Recent Blogging on Transconflict

My recent pieces posted by Transconflict:

Fear and Loathing in Kosovo - May 20, 2013

Kosovo:  More Negotiations - May 9, 2013

Kosovo:  Belgrade Moving Too Fast? - May 3, 2013

Kosovo:  What Should the Northerners Do? - April 29, 2013

Kosovo:  Implementing the Agreement - April 25, 2013

Kosovo:  Some Hope But Bigger Dangers? - April 21, 2013

Kosovo:  What Next from Pristina and Friends? -  April 15, 2013

Kosovo:  So What Is Plan B? - April 5, 2013

Kosovo:  Talks Need Not Remain Stalled Over Courts and Police - April 4, 2013

Kosovo:  Is Belgrade Seeking a Republika Srpska - March 28, 2013

Kosovo:  Painting Into a Corner - March 25, 2013

Serbia, Kosovo and EU Enlargement - March 12, 2013

Kosovo:  Remembering what the Ahtisaari Plan says - March 7, 2013

Kosovo:  Trust and Distrust -  Feb 20, 2013

Kosovo:  What About North Mitrovica? - Feb 13, 2013

Peaceful Change in the Balkans?  - Feb 5, 2013

Kosovo:  An Approach to Settling the North Emerging? - Jan 24, 2013

Albanians play the "Greater Albania" card over north Kosovo  - Jan 15, 2013

Belgrade's Platform for Kosovo - Jan 4, 2013

Kosovo:  The UN Role in the North - Dec 17, 2012

Kosovo – the EU still looking to bully Belgrade?  - Dec 14, 2012

Kosovo:  Still a battle for the North? - Nov 30, 2012

Kosovo:  Stuck in the same old places? - Nov 23, 2012

Kosovo:  What's so special about borders?  - Nov 5, 2012

Kosovo:  Belgrade plays smarter but still with nowhere to go?  - Oct 22, 2012


Archive of my TransConflict pieces here.

Kosovo: What Does Ashton's Entry Foretell?

Can't resist another word as I watch the EU continue its clumsy effort to force Serbia forward on Kosovo.  Will keep it short however.

In the past few days the ever heavy-handed Germans have suggested that Serbia will have to enter into a "legally binding" arrangement with Pristina and to dismantle "parallel" Serbian institutions in north Kosovo in order to get accession talks with the EU.   This comes after repeated hints that EU Chief Ashton will take the lead role in future talks between Belgrade and Pristina and is trying to arrange a meeting between Serbian President Nikolic and Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci during this month's UNGA.

Someone asked me what I thought about Ashton's entry into efforts to find a negotiated compromise between Serbia and Kosovo.  I replied that unfortunately, it suggests simply more EU efforts to bully Serbia but at a higher level.  Since it will be at a "higher" level, Brussels will likely expect quicker, "better" results and behavior from Belgrade.   This essentially means Serbia giving up the north and somehow "recognizing" the loss of Kosovo. 

I suspect that Nikoilic - despite his clear desire to find a way out of the Kosovo/EU box - will not be able to go as far and as quickly as the EU expects by deigning to raise the dialogue to the Ashton level.  This is likely to lead to mutual frustration and to renewed trouble on the ground as the Quint finds it impossible to simply give Pristina everything it wants on its own terms.

Enough said.

Kosovo: KFOR Caught in Own Device

Since last year, the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR) has been moving back and forth from peacekeeper to enforcer of Pristina "rule of law."  At times it has sought to force the northern Kosovo Serbs to open their communities to "freedom of movement" that had been abused by Pristina sending its special police (ROSU) into the north to wreck havoc.  It has also - most recently this week -sought to corral the northerners, into using the "official" boundary crossings manned by Kosovo customs, by closing alternative roads.  The Serbs responded with road blockages and refusal to submit to Pristina.  They also had to withstand several confrontations with armed NATO troops.  KFOR's actions go well beyond peacekeeping and have instead raised tensions and endangered the peace.

NATO is in Kosovo under a UN peacekeeping mandate, UNSCR 1244.  But KFOR serves the political agenda of the Western countries - led by the US and EU - that supported Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.  The current commander of KFOR, German General Erhard Drews, seemed to understand early on in his tenure that military solutions to the political problem of the north were not available.  Nevertheless, he no doubt must serve the orders of his political superiors.  They appear to see KFOR - and EULEX - as the means to continually press the local Serbs, to intimidate and wear them down and to test Belgrade's willingness to make them "behave."  No matter that this has not ended the northern resistance.  KFOR - and EULEX - keep jumping outside their UN mandate in order to force Pristina's political agenda on the north.

The press today is reporting that Drews has now said that the barricade on the north side of the Main Bridge over the Ibar River must be removed.  This is one of the last major barricades to remain in the north.  The northern leaders say they will not take it down until KFOR can guarantee Pristina won't use its access to launch new forays into the north.   KFOR has refused to make such a commitment and the Serbs have seen EULEX repeatedly seek to use its access into the north to support imposition of Pristina controls there.  The northern Kosovo Serbs simply do not trust the internationals to carry out their responsibilities in a status neutral manner, as required under the UN mandate.

All this comes at a sensitive time in the lead-up to possible new negotiations on Kosovo status and the north.  The Quint countries supporting Pristina may be trying to squeeze the Serbs - and mollify the Albanians - by stripping the north of its physical and psychological defenses.  Apparently, Drews made his comments in the context of a  meeting with the Albanian mayor of south Mitrovica.  The mayor is always complaining about lack of "rule of aw" and "freedom of movement" in the north, by which he means international protection for unilateral Albanian moves into the north.  Drews dutifully called the barricade a "shame" and said it must come down as the city is "ready to exist as a unity."

Now Drews must know - KFOR has people on the ground who tell him - that the Kosovo Serb community of north Mitrovica is not ready for unity with the Albanian south.  They are aware of Albanian designs for their territory.  They will not accept KFOR demands unless KFOR undertakes a clear commitment to keep Pristina's police and officials on the south side of  the River.  This Drews appears unable to do.  But he did reportedly note that "the removal of firm political symbols by military means is not good."  He suggested that the beliefs of those who set up the barricade "cannot be changed" by the military and that past efforts to try "removal of political symbols by military means did not yield good results."  Indeed.

KFOR has repeatedly stepped outside its legal role in order to attempt to impose political agendas on the north.  This is not a good precedent for NATO's use of UN peacekeeping mandates but the Quint may hope no one is noticing.   However, it is good that General Drews has come to draw the line at using his soldiers to endanger rather than protect the peace.  Hopefully whoever commands KFOR will hold that line.

Kosovo: Opening gambits?

A few weeks ago, two top officials of the US Department of State European Bureau visited Belgrade and Pristina.  I speculated at the time that it might be part of a US-led Quint effort to re-orient its approach to settling the issue of north Kosovo.  Perhaps the Quint had finally taken on board the fact that efforts to impose Pristina's rule north of the Ibar through intimidation and use of force simply would not work.  So some compromise might be in the works, something going beyond the current form of the Ahtisaari Plan.  The US would have to take the lead because only it could bring Pristina forward from it's maximalist stance of getting everything on its own terms.  Now perhaps we are seeing - repeat, perhaps - opening gambits from both sides. 

The new government in Belgrade has suggested it is ready for serious negotiations and wants first to reach an internal consensus on what Serbia's bottom lines in Kosovo are.  It makes sense to clarify, openly, Serbia's real achievable goals vis-a-vis Kosovo.  It'd be a good start.  President Nikolic and other members of his government have covered this "approach to an approach" by reaffirming that Serbia will never recognize Kosovo independence and with an offer by Nikolic to provide autonomy to Kosovo within Serbia.  The latter cannot be taken as anything but some protective smoke thrown over the possibility of reaching some more realistic accommodation with an independent Kosovo.  Pristina, of course, was quick to reject any such within-Serbia formula.

The more interesting development may have come from the Pristina side.  According to press there, Pristina will offer "new concessions" to the north to include increasing the number of Serb seats in the Kosovo Assembly, tax amnesty for citizens in the north and the Serb Orthodox Church, and adding another Serb representative to the Consultative Council for Communities.  The four northern municipalities would also be able to set up a special association with its own Assembly and would deal with management of the funds allocated to them from the Kosovo budget, Serbia and the international community.  Four senior officials would be appointed for police, culture, education and religious affairs, and for economic development and infrastructure to coordinate projects in the north.  The northern district court would reflect the population in the north and judges and prosecutors in the north would be appointed in accordance with UNSCR 1244.  Internationals would man customs at the northern Gates with funds collected in the north going for projects there.  These later elements would reflect the approach suggested by the UN Secretary General in 2008.

Pristina has been quick to call "ridiculous" the press reporting of this new package.  But it may be a trial balloon or something leaked by internationals trying to nail Pristina's feet to the proposal.  The proposals themselves - if seriously put forth at some point - would be worth considering.  The special association for the northern municipalities and the district court reflective of the ethnic composition in the north are nothing new.  They are contained within the Ahtisaari Plan.  But it is nice to see them spelled out.  Making clear that the association would manage the county budget and police through it's own four appointed officials suggests an important element of self-rule.  An agreement to deal with the northern boundary and customs in a status-neutral manner would be an important step.  The extra seats for Serbs in central institutions is an additional sweetener for northern Serb participation at that level.  Along with those south of the Ibar, that could make Kosovo Serbs a significant political force in Pristina.

The new "concessions" do not make clear what role exactly Pristina would have vis-a-vis the north.  How much control, for example, would it have on outside funds before they reach the north.  Could it overrule local decisions on local matters?  How about flags?  As the Albanian flag is allowed to be raised in Kosovo, would the Serbian? And would an international mission remain to help ensure implementation?  Many details would need to be fleshed out and agreed. But it would be a serious opening offer.

Some in Serbia and the north may cling to the stand that Kosovo remains part of Serbia and always will.  However strongly and righteously felt, this leads nowhere.  If Serbia waits for history to reverse itself, it will never move forward.  It must cut the anchor of Kosovo free.  A continued frozen conflict might serve the interests of some, but it is a drag on the great majority.  A compromise that allows the north to remain functionally as part of Serbia, while also part of Kosovo, offers a way forward, as would redrawing the border.  Both Serbia and the north Kosovo Serbs need to think seriously about their future and how best to serve their own national and local interests.  It's about time to start doing so. 

Kosovo: The March 17, 2008 Debacle

On March 17, 2008, the UNMIK leadership in Pristina authorized an effort by UNMIK Police (UNMIK-P) and KFOR to "re-take" the north Mitrovica courthouse occupied by local Serbs the week before.  I was the UNMIK Regional Representative in Mitrovica, responsible for the area north of the Ibar.  Those of us on the ground in Mitrovica - including in the UN Police and KFOR - warned our leaderships of the possible consequences of an armed effort.  We were seeking to find a solution through dialogue.  UNMIK HQ rejected our concerns and the chance for dialogue.  I warned DPKO (our UN New York HQ) but it refused to intervene in the Mission's decision.

On the 17th, an UNMIK policeman was killed and many people - civilians and internationals - seriously injured.  The UN Secretary General ordered an investigation by a senior international judge.  While his report was not released to the public, it generally confirmed our warnings from the field and was critical of the actions of the UNMIK leaders.  They were let go at the end of their contracts in June of that year.

On the morning of March 18th, I prepared a report on what I termed the "debacle" of the previous day.  I sent it widely, including to UN HQ in New York.  I was concerned that the leadership planned another action and I wanted to make clear the position the action of March 17 had created.  My report led to efforts by Pristina HQ to remove me from my position that same day.  DPKO intervened and I went on scheduled leave.  While I was gone, my report was passed - without permission of any kind - to the Serbs by a junior UNMIK staff member.  He may have thought he was doing good to show that not all internationals supported the use of force.  The northern Kosovo Serb leaders provided that report to the press.

I have never myself publicly acknowledged the leaked report or released it.  I do so now - full text below - to underline at this sensitive time for Kosovo and Serbia the potential costs of any effort to alter the situation on the ground in the north through use of force.  It is entirely possible to find a compromise approach to the north.  But this can only come through efforts that eschew use of force and give greatest weight to the views of those who live north of the Ibar.  As it is clear that Kosovo cannot return to being part of Serbia, north Kosovo cannot be ruled from Pristina.  Neither side can claim possession of the other.  But perhaps some form of co-existence within Kosovo can be achieved.

March 17, 2008 – After Debacle Report

Yesterday's ill-conceived operation to "restore law and order" in the north has led to the disappearance of law and order in the north.   The choice of the day -- March 17, the 4th anniversary of the last episode of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, one against the Serbs -- and the decision to arrest and transport the Serbs to Pristina seem almost designed to inflame Serbian sentiments.   If on another day, police had simply asked the people to leave the premises rather than sought to detain them as well, we might have been able to declare victory without cost.  (As it was, the people in the court apparently left the building without resisting.)



Where we now stand:



People have suffered loss of life and limb.

There is now no UNMIK in the north due to security concerns except for some IPOs in the far north and on the boundary (or so I'm told).  Whether and when UNMIK and UNMIK-P can go back safely, especially into north Mitrovica, is unknown.

Forced to choose sides, apparently at least one KPS officer fought against internationals (and was shot). Our ability to hold KPS in the north is now an open question.  Additionally, north station KPS has apparently been emptied of equipment by KFOR.  Our ability to return to local policing -- essential if the IC (international community) is to avoid becoming an occupation force -- is in grave doubt.

While KFOR has "assumed primacy" in the north, security in north Mitrovica is spotty at best. Someone has put barbed wire and over-turned garbage containers at the north side of the Main Bridge to block it.  There was no KFOR there, at Three Towers or at the mixed boundary area in the heart of Bosniak Mahalla when I drove through this morning.  The only thing keeping Serbs and Albanians from possible clashes appears to be their mutual self-restraint.  (It is positive and worth noting that during yesterday's events, the Serbs did not harass or attack the northern Mitrovica Albanians and cooperated with UNMIK on extraction of our civilians.)

In sum:

KFOR is not a police force, there are now no official police in the north.  There is no IC supervised law and order.

Credibility and relationships essential to our peacekeeping role in the north have been severely damaged -- perhaps beyond repair -- by the apparent cavalier way we in the Region were overruled -- or as many Serbs will see it, complicit -- in Pristina HQ's decision to use force while the Serbs had been honoring -- yes, in their own way -- relations with UNMIK and KFOR under 1244.



Lessons learned:

The Serbs will resist with force any effort to use force against them in order to achieve political objectives which they see as requiring recognition of Kosovo institutions or "independence."

We suspect some in the IC thought we were simply too close to the Serbs to see they were bluffing.  Now we can all see that they are determined, well-organized and well armed.

The northern Serb community -- whether they like Marko and Milan or not -- will rally around their "radical" leadership if directly challenged.  The reaction to any attempt to arrest them would be fierce.


Police are a poor instrument for imposing political objectives.  KFOR even more so.  Police-KFOR coordination leaves much room for improvement.  At one point, KFOR was blocking the retreat of UNMIK-P (apparently in order to not be left alone in north Mitrovica?).

In sum:

It should be clear that use of force to achieve political objectives associated with status will not work.  As we have said many, many times before -- maybe we bored some people -- use of force will only lead to destabilizing violence that likely only accelerates partition or unleash further ethnic cleansing and conflict.  This should inform the UN's further decisions on customs, courts, railroad, elections etc.



What to do:



There must be some act of UNMIK (or UN) contrition or recognition of the mistake we made if we internationals are to have a chance to move past the anger and resentment among Serbs and seek to re-engage with this community.

We've seen signs of willingness for continued dialog, during the events and from the northern mayors.  The Mayor of Leposavic told us they all met with Minister Samardzic yesterday and they all agreed on their continued interest in cooperation with UNMIK.  We will look into the possibility of putting our UNMIK staffs back at least into Zubin Potok and Leposavic and perhaps proceed in stages.  The hard nut to crack will be north Mitrovica.  We are unsure how to proceed until an UNMIK presence can be returned.  And we don't know how the locals will react now to any effort to form the new municipality under UNMIK in a regulation signed by the SRSG.  (The Serbs blame him for the violence and can be "petty" in this regard.)  When we have a message from the UN to pass, one that expresses whatever we have to say to explain our behavior and suggest we have learned something, we can test the waters.  Until we have something to say, there is no use talking to the SNC north Mitrovica leadership at this time.

UNMIK-P also needs to be able to say something to their local contacts in order to begin a dialog about returning to northern Mitrovica.  This  is urgent.  We cannot leave the current policing vacuum. The longer it  remains, the harder to reinsert our police. Special efforts must be made urgently to provide north Station KPS all the support they need to return to effectiveness.  The prospect otherwise may be sooner or latter "other" police fill the space we've vacated.

The Albanians need to be clearly told to leave the north to us.  "Get on with your lives and stop threatening violence."  (We've heard PM Thaci  tells people that he is having "trouble controlling the Drenica guys.")

UNMIK cannot take actions to simply please either side but must deal with realties it finds north and south.  We did not annul the UDI because we could not prevent it.  In the same way, we cannot enforce its recognition on those who reject it.  Not only do we not have the moral or legal standing to use force, but it doesn't work.  "Shock and Awe II"  did not work.
Jerry Gallucci


RR Mitrovica






Kosovo: When the Elephants Make Love...

There's an old saying in Africa - where people have learned the hard way - that when the elephants make love, the grass gets trampled.  Meaning, when the big chiefs get ready to be serious with one another, the little people better watch out.  This could be the season for getting serious about settling the still open Kosovo status issue, so everyone on the ground needs to be cautiously patient.

I've speculated before on whether the impasse over the last year - Quint efforts to use KFOR and EULEX to force the northern Serbs to accept rule from Pristina vs determined peaceful resistance by those same local Serb communities - may have brought the US and EU to accept the need for compromise.  The Kosovo Albanians seem to fear it while the new government in Belgrade is clarifying - and toughening - its starting position. 

A possible sign of impending seriousness about resolving the question of the north through talks is KFOR's renewed "trampling of the grass."  In the past few days, KFOR is again seeking to block alternative roads from Serbia into the north to force the northerners to utilize instead the "official" crossing points manned by EULEX and Pristina police and customs officials.  This has not worked before.  But in Pristina, this is seen as enforcing "rule of law."  In reality, it is NATO taking sides, seeking to impose Pristina institutions north of the Ibar.  This may be in part a test of the new Serbian government.  KFOR reportedly is even appealing to Belgrade to please help corral those bothersome northerners by unblocking the Serbian side of the official crossings.  Citing its UN mandate to "maintain a safe and secure environment," KFOR closed alternative roads to commercial traffic and now "calls on responsible authorities to intervene to stop the illegal blockage of commercial traffic north of Gate 1 (Jarinje) on the Serbian side."  To again be clear, these KFOR actions are well outside its UN mandate  Enforcing Pristina customs in the north is not a military role for the NATO peacekeepers. 

But KFOR's actions also seemed aimed at tightening the grip on the north before any serious talks get underway.  The recent visit by the mayor of South Mitrovica to the sensitive Brdjani area of north Mitrovica - EULEX and/or KFOR most likely provided security - is part of this effort to remind the Serbs who is in control.  (This in line with the Potemkin Pristina office for north Mitrovica recently planted on the north shore.)  Pristina is also heralding an "agreement" with Brussels to put EULEX under the Kosovo constitution instead of UNSCR 1244.  This can only be a slightly veiled threat of more EULEX efforts to impose Pristina rule in the north.

The new Serbian government is not taking any of this lightly.  The head of the new Kosovo office - Aleksandar Vulin - suggested that KFOR's action endangers peace and is aimed at putting the Serbs under pressure before any talks.  He also took on more directly the Western demand that Belgrade remove its "parallel" structures in Kosovo by making clear that the only real "parallel" institutions in Kosovo are those of Pristina.  Serbian institutions, he said, would remain.  According to Vulin, Serbia will also emphasize more UNSCR 1244 and the views of those on the ground.  The new government wants the UN directly involved in future talks, a request now echoed by Security Council member Russia.

So, it seems the two sides may be positioning themselves for talks.  KFOR's actions in the north may be just the Quint's strange form of foreplay?

Kosovo: How Should We Take Albanian Threats of Regional Instability?

The aptly named "Kosovar" Institute for Policy Research and Development based in Pristina released earlier this month a paper entitled Autonomy for the Northern Part of Kosovo: Unfolding Scenarios and Regional Consequences.  While presented in an overtly dispassionate and "objective" manner, it is actually a warning that if Pristina is not handed the north on its terms, there will be trouble. 

KIPRED notes that efforts to implement the Ahtisaari Plan have failed in the north.  Little has been accomplished since the effort to impose Pristina institutions there, begun with the action last July by Kosovo special police.  Barricades are now down, but KIPRED notes that the Serbs remain ready to renew them at strategic spots while their "parallel" structures have not been "dismantled."  Western plans to help former President Tadic win reelection failed and the new government is likely to demand more than his Four Point Plan to settle the north. The Quint is in a hurry to settle and expects to be able to do so later this year through agreeing with Serbia on a plan going beyond Ahtisaari - the "Ahtisaari Plus" option - that minimizes Pristina's influence there. 

KIPRED suggests that anything more than the Ahtisaari Plan as written will erode the "functionality" of the Kosovo state, negatively affect the southern Kosovo Serbs and lead Albanians to seek to change the status quo.  The southern Serbs would suffer from increased pressure from local Albanians and loss of prospects for sustainability.  The Serb patrimony in Kosovo would be endangered.  Albanian nationalism would grow.  There would be population exchanges, renewed demands for Albanian unification and political instability in Macedonia and the Presevo Valley.

KIPRED concludes that "the Western powers are tired of the Balkans" and see relations between Serbia and Kosovo as "the last unresolved issue."  They mean to settle it through a normalization of relations short of mutual recognition.  The “price” will be autonomy for northern Kosovo.  KIPRED warns that this "solution" will create "a fertile ground for a complete redrawing of the current borders in the region" changes that "will not occur peacefully" but "set the stage for yet another international involvement in the next 5 – 10 years, with much less legitimacy and trust by regional domestic players and the people of the region."

Obviously, the Western powers - the US, the EU, NATO - should not be led astray by this clever repackaging of the traditional Kosovo Albanian ploy of threatening regional instability if they do not get their way.  It would be totally irresponsible for the Quint to accept any efforts to threaten or create such instability as a result of a compromise settlement for north Kosovo.  Western acquiescence to such threats - not a compromise over north Kosovo - would lead to instability.

More interesting is the fact that apparently the Pristina political elite is feeling Western pressure for compromise.  This suggests that the Quint's failure over the last year to impose Pristina on the northern Kosovo Serbs has finally led them to accept that force won't work.  Also noteworthy is that Kosovar hardliners still hope to be able to somehow stop their Western sponsors from pushing them to compromise.  The truth is that any solution of the north would leave the south better able to focus on its own problems.  This may be what the Albanians really fear; without the distraction of the north, then the leaders will have to answer for their corruption and mismanagement of the economy.  So take KIPRED with a large grain of salt.