set up." EULEX says, rather shamelessly, that "the overall aim is to improve the rule of law" and it called for calm and respect because "this is expected by all Member States of the European Union." Reportedly KFOR has now moved up some 100 trucks to use water cannon and heavy machinery to remove the barricades.

I won't comment further on the outrageous and clearly self-defeating tactics that the Quint has been using in the north to subject the northern Serbs to a government dominated by Kosovo Albanians. That the US, Germany and UK especially remain oblivious to the dynamics of tribal conflict is unfortunate but clear. In such conflicts, everything tends toward zero-sum confrontations unless neutral peacekeepers find ways to prevent unilateral actions. Since July, KFOR and EULEX have been supporting the unilateral actions and aims of one side in the conflict by seeking to force the Serbs to accept what they see as Kosovo Albanian customs on the boundary with Serbia. This is either US/EU policy or perhaps just the Quint embassies in Pristina being allowed to operate without adult supervision.

But the policy is ineffective as well as illegal. Through use of enough tear gas, pepper spray and muscle, KFOR may be able to remove some barricades. But people will get hurt, new barricades built and little gained. KFOR would face the prospect of either conceding defeat - and looking ineffective, never a good thing for a peacekeeping force -- or having to resort to perhaps killing force. This is dangerous and entirely unnecessary.

It still seems that General Drews understands this dilemma. As of mid-day October 21, the KFOR commander is reportedly calling for renewed talks with northern leaders before he orders further action because he prefers political solutions. Drews said that he does not accept roadblocks as a form of peaceful protest and cited UNSCR 1244 that requires international missions have freedom of movement (FOM). Concerning the Serbs' refusal to allow EULEX to pass through barricades as well, Drews said that FOM has to apply to all international institutions in Kosovo and that KFOR and EULEX could not be separated.

Drews' citation of UNSCR 1244 is a bit disingenuous. Yes, it does require FOM for the internationals. But it also requires they act in a neutral manner. The sole cause of the Serb refusal to allow KFOR and EULEX to pass through the north is that they have been using their access to the boundary to transport Kosovo customs officials there. All KFOR and EULEX would have to do to reach agreement with the northern Serbs is to agree to stop trying to impose Kosovo customs at the boundary crossings. Nothing the Serbs have said suggests they would oppose EULEX control at the two northern Gates. Their opposition to EULEX - and call for it to be replaced by the UN - owes solely to their belief that it is not acting in a status neutral manner.

Belgrade's September 2 agreement with Pristina on customs stamps was meant to cover goods crossing between Serbia and Kosovo at the southern crossing points. EULEX is lying if it suggests that its effort to enforce Kosovo customs in the north was part of the agreement or is simply enforcement of "rule of law" under 1244. Status neutrality requires EULEX to refrain from any actions to impose a one-sided political agenda.

So, all that should need to happen to end the current impasse in the north - and prevent real violence - is for KFOR and EULEX to agree to keep Kosovo customs from being enforced at the northern boundary. With such an agreement, and some time to rebuild trust, perhaps they could discuss with Belgrade and the northern Serbs finding a formula for some further compromise on customs. This should not be so hard.

Kosovo: View from Within The Gates

2011-10-20T14:20:00.002+02:00

This is a posting to the Within the Gates group on Facebook. How things look inside north Kosovo in the face of today's illegal action by NATO to use force to remove barricades and impose Pristina's institutions - which KFOR and EULEX refer to as "rule of law" - on people who clearly and peacefully are demonstrating they reject them.

International community embodiment in KFOR units has repeated to non-Albanian community this morning its position about the situation in the North. You must obey or you will be lectured how to obey! The situation in Zubin Potok is still tensed and KFOR units are still holding positions, while the Northerners are reinforcing barricades. The people I spoke with are saying that more and more people are coming to join those who were there from first minutes of KFOR action. They said also their are not cold, although it is close to 0 deg Celsius. People are worried but firm in its position not to withdraw. One of them said: Well we just managed to finish preparing Rakija and we have enough to keep us worm whole winter. It was also noticed that many KFOR soldiers are young and scared about what will happen. This can be dangerous as they can do something uncontrolled like the American soldier on Gate 1 - Jarinje, who apparently shot one of soldiers in line of fire. Whole night surveillance aircraft were flying over Mitrovica and Zvecan. Mobile phones were hard to use as NATO used its systems for interference.

It is really hard to understand that international community is not ready to find agreement with Northerners and continues to wait for right moment to continue with its plan to support Pristina institutions. They also do not understand local mentality and stubbornness of nation who already lost most of the residential areas and is not ready to bargain what was left over - its home land.

While I write, people are gathering in North Mitrovica on the barricades in order to protect them with their bodies, the once they see as final line of defense. When I say people, I mean man, women and youngsters, not hoodlums. Yes, there are hoodlums in the North too, like you can find them in London, Paris, New York or everywhere in the world. Because, North is part of the world it is not Mars or Moon, although it looks like we can only be saved by aliens. Maybe they can persuade those who should listen, to listen.
Still, foreign medias are not reporting realistically, although the change can be noticed.

Most have passed the news yesterday that Serbs have refused to remove barricades, without saying that KFOR made new requests to local representatives, as they knew it will be refused. Similar like the phantom Annex in Rambouillet during the talks in 1998, which was presented to Serbian Government last minute, with purpose to have the 'No' answer from them and to have argument for beginning of action against Serbian forces.

Unfortunately, it looks like the history repeats, with minor finesse, but there's not much we can do about it, although many public figures are saying 'Serbs will make the same mistakes from past'. This is not true, because in its 'fight' Northerners are using democratic means of civil obedience. The one that started in late hours on Monday 25 July 2011 and which represents final mean of survival to those who intend to stay and live with their families on their home land.

What is to be done? To continue the same peaceful way of resistance and to hope that international community will finally change its way of communication by beginning to understand local community in the North and to be honest, rather they trying to impose its plans, or simply to surrender. No, this will apparently be a long winter if international community does not change its approach.

Kosovo: KFOR Refuses Status Neutral Compromise

2011-10-19T18:18:00.000+02:00

The four northern Serb-majority municipalities met today to discuss their position on KFOR's request to take down their barricades. Their leaders then met with KFOR to discuss the issue and convey their offer. The northerners apparently agreed to allow KFOR access through the barricades under observation so that NATO could resupply its forces without using helicopters. This would have met KFOR's request to allow it freedom of movement (FOM) in the north. Reportedly, the Serbs also agreed to remove the barricades entirely if Pristina's customs officers and police leave the two crossing points. KFOR apparently refused the offer, now demanding as well FOM for EULEX. They did this without any indication that EULEX would not use its access to transport Kosovo Albanian police and customs officers to the boundary posts.

It seems that both Belgrade and the Quint may have been expecting the northern Serbs to accept the demand for FOM without any agreement by KFOR and EULEX to stop seeking to impose Kosovo customs on the northern boundary. Belgrade's messages to the northerners were mixed but clearly leaning towards asking them to step aside in the national interest, i.e., in order to meet the EU conditions for granting Serbia EU candidacy. KFOR – acting on behalf of the Quint hardliners – had been warning yet again that it would remove the barricades if the Serbs did not. A partial agreement to allow it FOM was apparently not enough to satisfy the political objective of forcing Serbia and the northern Serbs to accept Kosovo customs.

The press reported a KFOR statement, that has not yet appeared on KFOR's website, that it remains determined to act to remove the barricades. This would run the risk of violence and even if effective would probably lead to the Serbs putting up other barricades. There would seem to be no way for the Quint to impose its will in the north through use of the military or police. Indeed, every time they have tried to use force, or to set deadlines, they have been ineffective. One wonders who believes that NATO's demonstrated inability to impose one-sided political outcomes does any good for the alliance's reputation.

In any case, the ball remains in the KFOR/EULEX court to prudently back off their effort to impose Kosovo customs in the north or to continue to risk further conflict in the hopeless task of forcing one people to submit to another.

Kosovo: KFOR and Northern Serbs Moving Toward Compromise?

2011-10-18T17:00:00.000+02:00

As of the afternoon of October 18, it appears that KFOR has decided not to seek to remove the Serb barricades in the north through use of force. KFOR approached the barricades but then backed off after discussions with local leaders. Meanwhile the northern Serbs themselves are talking about possible compromise that would allow KFOR freedom of movement in the north in return for it acting in a status neutral manner and not transporting – or cooperating with EULEX in transporting – Kosovo Albanian customs officials to the boundary checkpoints. After appearing to have given the Serbs various deadlines, KFOR reportedly is now suggesting that it never said it would remove the barricades.

President Tadic reportedly gave the local Serbs a message emphasizing that they “bear great responsibility” over the situation in the north but adding that it would be “irresponsible” of him to discuss his instructions to them via the media. Indeed, Tadic suggested that “northern Kosovo should not be a topic for debate in the widest public and should rather be discussed among individuals who are in charge of such issues, have a high level of responsibility and can offer effective solutions.” However, in an extensive TV interview, chief of Belgrade's negotiation team, Borislav Stefanovic, made clear that the government is in no position to simply order the northerners to surrender. In any case, it seems that the northern Serbs themselves do not wish to prolong the current stalemate and would be ready to bring down the barricades – at least in part – if KFOR returns to status neutrality.

Whatever the reasons, the mutual decisions to avoid confrontation and discuss possible compromise should be applauded. The new KFOR commander seems to be moving KFOR back toward acting as a peacekeeper rather than a political actor. But it remains to be seen whether he can resist any pressure emanating from the Quint hardliners (US, Germany, and the UK) and the Kosovo Albanians to keep supporting the introduction of Kosovo customs at the boundary through use of force.

Kosovo: NATO Moving Toward Another Confrontation?

2011-10-17T17:38:00.000+02:00

The new Commander of NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR) seems to be trying to walk a finer line than his predecessor (who tried to bully the Serbs into surrender). General Drews has continuously spoken of the desirability of resolving the current crisis in the north through political means. He has been meeting with northern leaders, with KFOR issuing press statements at an increased pace, to show KFOR's efforts to look to dialogue to resolve issues. But COMKFOR also seems to be under orders to continue to press the northern Serbs by demanding they remove their barricades or NATO will do it for them. KFOR must feel somewhat ambivalent about being put in this situation as it has been giving, denying and then extending deadlines for the Serbs to remove those barricades. The new deadline, unless it is wisely dropped, is Tuesday, October 18.

All barricades mounted by the Serbs in the north remain as of Monday. The locals are concerned that anything can happen if KFOR seeks to act against them with force. Tensions in the north are high after almost three months of Albanian, KFOR and EULEX efforts to force the northerners to accept Kosovo customs. They view this effort as an attempt to separate them from Serbia and to push them into the hands of a government in Pristina that they believe means them ill. KFOR says it will act peacefully – “firmly, carefully and impartially, in full compliance with our mandate” – but the Serbs feel they have little reason to trust such assurances given NATO's past and continuing efforts to force them to accept Kosovo customs and last month's use of live fire. They are also concerned about outsiders looking to provoke or mis-guided Serbs responding to use of force by KFOR. They wonder if there may not be elements in the international community or on the Albanian side that would like to provoke violence in order to justify further repression in the north. They also remain concerned about the possibility that the Tadic government has made some deal to leave them to their fate. The situation is explosive. Nevertheless, the northern Serbs are holding peaceful demonstrations and seeking to ensure that nothing provocative happens from their side.

It may well be that in light of Brussels' focused pressure on President Tadic to surrender the north if he wants EU candidacy, the Quint believes this is a good time to mount another effort on the ground in the north. They may believe Tadic will ultimately accept anything they do there as long as he doesn't appear to blame. The Quint may even have – or believe they have – a deal with Tadic to order the northerners to stand down and accept a “peaceful” push by KFOR to remove the barricades. (Members of the government have given contrary advice in this regard.) Indeed, it is possible that President Tadic might agree to Quint demands that he knows they cannot, ultimately, gain because the northern Serbs will not abandon their barricades simply on orders from him.

It may also be that the Quint hardliners don't care about the actual results of an attempted use of force in the north, having run out of any other ideas anyway. But KFOR is in the middle of this dangerous situation. Anything it does to remove the barricades may ignite violence. General Drews might well prefer to work with the northern officials to gain their trust and find a way to allow freedom of movement for his forces and EULEX. But he and EULEX chief de Marnhac might have to be clearer on their commitment to act in a status neutral manner and not seek to introduce or enforce Kosovo customs officials and fees in the north without prior political agreement. And the US, Germany and UK would have to back off use of force and allow everyone to begin looking for the broader political accommodation on the north that clearly seems overdue.

Kosovo: Quint Policy Bankruptcy

2011-10-13T17:44:00.000+02:00

The day after the EU set Serbia the condition of surrendering Kosovo in order to move forward on membership, EULEX, KFOR and the Kosovo Albanians are stepping up their efforts to pressure the northern Serbs. The aim seems to be weakening their resolve to continue resisting the imposition of Kosovo customs and other institutions. With support within Serbia for EU membership dropping and no sign the northern Kosovo Serbs are ready to surrender to Pristina, one wonders what the Quint's Plan B may be.

On October 13, EULEX took over the Sisyphean task of trying to prevent the local Serbs from bypassing the “official” checkpoints in the north. With KFOR – despite COMKFOR's stated preference for “political” solutions – reportedly doing the actual work, EULEX said it was acting in Leposavic “to support the rule of law and restore authorized routes.” According to EULEX, its mandate is to “implement the rule of law, which includes conducting police and customs operations at Gates 1 and 31.” The British acting chief of EULEX said that “unauthorized routes evade legitimate controls and road blocks are illegal and help no one. It is important that the situation in the north of Kosovo is brought back to normal as soon as possible, for the benefit of everyone.” EULEX declared it would “continue our actions to support freedom of movement and establish the rule of law, carefully and impartially.” KFOR reportedly describes the action as directed against smuggling.

Apparently unobjectionable words about law and order. But whose rule of law is being “restored?” Whose police and customs operations are being imposed? Under which law is it found that any particular goods might be “smuggled?” The simple fact is that these remain unresolved issues of status: EULEX and KFOR continue to abuse their UN mandates by trying to force the northern Serbs to submit to Kosovo customs and “laws.” This is not impartial.

The Kosovo Albanians reportedly mean to increase pressure on the ground too by launching yet again a unilateral effort to “return” to north Mitrovica. Pristina is also continuing to refuse to discuss the north as part of its dialogue and now is proposing a “peace treaty” between the two “countries.” This would be the vehicle for Serbia to recognize Kosovo de facto.

Meanwhile, the EU is making it clear it is in no hurry on Serbian candidacy. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule told the press that “in the months ahead of us we will make an effort to work on achieving the goal with Serbia.” However, “the dialogue with Pristina remains the open issue” and solutions “for all open and difficult issues” must be found and implemented.

The Tadic government is seeking to find a way to squeeze through the noose the Quint has set for Serbia. The head of its negotiations team said Belgrade will be ready to resume negotiations once a “framework” is found for solution of the north. He accused Pristina of being unwilling to compromise. State Secretary Oliver Ivanovic suggested that the EU might have to convince the US to press Pristina to take a more positive approach. Good luck with that.

So, the Quint remains bent on seeking to force a Serbian surrender. Brussels says, accept these terms or dangle outside the EU forever. The Quint agents in Kosovo – EULEX and KFOR – act under orders to somehow bring the northern Serbs to heel. The Albanians will continue to resist compromise while making whatever trouble they can under cover of “returns” and bringing “rule of law” into the “criminal” north. A sadder display of policy bankruptcy it would be hard to find. So what is Plan B? Are those Europeans ready to look at some enhanced autonomy model for the north ready to step up? Or will the frozen Kosovo conflict continue to be allowed to anchor everyone in the grim present?

Kosovo: The EU Demands Surrender

2011-10-12T19:15:00.001+02:00

The EU – in the form of the European Commission annual report and statements by officials – has apparently accepted Berlin's “Kosovo” conditions for further progress by Serbia toward EU membership. The Commission report on Serbia was overall quite positive suggesting that “Serbia would be in a position to take on the obligations of membership in the medium term.” However the EC's "Communication" to the EU Council recommends granting candidacy “taking into account progress achieved so far and on the understanding that Serbia re-engages in the dialogue with Kosovo and is moving swiftly to the implementation in good faith of agreements reached to date … [and] that progress continues and that practical solutions are found to the problems with Kosovo.”

The Commission recommended that

negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with Serbia as soon as it achieves further significant progress in meeting the following key priority - Further steps to normalise relations with Kosovo in line with the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process by: fully respecting the principles of inclusive regional cooperation; fully respecting the provisions of the Energy Community Treaty; finding solutions for telecommunications and mutual acceptance of diplomas; by continuing to implement in good faith all agreements reached; and by cooperating actively with EULEX in order for it to exercise its functions in all parts of Kosovo.

Spelling it out,

Further results remain to be achieved to implement, as a matter of priority, the principles of inclusive and functioning regional cooperation and to provide sustainable solutions on … energy and telecommunications. All sides need to play their part in defusing the tension in northern Kosovo and allow for free movement of persons and goods, for the benefit of the people of the region.

The Commission will keep Serbia's progress under review and will “present a report … as soon as sufficient progress has been achieved.”

Belgrade is expressing pleasure at the positive EC evaluation while insisting its position on Kosovo won't change. The EU is spinning positively while underlining that its evaluation of Serbia's progress would be in the hands of its facilitator for the Pristina-Belgrade dialogue and that there is no deadline for reporting on progress. This last suggests there is also no target date for granting Serbia candidacy.

What does all this mean? That the EU has moved far ahead of making eventual rapprochement between Serbia and Kosovo a condition for actual membership for Serbia – something that would not be relevant for at least a few years in the best of circumstances – into a demand that Serbia surrender the north now if it wishes to be granted even candidacy. The EU requires Serbia implement all agreements reached so far – presumably including customs in the north – as well as reaches agreements on telecoms and electricity. Serbia must also “allow for free movement of persons and goods” in the north and cooperate “actively” with EULEX so it “functions in all parts of Kosovo.” This seems to demand that Belgrade get the local Serbs to end the blockades in the north and allow EULEX to implement Kosovo rule of law – customs and courts – there. The EU says it will track how both sides approach the dialogue but there is no indication that the Quint and its EULEX/KFOR agents in Kosovo will work in a status neutral manner or apply any pressure on Pristina to accept compromise solutions.

As long as the EU acts as an agent to impose Pristina's rule in the north and presses Belgrade to simply surrender, Serbia will remain without candidacy. The Quint appears to expect now that the Tadic government will find a way to cave. But the essential problem with this scenario is that Kosovo and the north are not for him to surrender. Tadic lacks sufficient political tools and support to deliver what the EU demands and the northern Serbs still do not seem ready to roll over. Perhaps this was just the EU's way of saying “we really don't want any more members.”

Kosovo: Will the EU Demand Surrender?

2011-10-11T15:11:00.000+02:00

Last July I suggested that the EU appeared to moving towards setting a new condition for Serbia's EU membership: reaching an accommodation with Pristina on the north. By August it seemed clear that the EU – indeed the Quint – was using the crisis in the north (provoked by Pristina's attempted “invasion”) to demand that Serbia effectively give up the north to receive candidacy with a date. Now it seems the EU may be under pressure from Germany to allow only candidacy and that only under specific conditions that would push Belgrade to surrender the north on Pristina's terms. The Germans apparently remain anxious to settle the Kosovo issue in a way that pleases the Kosovo Albanians so that the Albanians (and Roma) can kept – and sent back – there. They now may believe they have Tadic in a strangle hold.

Blic reports that Germany is insisting that the European Commission in its opinion on Serbian candidacy demand Belgrade meet four conditions: unconditional continuation of dialog with Pristina, reaching agreement over regional representation of Kosovo, agreement on telecommunications and electricity, Pristina taking over the court in north Mitrovica and abolition of local Serbian (“parallel”) institutions in the north. Not all the Europeans feel as strongly as the Germans. Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt reportedly denied that Kosovo was an obstacle for Serbia on its path to the EU and noted that it was not Belgrade but Pristina that was responsible for the current crisis in the north. The Italian Foreign Minister reportedly said that Italy would push for Serbia's candidacy but that while dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is not a precondition for the candidacy, it “help improve the atmosphere in that regard.” But the UK predictably seems also to be taking a hard line, insisting that the question now is not Serbian membership but finding “constructive” solutions between Belgrade and Pristina. If Berlin – backed by the UK and non-member US – insists on the suggested four conditions, then it would seem unlikely that the other cash-starved EU members would balk.

Belgrade reportedly offered some ideas for resolving the current northern crisis through the EU mediator. But with support from NATO and EULEX on the ground in the north – still trying to force the northern Serbs to accept Kosovo customs checkpoints – and from EU pressure over Serbian candidacy, Pristina sees no reason to accept dialogue or compromise on the north. Belgrade, for its part, seems to be running out of room for maneuver. Some officials there are talking now of accepting a “Dayton-style”conference in which everything would be up for grabs. President Tadic needs a clear opening from Brussels on EU membership. By now, everyone knows there will not be a date. Serbs also understand that some form of accommodation over Kosovo – perhaps even recognition – would have to be done before actual membership. But candidacy with conditions that require immediate acceptance of placing the north under rule from Pristina is further than Tadic can go politically.

The German/British/American hardline approach of using EU candidacy to “force” Serbia to accept the loss of north Kosovo would require Tadic to recognize the complete loss of Kosovo. The use of force – in the form of diplomatic pressure as much as on the ground – is unlikely to produce the results that the Quint demands. More likely is that flagging Serbian support for EU membership would turn into complete rejection of Tadic and his European perspective in reaction to the unacceptable terms and blatant effort of EU blackmail. It seems that the EU may be on the verge of setting back an historic accommodation in the Balkans for trying to hand a tiny piece of it to a regime that already cannot deal with its own problems alone.

And the barricades, by the way, remain despite the advent of cold weather.

Kosovo: KFOR Returning to Peacekeeping?

2011-10-07T22:46:00.000+02:00

Doing peacekeeping is rarely easy if you try to do it right. In Kosovo, where every attempt to find shortcuts to political solutions has either created new problems or simply failed, the internationals have hardly anything new left to try except dialogue. As some members of the Quint periodically grow impatient, the use of force to resolve the issue of the north seems to recommend itself again. The previous commander of KFOR, either on his own or under external influence, tried the force option once again. He used his NATO forces to seek to close the boundary with Serbia and channel the northern Kosovo Serbs into using crossing points imposing Kosovo customs checks and fees. This has failed, and not only that. Whatever the facts of the events of September 27, the use of live fire to remove a barricade and close an alternative road caused everyone to pull back before the abyss of further violence. Meanwhile, the northern Serbs remain on the barricades and the north has risen to the top of the political agenda.

This outcome was probably not what Prime Minister Thaci intended when he sent his special police into the north in July. Pristina's provocation gained nothing substantive but has led to renewed suggestions of a special status or even partition for the north. Indeed, on October 6, opposition MP Arben Gashi reportedly told the Prime Minister that “if your intention was to escalate the situation in the north in order to create conditions for solving a problem through a new agreement that provides autonomy outside the Constitution of Kosovo, then you are certainly heading toward national treason. ” Gashi said that while his party supports coordinated action in the north with the internationals, the latest actions are “dangerous” for Kosovo's future. Of course, the “danger” he refers to is the possibility of political compromise over the north rather than Pristina merely seizing it, which Thaci continues to advocate.

The new KFOR commander has seemed to grasp the reality of the north fairly quickly, no doubt helped by presiding over the mess created at Jarinje on the 27th. General Drews has said repeatedly that the problem of the barricades is best resolved through political agreement rather than military means. On October 7, he told a press conference that he has no deadline for the removal of barricades, adding that it depends on the people in the north. He called the barricades illegal and repeated that the violence of September 27 was provoked by Serb “criminals.” He assured that KFOR could remove the barricades if it decided to do so and is training a contingent to do just that. Drews said that the 16 Kosovo Serb barricades in the north leave KFOR in “small pockets around the crossings” and is not a situation that it “can bear for months.” But no action to remove them seems in the cards for now. Drews admitted that if KFOR sought to use force to bring down the barricades, “we would face the danger of injuring someone, of hurting innocent people.” The Commander talks as someone seeing the wisdom in a peacekeeping approach to the north. Hopefully he will not give in to pressure – wherever it might come from – to abandon that for the one-sided efforts of his predecessor.

Meanwhile, EU envoy Robert Cooper is back in the region where he seems ready to tackle the issue of customs, the barricades and the north in order to unblock the talks he has been facilitating on other issues. He'll need to have support from the Quint – including the US – in getting Pristina to accept a genuine compromise. But with winter approaching, tensions should decrease with the cold weather. This may give time to consider the more general issue of the north and finding a formula for a special status that could avoid partition and further violence.

The US and The Intervention Trap

2011-10-06T18:34:00.000+02:00

The Washington Post Editorial for October 6 – “Cowardly Vetoes” – lambasted Russia and China for vetoing a draft UN resolution critical of the Syrian government's crackdown on its opposition. Without doubt, President al-Assad's military assault against his own people has led to many deaths and has not resolved any of the issues behind the uprising. Nevertheless, Russia and China – whatever their motives – were right to oppose action in the Security Council. The record of outside interventions in internal conflicts does not suggest their efficacy or usefulness. The two countries may have saved us from going down the road of another well-meaning effort to resolve another countries internal problems that we don't understand and in which we have no stake.

US foreign policy has been interventionist almost since our creation. But until World War I, we sent forces outside our own borders mostly to protect what we perceived as direct US interests, or to seize and annex territory, and not primarily for “moral reasons.” We entered World War I in self defense – German subs were sinking our ships – though President Woodrow Wilson cast it in moral terms as a war “to make the world safe for democracy.” World War II was another defensive war in which, ironically, the great moral accomplishment of ending the Holocaust was not the prime aim.

During the Cold War, our inventions in places such as Korea, Vietnam and Angola were part of our perceived global conflict with communism. But beginning in the 1980s and accelerating after the end of the Cold War, the US increasingly sought to intervene for reasons we saw or presented as “moral.” Something “bad” would be happening someplace outside our borders and under political pressure (internal and external) we would find ourselves either leading or joining an international effort to intervene to stop the bad thing and bring order to the place involved. This didn't always happen. In some places – Rwanda and Bosnia – we did not respond to calls for intervention or we responded late. In others – East Timor and Kosovo in 1999 – we initiated or joined efforts to end violence and bring relief. But as the record shows, getting in is easier than getting out. (US troops remain in Korea almost 60 years after that “police action” supposedly ended.) We use the UN when we can to get us off the intervention hook – UN missions remain in East Timor and Kosovo 12 years later – but find ourselves still holding the bag at great expense in lives and money in Afghanistan and Iraq. And some interventions – such as Somalia – just fail.

We did not intervene in Egypt this year. Whatever happens there, the Egyptians own it. They may make mistakes but they won't be our mistakes. Events may yet play out in a way we find troublesome, but the internal dynamics of Egyptian society – dynamics we are institutionally incapable of understanding or affecting – will unwind in a way that they must if the country is to find its own way to stability and perhaps democracy. In Libya, we used our UNSC mandate to protect civilians to help one side against the other – a sovereign government – for reasons we find good and reasonable. This makes us responsible for what follows there. But if we are lucky, the Libyans will now insist we stay out of it while they settle their own differences.

The Syrian case is quite complex. It is not clear that either the country or the region would actually be better off, more at peace, if Assad were to be overthrown. It is foolish to insist that the international community do or say something when we really do not know what the results would be, however good our intentions. And the Security Council members who voted against our Syria draft have ample reason to be distrustful of how we will use any UN resolution they allow us.

It can be painful for Americans not to act. But we have neither the capacity nor the wisdom to act as the world's policeman. We need to let other people settle their own problems. We do not have a good record of doing it for them.

Kosovo: Pristina Still Seeking to Sink Trepca North

2011-10-05T22:43:00.000+02:00

Since 2008, Pristina has been trying to change the situation on the ground in north Kosovo through various provocative actions. Sending its special police to seize the boundary crossings in July was only the most outrageous and dangerous. In 2009 and 2010 – with the support of KFOR and EULEX – it launched an effort to impose unilateral returns in north Mitrovica thus trying to re-engineer the ethnic make-up of the north without similar efforts on returns to the south. Pristina also sent its police into sensitive areas in the north and earlier this year sought to “replace” the commanders of the local Kosovo police stations in the Serb-majority municipalities in the north. Since June, Pristina has been seeking to undercut one of the main economic pillars of the Serbian community in the north by making it increasingly difficult for the Trepca North complex to function, earn money and therefore pay salaries. In all these, the Quint's and its agents have been complicit and supportive. EULEX especially has failed to follow a status neutral approach in dealing with these provocations by the Kosovo Albanian side. Most recently, it allowed Pristina to hold 13 truck drivers for “illegal entry” into Kosovo and is now allowing it to delay the return of the trucks used by Trepca to export its product.

The truck drivers were released. They were arrested – for entering from Serbia without passing through a non-existent Kosovo control point in the north – at the south Mitrovica customs terminal where they were seeking to comply with longstanding UNMIK rules for Trepca exports. In June, Pristina unilaterally dropped the procedures under which Trepca North had been operating, insisting that it now recognize the authority of the Kosovo government and use Kosovo customs procedures and documents. Trepca North refused and insisted it be allowed to continue to use the status neutral procedures and documents of UNMIK. EULEX failed to intervene even though its grant of UN responsibility for rule of law (and therefore customs) was supposed to be carried out in a status neutral fashion. Trepca North was then in the position of not being able to export and earn money to pay salaries. It looked for other ways to comply with UN regulations. Thus the truck drivers entering Kosovo as usual but seeking to comply with UNMIK customs in south Mitrovica.

In the recent incident, EULEX understood that allowing the truck drivers to rot in Kosovo Albanian prison might provoke further problems. So it apparently pressured the Kosovo authorities to “deport” the drivers after imposing fines. The trucks were another matter. These Pristina confiscated and is now asking Interpol to verify their pedigree. This is a blatant effort to hold the trucks and punish the Serbs for trying to make a living. EULEX appears to be just sitting back and letting this play out again as Pristina wishes.

Pristina's “war” against Trepca is mean-spirited and narrow minded. So is the Quint complacency in allowing the Kosovo Albanians to continue acting in this manner. Pristina's behavior and the support it receives from KFOR and EULEX does nothing to further dialogue and reconciliation. It's just plain old school yard bullying.

Kosovo: As I was saying....

2011-10-03T19:16:00.000+02:00

A week ago, I wrote that the situation in the north had appeared to have perhaps stabilized. The next day, NATO forced a confrontation with local Serbs over barricades and alternative roads, eventually opening fire and wounding several. The NATO Kosovo force – KFOR – then proceeded to play more games with barricades and roads while continuing to ferry – by helicopter – EULEX and Kosovo government officers to man the crossing points it now said were “open.” But read EULEX's own status report for October 1 below. Everything NATO says is supposedly “open” is actually closed due to road blockages. All major roads remain blocked by the Serbs. They have now cemented the one on the north side of the main Mitrovica Bridge. Nothing has changed since KFOR and EULEX began trying to force the northerners to accept Kosovo customs, at least not for the better. Instead, the north is now more separate from the south than it has been since 1999. This seems to be what the attempted Quint use of force has accomplished.

Now it would be foolish to think that the Quint has given up the idea of pushing Serbia and the Serbs to surrender in the north. Clearly, the folks making the decisions for KFOR and EULEX are not quick to learn anything from past experience. But in fact, nothing essential has altered since July 26. The northern Serbs still reject Kosovo institutions and Pristina's writ stops at the Ibar. If the idea was to starve the northerners out by cutting off their access to Serbia, that is not working either. No sign that the locals are ready to end their peaceful resistance. This alone suggests why some are again talking of partition.

There does in truth remain only three possible peaceful solutions for the north: continued stalemate, dialogue and compromise leading to a possible Ahtisaari Plus formula for the north, or partition. All parties – including the internationals, Belgrade, Pristina and the northern Serbs – ought to pick one and get to work on it, hopefully together. Any of the three solutions would be better than blundering into the fourth possibility: further violence and renewed ethnic cleansing.

“EULEX SITCEN Report: Situation Update as of 0730 hrs, Saturday 01 Oct 2011:

Gate 1 - Open. Closed for vehicle traffic due to road blockades. Several KFOR platoons and EULEX FPU, BBP and Customs present. Also present are KP and KC. KFOR removed the blockades north and south of the Gate and blocked the bypass road. The operation ended without incidents reported.

Gate 31 - Open. Closed for vehicle traffic due to road blockades. Several KFOR platoons and EULEX FPU, BBP and Customs present. Also present are KP and KC. The road is completely blocked on Kosovo side with large piles of sand and a truck, and on the Serbian side by a truck.

EULEX FPU present at Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Court House. FPU vehicles patrolling Routes Bull and Hen and Bosnia Mahalla area. Additional FPU on operational standby in various locations.

Roadblocks

Leposavić/Leposaviq (at the southern entrance of the town - Vodica neighbourhood): the road is blocked, one lane open for vehicle traffic.

Sočanica/Soçanicë (5 km S of Leposavić/Leposaviq): the road is blocked with gravel, one lane open for traffic.

Veliko Rudare/Rudari i Madh (1.5 km N of Zvečan/Zvecan): The road is completely closed.

Malo Rudare/Rudari i Vogël (2 km E Zvečan/Zvecan): on Route Bull at the exit leading to Lipa/Lipë, the road is completely blocked by large rocks and concrete.

Zupce/Zupcë (5.5 km SE of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok): the road is completely blocked with gravel and concrete.

Jagnjenica/Jagnjenicë (5 km ENE of Zubin Potok/Zubin Potok): The road is partially blocked by trucks and gravel, one lane open for traffic.

Banjska/Banjskë (8.5 km NNW of Zvečan/Zvecan): The roadblock remains in place and only civilian vehicles can pass.

Dren/Dren (7 km SSW of Zupce/Zupcë): The road is blocked with timber and truck tires.

North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica:

. Northern side of Main Bridge remains blocked with large piles of gravel; the bridge is closed for traffic.

. EU House in the direction of Zvečan/Zvecan (close to the Muslim cemetery): The road is partially blocked with large heaps of gravel, around which the vehicles have to slalom. Civilian traffic is allowed to pass, reportedly EULEX cannot pass.

. "Knjaza Miloša" Street (north of East Bridge ): The road is blocked with large mounts of gravel and closed for all vehicle traffic.

Currently the general situation in the north is calm but volatile.”

Kosovo: A Possible Compromise on Customs & The North

2011-10-02T00:11:00.004+02:00

The situation in northern Kosovo created by Pristina's unilateral effort to change the reality on the ground – supported by NATO and EULEX efforts to push the Serbs to accept Kosovo customs – has become a tense standoff. KFOR “opens” a crossing point and dismantles a Serb blockade only to have the locals create another further down the road. KFOR blocks an alternative road, leaving others that can be used. KFOR cannot be everywhere and cannot afford to shoot everyone who disobeys. The internationals have lost the trust of the local community, the negotiations brokered by the EU have gone off the rails and the conflict over the north teeters on renewed violence.

What to do about customs and the north has become the pressing problem. EU facilitator Cooper reportedly visits the region next week for discussions. He must help find a formula for overcoming the crossing points stalemate for negotiations on other matters to resume with any hope of progress. I've written about a possible way for EULEX to approach customs in a status neutral fashion. Here I suggest a possible compromise that could allow everyone to protect their core interests.

For the northern Serbs, the essential demand is not to place Kosovo customs on the administrative boundary with Serbia and thus turn it into a political border. For Pristina and its international supporters, it is equally important to be able to close what they see as a hole in Kosovo's “fence.” Before July 26, the north was outside anyone's customs regime and some took advantage of the tax-free opportunity to trade in high value products both to the south and back to Serbia. EULEX says it is seeking to enforce a single Kosovo-wide customs zone and plans to collect fees and channel them to the Kosovo treasury. The Serbs say they will not accept Kosovo customs officers at the crossing points nor pay customs to Pristina. They have barricaded the roads leading to the boundary crossings and to the south across the Ibar River.

The impasse has both political and economic dimensions. On the economic side, Pristina and Belgrade both want to capture the funds lost to their treasuries by smuggling through the north. Belgrade has solved one part of the problem by now subjecting the north to its VAT. Until July 26, Pristina was also gaining by collecting customs on goods as they reached south Mitrovica. A compromise from the economic perspective could be straight-forward: eliminate the tax advantage from exporting goods into the north from Serbia by Belgrade taxing them (i.e, the VAT) while implementing an approach to ensure customs is paid on all goods crossing into southern Kosovo. A side agreement could be made so that goods reaching southern Kosovo might have their VAT refunded to make up for the customs collected. Belgrade and Pristina would have good reasons to cooperate in this.

The political issues are harder to resolve but if the EU took a firmly status-neutral and balanced approach, it could be done. First would be to clearly retain EULEX control of any customs in the north. Second would be to ensure and assure that Kosovo customs would be collected only once goods reach south Mitrovica and not for those remaining in the north for use there. That's the “easy” part.

The really hard part is what to do about Kosovo government officers at the Gates. The northern Serbs do not want Kosovo customs officials there. But having some regular Kosovo police (of whatever ethnicity) doing the routine boundary crossing checks – as before July 26 – should not be problematic. The core issue is the presence of Kosovo customs officers. A possible compromise here might be for the Serbs to accept Kosovo customs officers whose sole function it would be to observe shipments of goods bound for the south. These would not be “operational” but work to assist EULEX which would report such data to Kosovo customs in the south. Goods passing through for local use would be free to cross without fees or the need to pass through customs in the south.

This is just an outline of a possible compromise. Important details would have to worked out. But the essential element to reaching and implementing any agreement that would allow opening of the roads and de-escalation of the current confrontation is that both Serbs and Albanians accept they cannot have 100% of what they want and for the internationals to take a truly status-neutral approach and make everyone stick to it.

Kosovo: Bits and Pieces During Tense Calm

2011-09-30T14:50:00.000+02:00

Today, for the first time, KFOR soldiers stopped the daily train from Serbia to north Kosovo and subjected passengers to individual search. This is well outside NATO's UN mandate. But KFOR continues to deny it is doing anything wrong in its efforts to corral the northern Serbs into the Albanian-run Kosovo regime. KFOR claims its remains “unbiased” and denied it has been trying to obstruct investigation into its use of force at the Jarinje crossing on September 27.

From the UNMIK Media Summary for September 30: Pristina wants everyone to believe the northern Serbs are ready to give up while it also threatens to use force if they don't. ICR Feith's comments on possible splitting customs revenues are interesting, however.

The plan for the north (Express)

Express reports that the Government of Kosovo has intensified contacts with Serbs in northern Kosovo in an effort to normalize the situation there and to establish legitimate institutions foreseen in the Ahtisaari Plan. The Government’s plan aims to encourage Serbs to cooperate with Kosovo institutions and to prepare legitimate elections in municipalities to elect leaders.

Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuçi told Express on Thursday that the Government of Kosovo would be the guarantor of rights of the Serb community in northern Kosovo, but that it would also hold its citizens accountable.

An unnamed source told the paper that representatives of the Kosovo Government together with ICO officials and other international stakeholders have intensified contacts and now there is daily communication with Serbs who are ambitious and who want to cooperate with Pristina in creating conditions for free elections in the north.

Feith: No discussions on the north (Kosova Sot)

Kosova Sot reports that the ICO Chief Pieter Feith, stated that it is important for Kosovo and Serbia to normalize the procedures at the border, as seen everywhere else in the European Union. “This means movement of goods beyond the border and excise deriving from them are of benefit for both sides of the border, and these incomes go to the central treasure, as one of the main sources of incomes for every government. I do not know whether there are going to be further negotiations, it can be possible that some of the incomes, if they are collected in the north, could also be poured again to the municipalities for the social and economic benefit of the citizens in the north, but this is an issue that Government has to take a position. This is the kind of the philosophy we are thinking about,” said Feith.

Asked whether there are discussions for a special status for the north, Feith said that there are no such discussions and there are no models. “My office and the Government, the group of close friends of the Government of Kosovo, agreed completely that Ahtisaari’s plan represents the best foundation for an arrangement in the north,” said Feith.

Kuçi: Pristina can intervene on its own (dailies)

Several dailies report that in an interview for Rubikon TV show, Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuçi said Pristina could again intervene with force if KFOR and EULEX fail to remove roadblocks in northern Kosovo according to the strategic plan. He added that roadblocks should be removed as soon as possible, otherwise force will be used. Kuçi also said Pristina would never enter political dialogue with Belgrade on the state’s internal affairs, adding that dialogue would only include technical issues.

Kosovo: NATO Actions Illegal, Illogical and Immoral

2011-09-29T18:31:00.000+02:00

NATO's Kosovo force (KFOR) spent the day seeking to further cut-off the northern Kosovo Serbs from Serbia. Since July, KFOR – using mostly American National Guard troops and German soldiers – have been supporting the Kosovo government's effort to force Kosovo Serbs and Serbia to accept the imposition of its customs checkpoints despite the continued rejection of Kosovo independence by Serbia. On September 27, NATO used force – tear gas and bulldozers – to remove a barricade placed by the local Serbs in Jerinje (Gate 1) while then using more force – this time rubber bullets and live fire – to chase away protesting Serbs trying to prevent KFOR's effort to close an alternative route that locals were using to cross the boundary. NATO (and the EU) then shamelessly blamed the Serbs and sought to prevent evidence of its actions from coming to light. On the 29th, NATO continued its effort to isolate the northern Serbs and force them to submit to Kosovo customs by destroying the alternate gravel road and placing a checkpoint there. Some reports suggest that KFOR crossed the administrative line to make the road inoperable from the Serbian side as well.

NATO's activities have strayed far from the UNSCR 1244 mandate by which it is in Kosovo. By 1244, NATO's duties in Kosovo include “ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility,” “conducting border monitoring duties as required,” and “ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations.” It would be legal for KFOR to monitor the boundary – even place check points to conduct weapons searches – and to ensure it, EULEX and UNMIK can exercise freedom of movement. But its responsibility to “ensure public safety” means it should conduct its activities in a manner that does not in itself threaten the peace. Under 1244, NATO has no political role whatsoever. It is not KFOR's business to be channeling traffic across the boundary into Kosovo customs checkpoints. This is playing a political role and has proven a threat to public safety. NATO is acting illegally.

The northern Serbs have been careful to allow ways for KFOR and EULEX to cross their barricades and have reacted only when it appeared the internationals were using this access to assist Pristina's police and customs officials in reaching the crossing points. The barricades are there to prevent another unilateral provocation such as occurred on July 26 when Pristina sent its special police to seize the boundary.

KFOR's new commander continues to suggest that he understands issues such as the barricades and courts should be settled through means other than military. But he also is repeating the line used by his predecessor that it is criminals and smugglers who make barricades and use alternate roads. This ignores the many reasons that normal people would have to cross the boundary without submitting to KFOR/EULEX blackmail to use the Kosovo customs points. The commander may have been overruled by the US and German governments or perhaps the commanders in the field have simply been operating on orders from their embassies. In any case, the Serbs can find ways around the NATO blockade and they are unlikely to submit to efforts to force them to accept Kosovo customs. Not even Belgrade can change that, as it appears to come to grips with its inability to bend as far as the EU and US demand. NATO is thus reducing the Serbs' room for cooperation and peaceful rejection of Kosovo institutions and setting the stage for more violence and perhaps full partition. Its behavior is illogical.

Finally, NATO is showing the world that when the Big Western Powers feel like it, they can just disregard the terms set by the UN Security Council. They did the same in Libya. Some may agree with what NATO has done/is doing in Libya or Kosovo. But the Alliance's readiness to cast aside UN mandates may make it harder to convince others to grant new ones in the future. The precedent set by NATO's illegal and illogical actions in north Kosovo undercuts UN peacekeeping and handicaps the international community's ability to maintain world peace. Flaunting international law and the means by which we collectively determine our cooperation is dangerous and deeply immoral.

Kosovo: KFOR-EULEX Violence and a Cover-Up?

2011-09-28T15:41:00.000+02:00

It is always difficult after the fact to know for sure what happened in a violent confrontation as happened in northern Kosovo on September 27. But despite EU and KFOR protestations of innocence and casting of blame on Serb “extremists,” it seems clear that they were responsible for the initiation and escalation of violence as well as the use of live fire. There appears to be no evidence that they were fired upon – no gun injured soldiers offered up – and the essential fact remains that they used force to impose Pristina's political blockade on the northern Serbs. Additionally, there may be a cover-up operation being conducted to hide the truth. An independent inquiry is required to established the facts and, until then, none of the Quint capitals should feel free to use the day's events to justify further repression by KFOR and EULEX.

The EULEX report on the operation it called “Reinstating Gate 1” is attached below. It clearly shows that events started moving toward confrontation only when KFOR sought to close an alternate road used by Serbs to circumvent the barricaded official crossing. Angry Serbs threw rocks – David vs Goliath? – and KFOR responds with tear gas. A neutral international observer says that Serbs began gathering mid-morning at the secondary road near Gate 1 to protest the arrest of the person reported to have “attacked” an armed US soldier. When KFOR started using tear gas a while later, Serbs began throwing stones while retreating. Then KFOR started firing rubber bullets injuring at least one person. Things remained otherwise calm until afternoon when a large number of Serbs gathered again in front of the bypass as a local truck driver tried using his truck to push aside the barbwire placed by KFOR to block the road. German KFOR again used teargas and US combat soldiers emerged and pointed weapons at the civilians already trying to move away from the gas. At that point, there was gunfire – live ammo and rubber bullets – and the truck driver was shot. The Serbs then ran from the scene.

It was observed later in the day that KFOR prevented a UN military observer from visiting the scene and bulldozers appeared to be clearing the ground, removing evidence of the days events. Local Kosovo police who went to investigate the earlier events reportedly were ordered to leave and shot at by an American soldier as they were collecting spent ammunition that appeared of a type used by NATO.

The combined NATO/EU action to enforce Pristina's political agenda was another blatant violation of their UN peacekeeping mandate. The EU/KFOR efforts to shift blame onto the Serbs suggests shameless cynicism and arrogance of a high order. Some Serbs may have reacted to the strong-arm tactics used against them by throwing stones and firecrackers used at sports events (as one admitted to me). Some may have even possessed weapons and fired them into the air. This can be investigated too. But the violence was provoked and escalated by those sent to Kosovo to keep the peace. The Quint countries – the US and Germany especially – have used their control of KFOR and EULEX to push the northern Serbs into a tight corner and are now trying to tighten the wire around them. As the local Serbs see it, they have no choice but to resist or flee. They will not flee their homes, though they could be driven off if that is what NATO seeks to do. So far, EULEX says it remains determined to take down the remaining barricades and supports the actions by KFOR. The situation created by NATO and the EU is very dangerous and, unless they stop their provocations and return to status neutral peacekeeping, it will only get more so.

Kosovo: NATO Shoots Unarmed Civilians

2011-09-27T19:12:00.002+02:00

On September 27, the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR) lost completely its guise as UN peacekeepers and became a repressive, lawless military occupation force. After seeking to use force to remove peacefully maintained barricades and to close a alternate road used by northern Kosovo Serbs, some locals apparently threw stones at the KFOR soldiers who then responded - in "self defense" - by firing at the otherwise defenseless Serbs, wounding at least six. The NATO action ought to be thoroughly investigated by an independent body to verify whether or not war crimes were committed. KFOR and EULEX ought to stand down and stop trying to change the political reality on the ground through such bullying and repressive measures before they provoke real violence.

Details about the day's events remain somewhat unclear. Various reports have suggested that the NATO shots fired were either rubber bullets or live ammo. It is also unclear whether the soldiers involved were German or perhaps American or Polish. Some apparently erroneous reports suggested that shots were exchanged in a “fight” between NATO troops and the Serbs. (Local sources say some Serbs may have fired into the air after the initial KFOR action.) Some reports also claimed KFOR soldiers were somehow “injured.” But it seems clear that NATO was responsible for the violence, which it provoked by using force –including tear gas – against the local Serbs and then escalated by using stun bombs and firing at them. (One video is circulating apparently showing NATO using automatic weapons.) The injured Serbs were taken to the north Mitrovica hospital, where their wounds reportedly were found to be serious but not life threatening.

Whatever the details, NATO and the Quint appear to be acting without restraint to impose their control on the north on behalf of the Kosovo regime. KFOR and EULEX were apparently seeking to end the Serb barricade of the crossing in Leposavic (Jarinje) by forcibly removing it. They also sought to close a nearby alternative road being used by Serbs to circumvent the “official” crossing point. This was a blatant effort to force northern Serbs to use the crossing manned by EULEX and Kosovo Albanian customs and police while denying them an alternative. This on the eve of so-called further “negotiations.” KFOR and EULEX were clearly using force to support Pristina's control over the boundary, a political objective that has nothing to do with their UN peacekeeping mandate. The reaction by KFOR soldiers to the Serbian response – which did not include Serbs firing at them – was disproportionate and perhaps criminal.

I suggested yesterday that reported comments by the new KFOR commander suggested that he might have come around to understand that political solutions should be found for the north rather than trying military options. Either he was mis-quoted or perhaps simply over-ruled by his Quint political masters. One must wonder at this point if they are capable of learning anything or are simply bowing to pressures from the Kosovo Albanian side. Indeed, Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Kuçi told the press that “our patience in this respect [on the north] is coming to an end.” That is a barely veiled threat of violence. This may be all it takes for the Quint to decide it's easier to force the Serbs to surrender or flee than contain the Albanians.

It seems most appropriate at this time to bring back UN police and replace NATO with UN Blue Helmets in north Kosovo. But who can bring a more civilized and lawful approach to peacekeeping when the Western powers have moved beyond the bounds of morality and still have a veto?

Kosovo: Myth Busting

2011-09-26T19:10:00.000+02:00

The situation in north Kosovo may have stabilized, at a point not quite back to July 25 but substantially much the same. It can be said that the Quint/Thaci effort to change the situation on the ground in the north by bringing the Serbs to accept rule from Pristina has failed. While the local Serbs have certainly been affected by the moves by KFOR and EULEX to isolate them from Serbia proper and impose Kosovo customs at the northern Gates, their resistance in the form of peaceful protest and barricades has stalled the Quint effort to make them accept the Kosovo state. EULEX has not backed away from its plan to impose Kosovo customs at the northern crossings. But as the locals have blocked these, there is nothing for customs officials to do. The Serbs appear able to find ways to cross the boundary quicker than KFOR can close them. KFOR may be tiring of chasing down trucks and providing helicopter service for Gate workers. The new, perhaps more sensible, KFOR commander reportedly is urging a political approach to resolving the current crisis rather than looking for military solutions.

Thus the first myth that apparently still needs busting: that there is a military/police solution to the northerners refusal to accept rule by Pristina. In March 2008 this failed and it has failed again. Not even placing a large occupying force on every road and town center can compel people to give up institutions they view as their own and to accept those they find illegitimate. NATO never had the stomach for this but let itself be used by the US to back up Thaci's politically motivated effort to steal the north. KFOR's support for Pristina's trade embargo was, and remains, illegal under its UNSCR 1244 mandate. And it has not worked; there remains no solution to the north through use of force.

Next, the myth that criminals are forcing the northerners to refuse the benefits of being ruled by the majority-Albanian government in Pristina. The Serbs have been holding weddings, classes and parties on the barricades. They have been peaceful but insistent. They blocked the northern Gates while building a new boundary along the Ibar on main roads crossing the line to the majority-Albanian south. But the “hoodlum” myth remains dangerous as even now Thaci is using it to justify his call to impose a Kosovo court in north Mitrovica. Hopefully, KFOR and EULEX will not rise to this provocation.

The next busted myth is that EULEX is acting legally in seeking to impose Kosovo customs in the north. It claims that treating Kosovo as one customs zone and the agreement on customs stamps agreed to early this month means it can support establishment of Kosovo customs in the north and collection of fees to be sent to Pristina. Some argue that EULEX's mandate includes helping develop the Kosovo state. But the UN passed EULEX responsibility for rule of law in November 2008 with the condition it be status neutral. Whatever customs regime might be established, it would have to meet that condition. Imposing Kosovo customs and officials and collecting funds for Pristina clearly would not. And any agreement on customs stamps between Belgrade and Pristina does not ipso facto allow EULEX to apply it where Belgrade and the local Serbs refuse to accept it. Finally, while EULEX does also have the mandate to help develop Kosovo institutions, this does not extend to acting in a one-sided manner to impose them where there is no agreement to do so. EULEX's UN mandate for status neutral peacekeeping trumps that. (EULEX should act speedily to release the 13 truck drivers arrested by Pristina for illegal entry. Crossing from Serbia to Kosovo in the north has never required a Kosovo visa or entry stamp. To allow the arrest to stand would be a violation of status neutrality.)

The final lingering myths are that the Quint/Pristina effort to seize the north is legal as it enforces a Kosovo state and constitution that the ICJ found legal and that Serbian “parallel” institutions are illegal under UNSCR 1244. The ICJ never said that the Kosovo declaration of independence or state were “legal.” It said that there was nothing in international law on the subject and noted that the Pristina UDI was made outside the ambit of UNMIK. The ICJ did reaffirm the continued legality of UNMIK. One could argue that Kosovo independence and institutions are a fact – they are – but not that they were found legal by the ICJ. Under international law, UNMIK remains the official administrative authority for Kosovo. Any other institutions are therefore parallel to it. But in the north, the local institutions fly under the UN flag, south of the Ibar they don't. Some are therefore more “parallel” than others.

Kosovo: KFOR, EULEX and Pristina - Acting with Impunity

2011-09-23T03:00:00.002+02:00

KFOR is trying to close alternative crossing points in north Kosovo to keep the locals Serbs isolated from Serbia proper. As fast as they string barbed wire across one, the Serbs open another. One could see this as an episode of the Keystone Kops were it not so flagrantly illegal and beyond NATO's UN mandate. That NATO has acted without restraint to support the imposition of Pristina authority in the north is clear. And there is no one apparently to hold it to account. Impunity.

EULEX says Kosovo is one customs zone and they award the game to Pristina. It and KFOR dutifully transport Pristina's police and customs officials to the Gates. EULEX is clearly taking sides and not acting in a neutral fashion as required by the November 2008 agreement with the UN. But it seems accountable to no one. Impunity.

The Kosovo government arrests 13 Serbian truck drivers contracted by Trepca North for export of its product. The drivers come from Serbia proper and are arrested at the customs office in south Mitrovica. They were presumably there to comply with Kosovo regulations. Yet Pristina orders their arrest for illegally entering the still disputed Kosovo "state." The 13 reportedly could face three years in prison. Belgrade appeals to EULEX to intervene but EULEX - wrongly - claims it is in Kosovo only to monitor the police. (Under the 2008 agreement with the UN, it took over UNMIK's executive authority for rule of law.) So neither Pristina nor EULEX have any responsibility to correct this clear violation of the truckers' human rights. Impunity.

The Quint has power enough to guarantee such impunity. But it sets an example that will haunt the "Western powers" in the future. And it still may do nothing more than provoke further conflict.

http://www.focus-fen.net/index.php?id=n260099

http://www.m-magazine.org/index.php/en/news/region/1173-eulex-to-arrest-serbs-we-only-monitor.html

Posted by iPhone.

Kosovo: A Personal Note

2011-09-21T03:14:00.000+02:00

When I arrived in Mitrovica in July 2005 as the UN Regional Representative for north Kosovo, the Main Bridge was closed with barricades and barbed wire. It had been closed for security reasons since the previous year. UNMIK worked with UNMIK-P and KFOR and, most importantly, with the local communities on both sides of the Ibar to be able to open the Bridge in peace. It was necessary to build trust and it took time and a willingness by everyone to take chances.

Now, under current management by EULEX and KFOR - pushing UNMIK and its peace-keeping approach aside - the Bridge is once again closed. Trust is gone. It is sad to see how the clock has ticked backwards. And I am myself ashamed that my own country, the USA, has played a major role in this latest setback through using and supporting bullying tactics to achieve one-sided political objectives.

There are no completely innocent or completely guilty parties in the many years of the conflict over Kosovo. Both Serbs and Albanians have been the abused and the abusers. There are no solutions that will please everyone and just and fair solutions would probably not completely please anyone. But the internationals have the moral and legal responsibility- under UNSCR 1244 - to peacefully maintain the peace necessary to allow time for longer term political accommodations.

However, in the last several weeks, KFOR and EULEX have let themselves be used to force events and circumvent compromise. And accomplished what? The Bridge is closed again and a population on one side made to suspend normal life to protect their communities and way of life.

There is still time to avoid conflict over customs. I have tried over the past few days to suggest ways EULEX could act in a status neutral and fair manner. There may be others ways to do the same. But the aim should be to allow those who feel most threatened to themselves bring down the barricades and reopen the Bridge. Water cannons, bulldozers, and threats won't do that. Acting justly will.

Kosovo: EULEX & Customs - continued

2011-09-20T00:08:00.000+02:00

I've written here previously about how EULEX might approach status- neutral customs in north Kosovo. A key element would be how it handled fee collection, whether funds went to Pristina, into escrow or stayed in the north for local use. EULEX has said publicly that it would be collecting fees once the Gates are operational but has not said where the money collected would go.

According to a source, the funds collected will go directly into the Kosovo budget. Belgrade and Pristina could not agree on an option - Pristina rejecting leaving the funds in the north or in escrow and Belgrade rejecting having the funds go to Pristina. With the Kosovo Albanians vetoing the alternatives, EULEX decided the funds should go to Pristina.

A status neutral approach to peacekeeping under UNSCR 1244 would not give any side a veto on a central status issue such as customs. Adopting the position of one side is not status neutral. A neutral approach would have been to perhaps not collect customs fees at this time. Or, if it was felt absolutely necessary to tackle smuggling or whatever, put the funds collected into escrow until the two sides could reach an agreement. EULEX collecting funds at the northern Kosovo crossing points and handing them over to Pristina is not status neutral, no matter what EULEX or the Quint say.

Unless...

Unless fees are collected only for commercial goods bound for south of the Ibar. Even before July 26, some goods headed south were being declared at the Gates with fees collected once the trucks reached south Mitrovica. If EULEX worked out a system by which goods staying in the north did not pay customs, this might still be considered status neutral.

Belgrade has taken the initiative on combating the practice of bringing high value goods - especially oil products - into the north without VAT for resale back into Serbia or to Kosovo Albanians south of the Ibar. Belgrade has returned the requirement to pay VAT to north Kosovo. This could be seen as complimenting a truly status neutral approach by EULEX. Goods for the north would pay Serbian VAT. Goods for the south would pay Kosovo customs.

Will EULEX act in such a status neutral manner in collecting fees? Perhaps the Quint simply does not want a practical compromise? Maybe they are counting on the northern Serbs to tire of their blockades and eventually to quit. But it may be more likely that Washington eventually asks the commander of US KFOR to explain all those helicopter hours spent flying a few Albanians to "work" every day while the local Serbs build a new border at the Ibar. KFOR leaflets from space are unlikely to stop this, or water cannons either. Maybe status neutral peacekeeping?

http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/pressreleases/0186.php

http://www.m-magazine.org/index.php/en/news/kosovo/1137-unblocked-path-mitrovica-zubin-potok.html

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=09&dd=19&nav_id=76458

http://www.tanjug.rs/vest.asp?id=20384

Posted by iPhone.

Kosovo: Interview with Pravda RS

2011-09-19T00:54:00.001+02:00

Here follows the original English version of an interview I gave to "Pravda" on September 15. It was published in Serbian on the 16th:

Q. Do you think it is possible to resolve peacefully the situation in the north Kosovo?

A. Of course it is possible. All that has to happen is that all actors eschew efforts to resolve differences over the status of the north through use of force or unilateral actions. Ways can be found to avoid the extreme, one-sided outcomes both sides fear. For example, the north could remain part of Kosovo while also remaining a stronghold of the Serbian community in Kosovo with some adaptation of the Ahtisaari Plan.

Q. What will happen after the 16th September?

A. If there is violence surrounding an attempt to impose Kosovo customs and controls in the north, most anything is possible, including ethnic flight, partition, ethnic violence elsewhere and even regional instability. If nothing provocative occurs, if EULEX retains status neutral control of the northern Gates and KFOR stays out of politics, then the situation can revert to what it was before July 26. With one important difference: everyone should be wiser.

Q. Do you expect that the Kosovo police and customs take a administration border?

A. I suspect, I hope, that the EU will be wiser than that and will be able to resist Albanian and US pressure to use force.

Q. But it will cause an escalation of violence?

A. It may do so as it will seem to the northern Serbs that their communities and connection to Serbia is under threat. While the great majority will seek to resist peacefully, some may not. Also there is the danger of over reaction from KFOR or EULEX and deliberate provocations or misdirection from the Albanian side.

Q. Of which countries can Pristina get approval for such action?

A. It needs only one, the US. But it seems that Germany too, at least, actively supported the latest provocations in the north.

Q. Do you think the EU has tried to use the crisis to put pressure on Serbia to give up the north of Kosovo?

A. For sure. Whether the EU was behind Pristina's move to seize the boundary in July, it has used the resulting crisis to push President Tadic to surrender the north.

Q. Is the Minister Hashim Thaci trying to put the north of Kosovo under the command of Pristina, or perhaps to force the Serbs to leave Kosovo?

A. First of all, he is trying to reinforce his weakening domestic political position. He has used the issue of the north to overcome growing doubts about the efficacy of his government.

Q. The Serbian Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac, said that if lives of Serbs were threatened, Serbia would use military force to protect its citizens. What would rapresent such military action?

A. I have not seen him use those words although it might seem implied in what he has said. But it is hard to imagine Serbia doing nothing if Kosovo Serbs were the target of organized violence that KFOR or EULEX did not stop.

As to "what," I suppose a few hundred MUP could quickly materialize north of the Ibar leaving the internationals and Albanians with little to do but withdraw.

Q. How much has been the whole region compromised?

A. Widespread ethnic violence in Kosovo could lead to instability and political challenges throughout much of the former Yugoslavia.

Q. Can it be that part of the deal to bring partition of Kosovo? Is there now an option for the division, since it was shown that multi-ethnicity is impossible?

A. Partition has always been an option and is more likely now after the Quint has been acting to support Pristina. By painting the northern Serbs and Serbia into a corner, the Quint itself may be reducing the alternatives to partition.

Q. What is the point of the international forces if there would be military action? What would they take?

A. I would not speculate on this.

Q. Is the sending of UN peacekeepers in northern Kosovo, the only solution?

A. It is not the only solution but might be necessary should KFOR continue to act outside its UN mandate or should EULEX threaten the peace by not acting in a status neutral manner. Another, by the way, might be increased participation in KFOR and EULEX by non-recognizing countries, especially Russia.

Q. Do you think that the Serbs should accept Ahtisaari's plan, or perhaps some changed part of that plan?

A. That is up to them but I think some version of Ahtisaari Plus could work for everyone.

Q. Can Serbia now demand full compliance with Resolution 1244?

A. Unlikely. But everyone who supports collective decision making and the role of the UN in helping to manage international affairs should be committed to not abusing or overstepping UN mandates.

http://www.pravda.rs/2011/09/16/dzerald-galuci-nemacka-podrzava-provokacije-na-severu/

Kosovo: EULEX and Status Neutral Customs

2011-09-18T02:40:00.000+02:00

There can be no doubt that KFOR acted outside its UN Security Council mandate in supporting Pristina's ban on Serbian imports. It did so by preventing commercial traffic through the northern crossing points into Kosovo. No doubt, really, as UNSCR 1244 gives NATO no political role as peacekeepers. (The political role belongs to UNMIK.) KFOR is also acting politically, and therefore illegally, in transporting Pristina's police and customs officers to the Gates. Everyone knows this directly implies that NATO accepts Kosovo's claim of sovereignty and independence. This is not status neutrality.

The case is a bit less clear with EULEX. EULEX is playing political favorites and, like KFOR, acting outside its status neutral peacekeeping role by having Pristina's officers at the Gates as even "observers." If EULEX were acting neutrally, there would be Serbian government "observers" there too.

But EULEX was passed the UN's responsibility for rule of law in November 2008. And customs does fall under that. EULEX is also correct in asserting that under UNMIK, Kosovo was treated as one customs area. So, if EULEX is performing status neutral customs controls anywhere in Kosovo, that would be legal under 1244. EULEX also claims that this is not only its mandate but follows from the September 2 agreements between Belgrade and Pristina on customs stamps.

But Belgrade denies the imposition of customs controls in the north was discussed or agreed in Brussels. It is also not clear that EULEX is doing status neutral customs control. An EULEX spokesperson reportedly indicated that EULEX would be collecting customs fees. This might be consistent with status neutrality if the mechanism and use of such fees had been agreed by the two parties or if the funds were put into escrow until there is an agreement. But Belgrade again denies there was any discussion or agreement on this topic.

We don't know the details of what exactly EULEX will be doing at the Gates. It could be status neutral if no fees are collected or if such fees stayed in the north or went into escrow. Or if any information collected is shared with Pristina and Belgrade both. And if all legal commercial goods are allowed through and if Pristina officials present have no role in or access to actual customs/policing functions. Kosovo Serbs are within their rights to expect such status neutral procedures should EULEX insist on doing customs on the north. The same Serbs may be excused for having their doubts given KFOR and EULEX's clearly provocative actions to support and appease Pristina's efforts to inject its unwanted official presence into the north.

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=09&dd=17&nav_id=76443

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=09&dd=17&nav_id=76444