Kosovo: Beware the Undertow

The Balkans is not an easy place for anyone. History is both long and recent. One hundred years ago, now defunct empires dominated the map. Look at the historical maps over time and nations appear to pop in and out of existence like shoreline reefs in the ebbing and flooding tides. Governing in these conditions sometimes requires plotting the phases of the moon months or even years ahead. Not everyone has the patience for this and for some it is simply easier to forge ahead, be it into shallows or deeps, despite the dangers of hitting the rocks, drowning or getting eaten.

Pieter Feith forges. Despite the strong tide pulling Serbs away from participating in the Kosovo local election this month, he keeps calling on them to vote "because it’s your democratic right." Trying to be helpful, he also reassured that "all ID documents will be accepted" for voting, even those issued by the Serbian government. Perhaps he believes the Kosovo Serbs will see that voting in Kosovo elections can be status neutral because they can avoid using Kosovo documents? Of course, there is nothing status neutral about the EU pushing participation in Kosovo elections. Under UNSCR 1244, every act of the Pristina institutions since February 17, 2008 is illegal. The existence of an independent Kosovo may be a kind of fact, but in encouraging participation in its institutions (including elections and municipal governments), the EU is not acting under 1244 but on its own self-generated mandate. One might argue that participation by the Serbs - especially those in the south surrounded by the Albanians and abandoned by the ICO - is in their own self interest. But should that not be decided by the Serbs themselves, perhaps through not participating? One might argue that it is only pressure from Belgrade that prevents the Serbs from embracing Kosovo and its elections. But perhaps instead it is because Pristina and the EU have done pretty much nothing to convince the southern Serbs that they are really wanted in an Albanian dominated Kosovo.

Mayor of south Mitrovica Bajram Rexhepi forges. He continues to urge KFOR and the police "to act determinedly" to dissolve the "illegal" Serb parallel structures operating in the north so that citizens of all communities could live and work without problems. He pushed UNMIK to do this in 2008 and even once admitted that if the effort to put Albanians back into the north Mitrovica court building cost blood, that would be okay. His vision of multi-ethnic harmony is Hobbesian: north Mitrovica is in a "state of nature" requiring rule from Pristina. Rexhepi knows the dangers of the deep waters but is "ready to rumble," at least behind the internationals.

KFOR forges. Although some members of NATO do not recognize Kosovo and despite the loss of legitimacy gained by working with the UN under 1244, KFOR is conducting another show of force on the boundary between Kosovo and Serbia proper. It is just shear intimidation and bullying. In 21st Century Europe - and especially in the context of Western Europe's mixed history of involvement in the Balkans - KFOR's action are just plain shameful. Too bad the U.S. doesn't care enough to bring a little diplomatic sensitivity to bear within the EU-controlled NATO force in Kosovo. In any case, each time the EU acts with naked force or allows the Albanians to do so (as in the recent cut-off of electricity), they undercut their own position with the Serbs and increase the forces tending toward partition. (Maybe that is what some of those behind the curtain really want?)

So the tides of history continue to ebb and flow in the Balkans and, since everything is connected to everything else, any mistakes made in Kosovo may stir waves elsewhere. Hopefully, in the end, everyone will understand the need to work through dialogue and finding practical solutions to practical problems. Much safer than heading out past the shore. There be monsters.

Kosovo: More Listening

It really does seem to pay to listen closely to what people say. Sometimes it can also pay to bring together pieces of different things that one actor may be saying at the same time. On November 2 the NATO commander in Kosovo emphasized that there are no external threats to Kosovo. The KFOR commander reportedly said that “The security situation in the region in general is satisfying. I do not see any military threat from outside. This is good news for all Kosovo citizens. There are no signs that there is danger.” Interestingly, however, KFOR announced on the same day that it planned a "Strong Gates" exercise for later this week focused on the boundary crossing posts between north Kosovo and Serbia proper. Against whom is this exercise to secure the boundary between Kosovo and Serbia aimed at if there are no external threats?

Some hints can be found in further reporting. The KFOR commander in his comments referred to "the situation in the north" as a problem The mayor of south Mitrovica called for security forces "to act determinedly to dissolve Serb parallel structures operating in the north of Kosovo." The Kosovo Minister of Local Government promised that the Serbs in the north would be ready to participate in Kosovo local elections in six months. One might infer from these that NATO and the Albanians see the local Serb political leadership and municipal structures (existing unbroken since 1999) as the problem, as the threat requiring NATO exercises along the northern boundary. While the Kosovo Albanians are entitled to their views, it seems strange for NATO to be using its forces to essentially intimidate the Serbs of northern Kosovo through a show-of-force between them and what they view as the rest of Serbia. Of course NATO has not agreed to act in a status neutral manner as the EU did last November in front of the UNSC. But unless someone has decided to determine the status of the north through force and violence, dialogue and negotiations remain the best alternative. And bullying is not the way to win hearts and minds nor to do proper peacekeeping.

Afghanistan: Not Rocket Science

Abdullah Abdullah has dropped out of the Afghanistan run-off election. This is neither surprising nor a fundamental problem in itself. Indeed, it clears the way for President Karzai to be re-elected without the dangerous and probably unsatisfying recourse to a second round, provided that the powers that be – especially the U.S. – can help engineer it. However, as all the pundits are saying, it would do little to increase the “credibility” of the next Karzai presidency. Nevertheless, this has apparently now been accomplished.

It is entirely unnecessary to comment on the urgency of settling the issue of a credible Afghani government for the U.S, NATO and Western plans for somehow dealing with the horrible slide toward an unwinnable war. The Obama administration has been entirely correct in resisting any decision on more troops as long as the main political issue has remained unsettled. The U.S. has little choice but to increase its troop presence in Afghanistan. It cannot afford to outright loose the war there, not least because of the effect this would have in neighboring Pakistan which is finally – and hopefully not terminally – deep in its own war against the Taliban. But to put more U.S. and NATO/allied troops into a war with the host government not possessing minimal credibility would be untenable. Peter Galbraith made sure of this dilemma. (No reason to assume he will be winning a Noble Peace Prize any time soon.) So it seems equally clear that the only solution now left to the U.S. is to somehow get Karzai and Abdullah into a government of national unity. The problem is of course somewhat broader than this as the real divide is between Pushtun and Tajik. U.S. policy for Afghanistan now rides on its ability to bring the two leaders and chief tribes into such a government. This will not solve all of the political problems facing Afghanistan – and indeed the fundamental issues may not be political at all but tribal as well as religious and criminal – but it is the sine qua non. In Afghanistan, peacekeeping requires a presentable semblance of political unity, cleaner and more efficient government, pragmatism (a la Kai Eide), focused and effective international development assistance and a heck of a lot more troops to defeat the Taliban. Not rocket science but as serious as a mission to the moon.

Kosovo: Listening and Observing

Continuing to just listen to what local actors are saying and making a few observations, drawing from UNMIK’s still useful press clippings:

Serbian Secretary of State for Kosovo Oliver Ivanović told Danas that establishment of customs between Serbia proper and Kosovo is not a pre-condition for abolishing the EU’s visa requirements for Serbians. Responding to suggestions from various EU officials suggesting that such was a pre-condition, Ivanović reportedly said that “the condition for visa liberalization is actually border control. Belgrade fulfilled those conditions by signing the Protocol on cooperation between EULEX and the Serbian Interior Ministry on fighting against organized crime, and then also by signing the agreement on repatriation and full control of the issuance of biometric passports.” Emphasizing nevertheless Serbia’s readiness to seek agreements on customs as well as the courts, he said Belgrade is ready for expert level talks with EULEX within the context of the EU’s “status neutrality” on Kosovo. He suggested that talks on judiciary and customs “have been slowed down by EULEX due to Pristina’s dissatisfaction with the signature of the Protocol on cooperation with the Serbian police.”

Meanwhile, Kosovo President Sejdiu blamed the “internationals” for the situation in the north. Problems there, he reportedly told Koha Ditore, “have been going on for ten years now, be it due to the situation that was created in the beginning, be it due to objective circumstances created as a result of the inefficiency of international institutions, and due to the tolerance toward the negative activities of parallel structures.” The internationals have sought “not to provoke the situation there and take it step by step.” But “our idea is to make investments quickly.” “Investments” is code for expenditures to support forced returns by Albanians to the north, as in Brdjani, and to impose Pristina institutions there.

Some Albanians really have no patience for a peacekeeping approach to the north. The Pristina press also reported that after two years, north Mitrovica prison still has no Albanian prisoners or guards. Koha Ditore labelled “ethnic cleansing” the decision a few days before Kosovo declared independence to remove such prisoners and guards because of the danger of violence inside the prison. The Albanian prisoners and guards were a small minority in this prison in the heart of north Mitrovica and their continued presence there might well have endangered their safety as well as that of the other prisoners and guards. Indeed the prison was next to site of the UN forced arrest of Serbs at the north Mitrovica courthouse one month later and could have also been sucked into that debacle and cleansed the hard way.

Lastly, it may be instructive to note the apparent glee provoked by the passage by the Kosovo Assembly of two laws for state administration, the Law on Civil Service and Law on Payment of Civil Servants. Infopress reported that “these two laws now get rid of UNMIK Regulations based on which the civil service functioned so far.” While one may hope that this is for the better, it must still be noted that according to UNSCR 1244 all such Assembly acts after February 17, 2008 are illegal raising questions about anyone acting under 1244 – including EULEX by the November 2008 agreement with the UNSC on status neutrality – seeking to impose them.

Kosovo: Sometimes It Is Good to Listen

The government of President Tadić has two lead officials for Kosovo: Kosovo Minister Goran Bogdanović and State Secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanović. Both men come from northern Kosovo and both have tried to work with the international community and at times with the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo institutions. To one extent or the other, they have also been at odds with the more "radical" northern Serb leadership. They have carried the water for Tadić on Kosovo attempting both to represent Serbia's refusal to accept Kosovo independence while also seeking to find ways to cooperate with the EU on matters such as police and customs in the interest of Belgrade's effort to gain EU benefits.

As noted here before, President Tadić does not have the political space in Serbia to simply give Kosovo away to the EU no matter what it offers. When the Albanians press hard - as in the recent electricity cut-off - or when the EU too blatantly acts in a one-sided, pro-Pristina direction, it undercuts his efforts to try to find ways to cooperate with the EU under the radar. Bogdanović and Oliver (this distinguishes him from another prominent northern Serb Ivanović) consequentially walk a fine line and sometimes talk on both sides of the coin. But when their message is clear and to the same point, it is worth listening closely. This may be one of those times.

Both men have been speaking to the press recently, especially to the local Serb outlets in Kosovo. Last week, Bogdanović made Belgrade's position clear in referring to the European Commission calling on Serbia to be more constructive on Kosovo: “We are prepared to be constructive to the point where it does not endanger our national interests in Kosovo.” Responding on EU pressure to be more accommodating on customs and the courts, he said "We cannot consent to having cases tried under the laws of the so-called state of Kosovo, and to have Albanians as judges in northern Mitrovica, or have the income collected from the administrative crossings go towards the Kosovo budget....The income must go to the Serb community in Kosovo, and the court and judges in northern Mitrovica must operate using laws that existed up to 1989...[and] the jurisdiction of the courts has to be known." Bogdanović made clear that Serbia is ready to cooperate in this way.

Speaking a few days later to local press in Mitrovica, Bogdanović addressed the electricity issue noting that people will have to start paying for it and the government remained ready to discuss the issue with KEK. Oliver Ivanović labelled the disconnection of electric power to the north by KEK "politically motivated." and that it should have not happened. He pointedly noted that electricity in the north and the hydro planto at Gazivode Reservoir (in the north) are sensitive issues -- with possible security implications - which need to be discussed. He warned that if such politicization continues, tensions will rise and conflict could ensue. Oliver called on UNMIK to mediate negotiations.

Ivanović noted suggestions that KEK - with the support of EULEX - might have planned to seize the electrical substation at Valač (Zvecan) supplying the north with power arriving from outside (from the south or from Serbia). He noted that if such an attempt were made, it could itself provoke a clash as Serbs would seek to prevent it. He too suggested discussion on electricity, perhaps at the technical level between the Serbian and Kosovo power companies. Living in north Mitrovica himself, Oliver also reminded of the possibility of clashes over the return of Albanians to the sensitive Brdjani area accomplished under a NATO/EULEX umbrella.

The new EU envoy to the north should keep these words in mind. He may find the pair seeming a bit more cooperative in private but the Minister and State Secretary know quite well how far Belgrade can go and what the danger points are in the north.

Kosovo: The Mixed Up EU

As noted here before, the record of Western Europe on the Balkans suggests a lot to make up for. Thus it is all the more ironic that the EU has chosen the heart of the Balkans - Kosovo - to field its first big solo "peacekeeping" mission. Peacekeeping is difficult and sensitive work and is made more so if it is combined with forcing a particular political outcome in a contested area. The EU mission in Kosovo has made clear its one-sided mandate to support the institutions of the "independent" Kosovo. Adding further complexity is that the EU itself is divided on Kosovo independence with five member states still refusing recognition while the other 22 have granted it.

The former German Chancellor reportedly now admits that recognition was in fact premature (and a result of US pressure). Germany was the first major European country to recognize a breakaway Yugoslav republic and one of the first to recognize Kosovo. Former Chancellor Schroeder's admission is therefore all the more significant. He went on to warn that the EU now threatened to undermine Serbia's pro-European government by going too slow on visa liberalization and greater economic cooperation.

Yet a divided EU nevertheless is pressing ahead to push Serbia to accept the loss of Kosovo. Speaking for the EU as current president, the Swedish ambassador to Belgrade appears to be setting as conditions for improved relations with the EU that Serbia agree to establish and recognize a border - with customs and visas -- between it and Kosovo as well as cooperate on courts. The Ambassador denied that it was necessary for Serbia to recognize Kosovo before getting any EU benefits but the conditions he did suggest amount to the same thing. The EU continues to try to gain Belgrade's acquiescence to its taking possession of the north of Kosovo - so it can begin the process of turning it over to Pristina - by dangling visas and economic assistance. This will not be an easy task with the Albanians turning off the electricity and with President Tadić looking toward the horizon of approaching elections, maybe 2011 but also maybe sooner. The ruling government cannot be seen to be surrendering national territory and it remains to be seen if what the EU eventually delivers as "rewards" will be enough to win Tadić much support. Unless the EU is careful, overplaying its hand in Kosovo while underplaying it with Belgrade may indeed have the result Schroeder warned against. And also of undermining the peacekeeping mandate it assumed from the UN.

Kosovo: Hard to get it right

The ending of the Kosovo saga – beginning in the mists of history, passing through 1999 and now muddling through 2009 with both independence and not-independence – is nowhere in sight. Wrapping up the strange and unfortunate decay of Yugoslavia was perhaps never going to happen but through some form of anti-birth pangs. In this regard, one cannot help but juxtapose Germany’s recognition of Slovenia at one end and Kosovo at the other with its reported decision to return 14,000 refugees to the hands of the newly sovereign entity as soon as a formal agreement can be made.

This past week saw a perhaps unintended – though well-advertised – cutting of electricity from south Kosovo to the north. Maybe KEK meant it – and waited until after the UNSC debate on Kosovo to avoid embarrassing its patrons – or maybe it was the result of two power lines going bad and the need to reduce power on the third to avoid burning it out. Anyway, power was cut and the electricity company of Serbia – EPS – stepped in with a temporary and partial fix. It is possible to see this as another effort by Pristina and its five big brothers – otherwise know as the Quint – to press the northern Serbs into surrendering to its control. The Albanians have used this tactic to good effect in the south, against Serb enclaves and monasteries there. The pressure is now on to push as many Serbs to take part in November’s local elections as possible. The Quint apparently sees nothing odd in using electricity cut-offs as winter approaches to enforce an outcome still not sanctioned by the UNSC, which actually legitimized NATO involvement in, and UN - repeat UN - administration of, Kosovo in the first place. Ironically, in the 20th Century, the EU operated on Kosovo within the context of the UN and now in the 21st has become a law unto itself.

It is also possible to see the current situation as a simple matter of making people understand they need to pay for electricity. The northerners – as with most Kosovars until very recently – have gotten used to not paying for the power they use. Unregulated usage means ever-growing usage. Since power is not unlimited – from KEK or EPS – there has long been a need for the discipline of customers paying for what they use. EPS started talking to UNMIK about reaching an agreement to collect fees from the Serbs and pay KEK for the power back in 2007. But the then UNMIK leadership was uninterested in anything which would entrench a “parallel institution,” meaning any that was not controlled by the Albanians in Pristina. Some of these people remain on the job.

EPS – known locally as Elektro-Kosmet – has decided to take the bull by the horns and has announced it will start reading meters next week and deliver the first bills on November 1. The EU – which claims it is looking for a new office in the north (and not calling it the ICO) so that it can help make things continually better – has lots to prove to overcome Serb skepticism. There is still the open question of the Albanian land grab in Brdjani and the reluctance so far to work with the northern locals to reopen the courts. (The EU appears fixated on pushing the Serbs to accept having both Serbs and Albanians working in the court enforcing God-knows-what law, Serbian, Yugoslav, Kosova, or UN.) Working with Belgrade so that EPS can play this crucial “sub-contractor” role would be a start. But the EU must keep in mind that real peacekeeping – as opposed to imposing one-sided political agendas – means moving step-by-step to build confidence. Using electricity to push Kosovo institutions on those who still reject them would be the opposite of peacekeeping and not at all status neutral.