North Kosovo Referendum - Not binding, No Surprise But It Changes Everything

Through two days of cold, snowbound weather, the Kosovo Serb community north of the Ibar River went to the polls February 14-15 to vote in a "referendum" with one question - do they accept living under Pristina authority or not.  According to local figures, of some 35500 eligible voters, 26725 voted with 26,524 (99.74%) of those saying "no."

The north Kosovo referendum had no legal character and called for no actions.  It was a poll on popular sentiment, an effort to refute charges that only "criminals" and "extremists" reject the "benefits" of rule from Pristina.  Its results were no surprise.  Yet politically, it changes everything.  It makes clear that the northern Kosovo Serbs reject the imposition of Pristina's institutions that has been the centerpiece of Quint policy for Kosovo since 2008.  The determined and peaceful resistance, since last July, to efforts to impose Kosovo customs in the north plus this poll mean that any effort to change circumstances on the ground would have to be implemented through force.  And force would not work, it would generate violence and full partition or ethnic flight.  In any case, NATO and the EU have no stomach for it.  After the poll, it must be clear that the policy of seeking to subject the north to Pristina has nowhere to go. 

The referendum also shows that the current government in Belgrade cannot force events in north Kosovo either.  Despite all its huffing-and-puffing, the northerners withstood the pressure and held their vote.  No matter how much President Tadic might want to make a deal with the EU to give up the north, it is clear he could not enforce it.  Even if he were willing to cut off funding for the north, politically he cannot (and the northerners would likely find a way around that anyway).  If Belgrade arrested northern leaders to force their community to surrender, that would split the Serbian electorate and not change anything on the ground.  The way to impose Pristina institutions does not pass through Belgrade.

The vote also helps make clear that the negotiations are going nowhere.  Tadic cannot make deals that he can enforce, not with the north and not during the current election campaign.  Pressure on the Thaci government from its critics - most notably Self-Determination and Albin Kurti - likewise means Pristina cannot make and enforce compromise deals, such as on regional representation.

All this clearly suggests that either a deal must be struck on the north acceptable to the Serb majority living there or the conflict will remain frozen.  There is no other choice.

It may remain a frozen conflict.  The key players could be more comfortable with the current situation than anything that might replace it.  Pristina gets to continue to claim the north as an integral part of Kosovo.  With its international agents - the ICO and EULEX - it can have an office just north of the Ibar - with its "municipal preparation teams" - and continue to fly its customs officers to the northern crossing points.  That the office and teams do nothing and that the customs officials man unused crossing points does not lesson their slight but still useful symbolic value.  The Quint gets to pretend through its "negotiations" that it is still working on the problem.  They also get to use the Pristina-Belgrade "dialogue" to keep President Tadic on edge for the next few months over EU candidacy.

Tadic may not enjoy this outcome but it could be argued that Serbian policy on Kosovo - guided as much by what Washington and Brussels wanted as anything else - brought Belgrade to this end.  It gave away its leverage with everyone as the Quint tried to extract too much, too quickly and gave him nothing in return.

All in all, the most stable outcome within reach may be the continuation of the current status quo.  Perhaps over time, with some patience, a way can be found to regularize the situation.  But that would mean recognizing that the northern Kosovo Serbs will not accept being governed from Pristina.  That much must be clear by now.

Kosovo: Referendum, barricades and EU Plans

The snows are piled deep throughout the Balkans leaving many stranded and dealing with the cold and electricity shortages.  Scores have died including an entire family - minus a young survivor - in an avalanche in southern Kosovo.  But Kosovo issues seem not to be taking any winter leave with a vote due this week in the north on attitudes towards Pristina, continued focus on the Kosovo Serb barricades and EU consideration of the continued role of EULEX.

The northern Kosovo Serbs says that they are ready for their "referendum" to be held February 14-15.  It will reportedly ask for a "yes" or "no" response to a single question:  "Do you accept the institutions of the so-called Republic of Kosovo?" Much has been made of this vote - essentially a poll unlikely to produce much surprise and with no legal or operational result.  Now, the UN has jumped into the fray - reportedly saying the vote is contrary to law and that UNMIK will have no role in it.  But the Kosovo police plan no special measures and KFOR's concerns seem more about the vote provoking violence against Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar.

Against the general backdrop of EU and German pressures on Belgrade over Kosovo, the International Crisis Group braved the snow and cold to travel through the north to look at the barricades there.  ICG found official crossing points open but unused with travel continuing across the boundary through alternative routes.  ICG's conclusion:  "Trying to use issues like freedom of movement – or the rule of law – as tools to change locals’ minds about sovereignty issues, rather than as ends in themselves, just damages the tool. The dispute isn’t a technicality and cannot be resolved as though it were."

Meanwhile, the Pristina newspaper Zëri reports that UNMIK appears to have negotiated a "gentleman's agreement" to allow EULEX access through the barricades.  UNMIK reportedly told the paper that it was "actively engaged" in discussing "unconditional freedom of movement" in the north with "northern Serbs, as well as officials in Belgrade" alongside KFOR and EULEX efforts to do the same.  No details but perhaps the "gentleman's agreement" allows EULEX to travel on the assumption they would not be conveying Kosovo Customs to the boundary crossings?  In its trip report, however, ICG reported that the northerners are still watching the roads.

There is further reporting on the EU's plans for "reformatting" the EULEX mission later this year "taking into account the progress made by Kosovo authorities in the rule of law and the needs of changing the mission."  This would be in line with plans announced by the Quint last month to move toward ending "supervised independence" of Kosovo.  A spokesman for Prime Minister Thaci told BalkansInsight that "we expect that in regions like in Mitrovica and Prizren, no EULEX police officers will be stationed due to the good performance of the police…[and] the same goes for customs."  Such changes would seem to take EULEX out of its peacekeeping role in the north - where it has taken the UN's place on crucial rule of law issues including the police, courts and customs.

So far there is no indication that the EU will consult with the UN on its plans or that the UN is considering how it may have to take back the responsibility for rule of law it transferred to EULEX in November 2008.  When asked for comment, a senior UNMIK official replied that the mission will "report to the Secretary General and Security Council on any such plans/actions, analyzing their potential implications - both in terms of the provisions of UNSCR 1244 and the Secretary General's six-point plans, as well as the hitherto critical international oversight of the rule of law sector."

Finally, it is worth looking closely at comments by KFOR Commander, General Erhard Drews.  Under Drews, KFOR has backed away from its confrontational approach to imposing Kosovo institutions in the north and has recently said it considers the local leaders there legitimate interlocutors.  In talking about Belgrade's influence over the northerners on the referendum, Drews reportedly explained that the interests of northern Kosovo Serbs "do not coincide with Belgrade's interests any longer."  He noted that "compromises Belgrade was making did not suit northern Kosovo Serbs."  This seems accurate and a long overdue recognition by the Quint internationals.  Pressure on President Tadic over EU candidacy cannot change reality on the ground in the north.  Therefore it must aim at something different.

Kosovo: Another Attempt to Abolish UN in the North?

The Pristina press is reporting on secret meetings between the Kosovo government, the US ambassador and ICO chief Pieter Feith on a new plan to push the UN out of the north.  According to Koha Ditore, the three have agreed to close the UNMIK Office (UAM) that administers north Mitrovica under UNSCR 1244.  Koha Ditore says it has the document, titled "Kosovo Government carries over the financing of the municipal services in the north from UAM to AONM."  It refers to an action plan aiming at the closure of UAM by March 31 and its replacement with an "Temporary Administrative Office for North Mitrovica" (AONM) under the authority of Pristina and to be placed in the mixed neighborhood of Bosniak Mahalla.  The plan is said to contain 10 actions which were due to begin implementation early this month.  Space and equipment for the AONM were to be secured by February 10 with a meeting with the UNMIK SRSG on the 17th to inform him that the Kosovo government would cease funding UAM.

What exactly the Quint and Pristina may be planning, and how far along they, are remains unclear.  The leaks to the press could be a bluff, feint, or trial balloon.  But a Pristina think tank has just published a paper fleshing out what could be the plans being considered.  KIPRED's paper - "A Comprehensive Vision For The North: The Final Countdown" is a professionally done effort to prod the Kosovo government and its international supporters to undertake ten actions to overcome the status quo of "criminals and extremists" in the north.  KIPRED calls for imposing its "non-negotiable" plan there "supported politically and operationally by EU, USA and NATO."  The actions include forming transitional local governments for the four northern Serb-majority municipalities, withdrawal of "parallel security institutions," imposition of Kosovo courts and police in the north supported by EULEX and KFOR and closing UAM.  KIPRED requires as well that the Ahtisaari Plan be implemented as it is.

KIPRED criticizes the EU, EULEX and NATO for not doing enough to bring the north under control by now and notes the failure of the ICO "northern strategy" in 2010.  It welcomes the recent efforts by Germany to pressure Serbian President Tadic to give up the north and applauds Pristina's effort last July to seize the northern boundary posts with its special police.

Putting this all together, and supposing where there is "smoke" there is at least some "fire," there could be less here than meets the eye.  It may well be that Pieter Feith and the departing US ambassador want to leave on a "high note" of providing for Pristina the framework for a virtual administration for the north.  Koha Ditore reports that the Kosovo government will inform UNMIK that it is stopping its funding of UAM.  This would essentially "cut off the nose to spite its face" because the funding has helped all communities there and has kept open one of the few institutional linkages between north Mitrovica and Pristina.  Diverting that funding to a new office in the "safe" part of north Mitrovica would change little on the ground but help Pristina claim a presence there.  Belgrade funding for the Serbian municipality for north Mitrovica would not be affected.  UAM might lose its current role but under UNSCR 1244, UNMIK must retain an office there as it does in the other three northern municipalities.

It would be another matter, of cource, if the Quint was ready to impose the other elements of the KIPRED plan.  This could only be attempted through force and vigorous repression by KFOR and EULEX.  But this would most likely lead to conflict and perhaps partition through violence.

Perhaps the Quint and Pristina are relying on their pressure on Tadic to lead him to surrender the north to get EU candidacy.  They have not been as vocal as Belgrade about next week's referendum in the north.  Perhaps they would find the vote a convenient excuse for Belgrade to cut funding for the northerners - public salaries and such - to force them into Pristina's arms?  It is difficult to see Tadic paying the political costs for that and it is far from certain that the northerners would simply give up.

This may all be a shadow game to increase pressure on the Serbs - especially those in north Kosovo - before getting serious about negotiating.  It must be clear by now that the only peaceful solution available will be that gained through dialogue and compromise.

On Twitter as DeaconBlue1103

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Kosovo: Short Interview with Blic on Local Elections

For general interest, I repeat here the entire original interview I gave Blic on Serbia holding local elections in Kosovo: 

Q. If Serbia decides to, respecting its Constitution, organize local elections in Kosovo, how would it reflect to its international position, especially on Serbia`s relations with EU (ed Germany) and possibilities to open political talks about status of northern Kosovo?

A decision by Serbia to hold local elections in Kosovo might well irk some of those countries supporting Kosovo independence.  The hardliners - such as Germany and the US - might see in this a failure to meet their conditions for EU candidacy including dismantling "parallel" institutions.  Others might, however, understand that President Tadic would have a hard time disregarding the constitution and would pay a political cost for appearing to abandon Serbia's claim to Kosovo.  Seems most likely that there will be local Serbian elections in places in Kosovo where there are concentrations of Kosovo Serbs. There is no reason, however, that any dispute over elections should justify delay in organizing talks on the north.  Indeed, talks on a special status for the north are necessary in order to find a way to bring practical benefits to the people of Kosovo despite the continued differences over status.
 
Q. EU is expecting that Belgrade dismantle parallel institutions and according to Resolution 1244 Belgrade can`t organize local elections without cooperation with international community. How both facts can be synchronized with Belgrade desire to continue with gaining status and eventually the date of starting negotiations and preserving the north of Kosovo?

As I suggested, there seems little room for the Serbian government to not hold local elections in Kosovo.  Where there are Kosovo Serb communities, the elections can probably be held without much involvement of the internationals.  Where an international role could be very important would be in finding a formula for holding the elections in a way that preserves status neutrality as well, such as holding them also under the UN flag or through OSCE or perhaps by UNMIK extending the mandates of the current assemblies.  As the International Crisis Group noted in its recent report, it is vital that the Kosovo Serbs in the north have elected local leaders - accepted as legitimate by everyone - who can take part in discussions about the future of the north within Kosovo.  The northerners have proven, by their determined, peaceful resistance on the barricades, that they must be part of any successful effort to resolve the status of the north.

Q. If Belgrade decides not to organize local elections on northern Kosovo would it weaken its position for negotiation on status of northern Kosovo?

In truth, a decision to not hold elections there would probably weaken Belgrade's position more than holding them would.  It may be that there is nothing Serbia can do short of surrendering Kosovo to Pristina that would move Germany to agree to granting EU candidacy.  Giving up on local elections now would declare, in effect, that the local governments there are no longer legal even under Serbian law.  This would not change anything on the ground in a way the EU would probably like.  It would more likely start a train of events that would produce immediate political effects and could even incite the other side to again try use of force.  It would be destabilizing and might well lead to violence and/or ethnic flight (and not just in north Kosovo).  Keeping a path open for negotiations requires that a formula be found to avoid a dispute over local elections in the north, not by canceling them.

Kosovo: ICG Report Key Recommendations

The International Crisis Group has traveled some distance on Kosovo over the last few years.  The latest report follows recent ones in noting the need to find a compromise approach to the north.  It begins:

A violent standoff in northern Kosovo risks halting Kosovo’s and Serbia’s fragile dialogue and threatens Kosovo’s internal stability and Serbia’s EU candidacy process. Pristina’s push to control the whole territory of the young state, especially its borders with Serbia, and northern Kosovo Serbs’ determination to resist could produce more casualties. Belgrade has lost control and trust of the northern Kosovo Serb community, which now looks to homegrown leaders. The international community, especially the EU and U.S., should encourage Belgrade to accept the government in Pristina as an equal, even if without formal recognition, but not expect it can force local compliance in northern Kosovo. All sides should seek ways to minimise the risk of further conflict, while focusing on implementing what has been agreed in the bilateral technical dialogue. They should build confidence and lay the groundwork for the political talks needed to guide a gradual transformation in northern Kosovo and eventually lead to normal relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

Its key recommendations include:

To Both Serbia and Kosovo:

-- Agree on a mutually acceptable process to ensure that persons elected as northern Kosovo officials are viewed as legitimate by all parties.

-- Complete technical preparations, gradually implement the agreement on integrated management of border crossing points (IBM) with EU support and normalise traffic through customs gates 1 and 31.

To Kosovo:

-- Abstain from operations to assert authority over the North in the current environment and without preliminary agreement of all concerned.

-- Engage with all elected representatives of the northern Kosovo Serb community without preconditions and without derogatory rhetoric against local leaders.

To the International Community:

-- Do not in the current environment and while Kosovo and Serbia are talking remove barricades or attempt to change the reality on the ground in northern Kosovo by force.

The ICG also calls on both sides to continue to engage in dialogue and on the Serbs to bring down the barricades.  ICG says it visited the barricades and found that "they have broad local support despite persistent charges by Pristina, internationals and even Belgrade that thugs man them."

ICG notes that EULEX started ferrying Kosovo customs officials to the boundary in September on orders from EU foreign affairs chief Ashton.  But the ICG fails to call on EULEX to begin acting in a status neutral fashion and stop transporting Kosovo customs to the northern boundary until the formula for joint presence agreed by Belgrade and Pristina can be implemented.  Without such commitment by EULEX, the northern Serbs are likely to continue their blockade.

ICG believes that northern Kosovo Serbs "should not be disenfranchised" but should have "elected officials Pristina, Belgrade and the international community accept as legitimate."  But to finesse the question of holding Serbian local elections this year, ICG recommends that UNMIK "extend the mandates of existing municipal officials or conduct a vote under its own or OSCE authority."

The ICG notes the existence of a "middle option" between the expectations of the two sides for integration or partition - the "Ahtisaari Plus" special autonomy.  But it says that "there are no easy solutions."  Any agreement would have to be implemented gradually and would likely require "an executive international presence to mediate and enforce what is agreed for several years beyond the lapse of the ICO and EULEX mandates elsewhere in Kosovo."

The complete ICG report can be found here.

Kosovo: Meanwhile in Pristina...

Two short items from the Pristina side:

The EU has a new chief in Pristina, former Slovenian Foreign Minister Samuel Zbogar.  Interesting choice, an official from the place where Yugoslavia started ripping apart to oversee the EU's effort to rip one last piece.  (One may be forgiven for wondering if Berlin's hand has shown itself again.)  Zbogar's first comments with his new hat suggest he will be a smarter, smoother version of Pieter Feith.  He reportedly sees his job as to bring the "country" of Kosovo as much into the EU as possible.   Zbogar believes Kosovo's biggest challenge is "regulating relations in the north."  As he sees it, "there is fear of Kosovo among the Serbs, which is why they feel the need to self-organize and isolate themselves from the rest of Kosovo" while "there is the Albanian population which sees Kosovo as an integral country, but has no access to its north. (emphasis added)"  According to Zbogar, this "must be overcome as soon as possible."

Suggesting that the Kosovo Serbs in the north have "self-organized" is a strange way to put it, as is describing the Serb-majority north as belonging to the "Albanian population."  The northerners might believe that they have been organized all along within local Serbian institutions and that their communities belong to them.  But of course, the EU is not status neutral.

EULEX is supposed to be status neutral in its handling of its UN-derived mandate for rule of law.  The mission will be re-organizing this year.  But despite Pristina's calls for an end to "supervised independence," EULEX chief de Marnhac told his staff on January 27 that it will remain even after its current mandate ends in June. He said there will be cuts - including in international and local staff - but "in all likelihood ... EULEX will continue in Kosovo after June 2012, it will still exercise some executive powers and MMA [monitoring, mentoring and advising] will continue to be a fundamental part of its mandate."

It remains unclear if EULEX will also continue to seek to impose Kosovo institutions in the north or will consult with the UN on any further changes in its approach.  And if EULEX limits itself to MMA, who will do the peacekeeping?